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Abstract 
 
The regime change of 2003 transformed the media environment in Iraq from one that 
was strictly limited and monopolised by the state, to one without any restrictions 
imposed by state agencies. Gender culture and ‘family values’ have especially been 
contested as a consequence of the transformation of access to the media. The common 
assumption is that sexualised media content, and also the increasingly privatised nature 
of media technologies, are contributing towards the transformation of gender culture, 
with worries that Iraqi women in particular are turning into Western women and 
becoming estranged from their genuine Iraqi identity. The aim of this research is to 
investigate the nature of the evolving relationship between media and gender culture in 
post-Saddam Iraq. The importance of this investigation lies in the fact that since 2003, most 
research on Iraq has focused on war. This is also true of studies on gender relations. This 
research, however, focuses on other developments that happened as a result of the regime 
change, paving the way for struggles over many issues, including gender culture and Iraqi 
identity. The project was carried out using the qualitative method of semi-structured 
interviews. The interviews were carried out in Baghdad and Erbil, giving a perspective of 
the urban middle class Iraqi Arabs and Kurds on the subject. The research demonstrates 
that although the media provides windows for Iraqi women to distance themselves from 
prevalent patriarchal rules that control their sexuality, the ‘realities’ of local life have 
not allowed for the ‘Westernisation’ of gender relations in post-Saddam Iraq. Since the 
media is viewed as a threat to the sexual honour, an important element of Iraqi gender 
culture, there is a tendency to reassert this notion in the processes of the redefinition of 
the cultural identity of Iraqi people that was triggered by the 2003 war. This thesis offers 
new insights into gender relations in post-Saddam Iraq, focussing especially on the 
update on media in this period, and how this relates to the constitution of Iraqi identity 
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and gender relations in families. It also offers a re-working of the concept of ‘honour’; 
one that embeds this into an analysis of Iraq’s hegemonic masculine system. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1   Struggle for Identity  
 “My fellow citizens, at this hour American and coalition forces are in the early stages of 
military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave 
danger” (BBC News 2003). On the 20th of March 2003, with this sentence, the then US 
President, George W. Bush, announced the beginning of a war that changed the face of Iraq 
forever. As is clear from this statement, this war had some specific and clearly stated goals, 
one of which was to free the Iraqi people and transform the country into a viable democracy. 
During the years of occupation (2003-2011) the emancipation of the Iraqi people, and 
helping them to build a free, democratic and prosperous Iraq, formed an important part of 
US policy. For decades, since the time of President Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921), the 
promotion of democracy abroad has been an intermittent dimension of US foreign policy 
(Dalacoura 2005). In 1994 in his State of the Union address, President Bill Clinton stressed 
that as democracies never go to war with each other, the US needs to embark on plans for 
democratisation in non-democratic countries. He emphasised that promoting democracy was 
a pillar of his administration’s foreign policy (Mansfield and Snyder 1995). The 9/11 attacks 
in 2001, however, took promoting democracy as part of US foreign policy to a different 
level. Since these attacks, the Bush administration’s Middle East policy has clearly been 
based on democratisation. In his second inaugural address President Bush stated: “it is the 
policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and 
institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our 
world” (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 2006: I). This policy had two 
dimensions: one was an aggressive action towards terrorist groups in the Middle East and 
the regimes that helped them; the other one was the democratisation of countries in the region 
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in order to prevent them from harbouring terrorists. This was to help to defeat terrorist groups 
in “their ‘global struggle’ against the US” (Dalacoura 2005: 963). Now regime change in the 
form of military action was justified in order to spread democracy and to eradicate extremism 
and terrorism (Stewart 2005). Hence the aim of establishing regime changes in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. 
Gender equality has also been repeatedly stated as one of the goals and achievements 
of these wars. In 2004 “President Bush… hailed the liberation of 25 million women in 
Afghanistan and Iraq and vowed to continue promoting democracy -- especially in the 
Middle East -- so that more women can claim “their rightful place in societies that were once 
incredibly oppressive and closed”” (Chen and Reynolds 2004). Bush makes a comparison 
between women’s status pre and post war. For him, women’s status in Afghanistan and Iraq 
during the pre-war era was disastrous, and the claimed successes have been achieved through 
the process of democratisation that was triggered as a result of the war. As will be seen 
throughout this thesis, however, gender equality has certainly not been achieved in Iraq, as 
women are still subject to the continuation of forms of patriarchal authority and rules. In 
fact, women’s status has deteriorated in many areas as a direct result of the war and the chaos 
and insatiability that ensued afterwards.  
Creating a free media environment in Iraq was another important goal for the Bush 
administration. In a speech in 2005 President Bush stated, “all successful democracies are 
built on five common foundations, one of which is a “vibrant free press” that “informs the 
public, ensures transparency and prevents authoritarian backsliding” (Rohde 2005: 1). As a 
result of this vision, the Bush administration embarked on a $200-million-dollar project to 
establish free press in Iraq. This project, which was run by the Pentagon, was “the largest 
attempt ever by the United States, or any country, to help create independent media in 
another nation” (ibid). 
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Developments such as the above have made post-Saddam Iraq a particularly important 
era. The US project of ‘exporting’ democracy to the region, and especially the Iraq war, are 
unsurprisingly controversial matters. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) the 
stated goal of promoting democracy by the US has been met by outright suspicion, and 
American policy is viewed as a way of consolidating its hegemony in the region; to secure 
the precious oilfields of Iraq, and to help Israel to control the Palestinians.  
The counter view to this is that endorsed by those labelled neo-conservatives who see 
the promotion of democracy as a meaningful foreign policy goal for the US. In this regard 
Dalacoura argues that: “the Bush administration is serious about democracy, both as a 
pragmatic means of eliminating terrorism and as an ideal” (2005: 974). Whichever argument 
one believes in, there is a fact that cannot be ignored: America had big plans for Iraq. An 
important issue here is that the US has not been the only player in post-Saddam Iraq. There 
are other influential forces in Iraq that did not necessarily share the American vision for the 
country. During the period of Ba’ath rule (1968-2003) the regime managed to marginalise 
any forces that opposed its ideology. Everything was supposed to be strictly in line with the 
party’s objectives. All political, economic, social and cultural spheres were completely under 
the regime’s control, and any opposition to the regime’s ideology and policies had severe 
consequences. Even the influential institutions of religion and tribe were contained. Identity 
was key to Ba’ath policy. The country’s identity was determined by the leader and was 
enforced by a combination of propaganda and force. The main identity was Ba’athist, which 
contained tenets such as Arabic, socialist, progressive, ant-imperialistic, and so on. 
Embracing any other identities was considered to be treason and was severely punished.  
After the regime was defeated, many socio-political forces found a space to operate; 
they found themselves in a space in which a struggle concerning the identity of the country 
and the nation was going on. For years under various Iraqi regimes with ‘secular tendencies’, 
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and especially under Saddam, numerous religious factions in the country were either 
supressed or brought under the patronage of the regime. After the regime was gone, these 
forces erupted like never before in the history of modern Iraq. By and large they had a 
completely different vision from that of the occupation forces. Many allied with the Islamic 
regime in Iran. Iran, having been labelled as one of the countries of the ‘axis of evil’ by the 
Bush administration and threatened with US attacks, sent its forces and allies to ruin the 
US’s plans for the region, resulting in the proliferation of Shia militias (Petraeus 2007), 
which until this day exert great influence in Iraq. To make the scene more chaotic, the Sunni 
regimes and organisations in the region, particularly those of the Gulf, supported and 
sponsored the Sunni insurgency to counter the Shia surge in the country. This was seen as 
an important part of the puzzle of Iranian hegemony to dominate the region by forming ‘the 
Shia crescent’ (Eisenstadt and White 2005). The Sunni organisations had another reason for 
intervening in Iraq. They have historically seen the West, and the US in particular, as 
colonising and imperialistic forces that have always had plans to subjugate the Muslim 
Ummah (nation). In this regard, they are in agreement not only with Sunni militant groups 
such as Al-Qaeda, but also with the Iranian regime, and many other Shia organisations and 
militias in the region. Therefore, like the Iranian regime and its allies, they were also 
determined to destroy the US’s plans for Iraq. In this chaotic scene, the Syrian regime’s 
position possibly was the oddest of all. The Alawite regime that has traditionally been close 
to Iran (Alawites are considered by some to be a strand of the Shia sect) functioned as a 
corridor for the Sunni insurgency, particularly Al-Qaeda sponsored by Sunni regimes and 
organisations- the same regimes and organisations that later and after the revolution of 2011 
sponsored jihadi groups against the Syrian regime. All these forces, many of them at war 
with each other, agreed on one thing: the failure of the US vision for the new Iraq; a vision 
that the US was forcibly pursuing by sending tens of thousands of troops, and thousands of 
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advisors and contactors, and spending hundreds of billions of dollars on the reconstruction 
of Iraq.  
Soon after the collapse of the old regime, the debate over the identity of the new Iraq 
began. Was Iraq going to be a liberal democracy and an ally of the West, as the Americans 
wished, or was it going to be an Iranian style theocracy, or something else? The new 
constitution was at the centre of these debates. The role that Islam plays in the legal system 
of the country was one of the most contentious issues around the constitution, with some 
religious groups demanding that “Sharia be specified as the sole source of law” (Brown 
2005: 3). The secular groups in the country fought for a compromise in which Sharia is one 
of the sources of law, and the moderate religious groups agreed, provided that no law may 
be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of Islam. Instead, the secular groups 
secured articles that ensured that no law may be enacted that contradicts the principles of 
democracy, and the rights and basic freedoms stipulated in the constitution. The struggle 
over the identity of the country had begun.  
The impact of these on-going political struggles was not limited only to the political 
sphere, as the struggle over the identity of the country influenced all aspects of society, 
including the cultural domain. It is clear that the cultural trajectory of the country in which 
the ‘fate’ of the traditions, values and norms of the society is determined has been an equally 
important issue for many Iraqi groups. When traditions, values and norms are mentioned in 
MENA, sexuality and gender are always at the forefront. Gender relations turned out to be 
a contentious issue even before the processes of drafting the constitution started. In July 
2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) formed the Iraq Governing Council (IGC) 
with members from a variety of Iraqi groups. As all the legislative and executive powers 
were in the hands of the CPA, the IGC did not possess any real power and was appointed to 
provide advice to the CPA.  In December 2003, some of the members of the IGC decided to 
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transform a very important aspect of gender relations in Iraq. It is interesting to examine the 
extent to which gender is important for some groups, and that in the middle of the chaos and 
uncertainties that Iraq was witnessing at the time, these groups (mainly religious) turned to 
gender. The IGC passed a decree according to which the relatively progressive Iraqi Family 
Status Law of 1959, would be replaced by another law that regulated family matters under 
Sharia. “In times of upheaval, gender relations and gender identities become contested 
terrains as different political and social forces attempt to shape the future identity of the 
polity” (Al-Ali and Pratt 2009: 93). This attempt was not successful, but since then the same 
issue has surfaced several times, including during the times of the drafting of the 
constitution, triggering women’s rights groups to protest and pressurise political groups to 
prevent the change to the law. 
The battle for the cultural values and norms of the society did not happen only around 
the constitution and other laws. Religious militias started fighting this battle on the ground. 
Sunni and Shia militias across the country have been trying to impose their interpretation of 
Islam, as well as Iraqi culture on people, using force. The ‘democratic’ process meant that 
many of these militias have now partaken in formal state formation processes and have a 
clear presence in state institutions. From the parliament to the executive, the religious 
factions, backed by millions of votes, have exerted influence to shape post-Saddam Iraqi 
identity. Family values are considered a key part of Iraqi identity. Therefore, these groups 
are particularly sensitive to any transformation of gender relations in Iraq, as they see gender 
relations as a backdoor that the imperialist forces of the West are using to dominate Muslims. 
Therefore, they are keen to maintain ‘genuine’ Iraqi gender relations according to which the 
power balance is in favour of men, keeping women subordinate to men, staying at home and 
taking on mainly domestic responsibilities. They have been successful at imposing hijab on 
women in many areas in Iraq and have attempted to implement sex segregation in public 
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places such as universities and schools (Al-Ali and Pratt 2009). Tribal forces have also found 
the perfect environment to promote their vision of gender relations. The weakness and 
instability of state institutions has led to them being unable to protect people, and this has 
pushed them further into tribal alliances, consolidating the patriarchal structures in society. 
All in all, Iraqi society has been going down the path of conservatism since 2003.  
In this increasingly closed and conservative environment, there is another force that 
brings with it its own contradictions. After decades of absolute state monopoly over the 
media, the regime change of 2003 gave Iraqis a media environment which is rare to find in 
the region. This environment brought with it Western cultural products that are viewed as 
unhealthy by conservative sections of Iraqi society, particularly their values and norms 
around gender relations. Media technologies have introduced pictures and ideas that in many 
cases are radically different from what the conservative social forces consider to be 
legitimate and/or appropriate. In fact, there is a notion right across MENA that Muslim 
culture is under threat. The idea of a ‘cultural invasion’, which shares some tenets of the 
theories on cultural imperialism, is a popular theme in MENA. A quick Google search for 
this term (in Arabic ‘ اﻟﻐﺰو اﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓﻲ ’ and in Farsi ‘ ﺗﮭﺎﺟﻢ ﻓﺮھﻨﮕﯽ ’) will show hundreds of pages 
covering this topic. Religious websites and forums are particularly concerned with this 
theme. According to this viewpoint, after the West, and particularly the US, realised that the 
old-style colonialism is no longer effective, they turned to a subtler, yet cunning strategy to 
subjugate the Muslim Ummah by corrupting their moral values and making them adopt 
Western lifestyles. The secular ideologies of the West are injected into the minds of the 
Muslim people to strip them of their most important defence system- the religion of Islam- 
and leave them vulnerable to the West to be exploited. In an interview with Al-Khaleej 
newspaper, Sheikh Ahmed El-Tayeb, the grand imam of Al-Azhar, which is one of the most 
revered Sunni religious institutions in the world, stated that: “undoubtedly the Muslims 
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societies are target of a fierce cultural and ideological invasion committed by powerful 
media outlets” (Al-Khaleej, 2010). The Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 
repeatedly brings up the issue of cultural invasion. He warns against “the enemy’s plots and 
its comprehensive cultural, ideological and political invasion using all the tools against the 
Islamic Revolution” (Mehr News Agency 2015).  
One of the main areas that the West is focusing on in Iraq is gender and sexuality, 
according to this viewpoint. By imposing their sexually deviant attitudes on Muslim people, 
especially the Muslim youth, as well as their feminist ideologies which are seen as unnatural 
and harmful to women, the West is considered by some to be aiming to destroy the Muslim 
family, which is the bedrock of Muslim upbringing. In this comprehensive cultural and 
ideological onslaught, the media is the main weapon. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei also warns 
the Iranian people that hundreds of media outlets are working to negatively influence their 
culture; to encourage people to adopt a Western lifestyle (Entekhab 2013). People from 
different backgrounds have voiced their concern over the influence of Western cultural 
products, channelled by the media, on their culture and religion. Similar arguments have 
been heard from people in Iraq. Although the Iraqi government is largely indifferent towards 
this issue, religious leaders have shown their concern about the negative influence of 
Western/Westernised media products on their culture. They repeatedly warn people in Iraq 
that watching these shows will have a devastating influence, particularly on family relations. 
The most revered religious leader in Iraq, Ayatollah Ali Sistani, has issued fatwas (religious 
edicts) forbidding people from watching these shows. In response to one of his followers’ 
questions about watching Iraqi/Arabic/Foreign dramas, Ayatollah Sistani stated:  
 
Considering that these drama shows most probably include scenes that are not 
compatible with sharia and moral values, it is not permissible to watch them for the 
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purpose of sexual pleasure or if there is a fear of watching them for this purpose. If 
fact, it is an obligatory caution not to watch them even without the purpose of sexual 
pleasure (Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani; 9: اﻻﺳﺘﻔﺘﺎءات/ اﻟﺘﻠﻔﺰﯾﻮن  [Question 9/ TV]). 
 
As will be shown in Chapter Two, Ayatollah Sistani’s edicts are obligatory for his followers, 
who are in the millions. Media is also seen as a major factor in the rise in divorce cases in 
Iraq. The topic of the influence of media on gender relations appears frequently in the Iraqi 
media, with experts warning of the collapse of the family as an institution as a result of that. 
Protecting ‘genuine’ Iraqi gender identity, therefore, does not concern Islamic militias or 
religious leaders only. This thesis will show that ‘ordinary’ Iraqi citizens also feel that they 
need to protect their values that influence and organise gender relations in Iraq. For decades, 
under the subsequent regimes, particularly the 35 years of Ba’ath rule, values and norms in 
Iraqi society were strictly organised by the regime. The 2003 invasion brought about a 
‘democratic’ system in which the views of a variety of groups needed to be heeded to. This 
is clear from the struggle over the constitution explained above. Media, which was 
previously regulated in the strictest possible way, was suddenly a free environment, bringing 
with it all sorts of pictures and ideas. The government in Iraq, unlike other countries of the 
region, such as Iran, cannot or does not want to regulate this environment. Therefore, the 
Iraqi people, and especially men prompted by tribal and religious leaders, have attempted to 
take the matter into their own hands, as will be shown in Chapters six and seven. It is a 
struggle over the identity of the Iraqi people; a struggle around what kind of people Iraqis 
are and what kind of values they embrace. 
This, however, does not mean that people in Iraq simply avoid media technologies. On 
the contrary, satellite TV is very popular in Iraq and the extent of internet connections is 
increasing by the day. In fact, many religious parties and organisations in Iraq use media 
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technologies intensely to disseminate their ideologies; they have satellite TV channels and 
websites, and always try to keep up with new media technologies. These groups are not 
against modernisation and development; building a prosperous Iraq forms an important 
element of their narrative. They realise that without technology, including media technology, 
it is not possible to prosper in the modern world, so they want to adopt these technologies, 
but at the same time they want to do it without compromising the values and norms that are 
a crucial part of their identity, and here the conflict arises.  
The media environment in Iraq is a very important area to explore, not least because 
of the complexity of the settings in which it operates and the abrupt dramatic developments 
that have happened post-2003. There has been some occasional research carried out into the 
media environment in post-Saddam Iraq; the political economy of the media (see Al-Rawi 
2012), and on press freedom (see Kim 2011; Kim and Hama-Saeed 2008). However, there 
has been little research into media use and consumption in post-Saddam Iraq. The dramatic 
transformations in Iraq’s media environment have attracted very little attention. Therefore, 
this research sets out to explore this very interesting and less explored area. The area of 
media consumption and use will be investigated to examine how the various pictures, ideas, 
concepts, and so on are mediated through these popular technologies, and how they interact 
with the cultural values of the country. This is important because:  
 
The analysis of media systems in and of themselves is of limited significance. But 
examined as institutions within national and transnational processes of political 
liberalization and democratization, of social transformation and the emergence of 
gender equality, of economic globalization and pressures to fiscal modernization, the 
contradictory and ambivalent role of the media can become a significant analytic focus 
(Sreberny 2008: 18). 
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The ‘influence’1 of media on values around gender relations is of concern to traditional Iraqi 
institutions, but equally to the ‘ordinary’ people. As a result, this thesis focuses particularly 
on media and gender, which is a very important dynamic that, despite its huge significance 
for the Iraqi society and the wider region, has been largely ignored in the post-Saddam era. 
Amongst the media technologies that have been chosen to investigate are satellite TV 
channels, as well as the internet, which obviously can be accessed using a variety of other 
tools such as personal computers, mobile phones, and tablets. Satellite TV channels are very 
popular in Iraq. There are hundreds of free channels in Arabic (and a fewer number in 
Kurdish) available in Iraq. The cheap price and the diversity of programmes mean that 
satellite TV is able to reach a vast number of the population from a variety of backgrounds. 
Young and old, rich and poor, uneducated and educated, women and men, urban and rural 
people, can easily have access to the programmes that they want. However, the internet is 
less accessible; it is much more expensive, and it requires a certain amount of knowledge to 
be able to use it. Even so, it provides services that make it an interesting technology to study. 
The ‘privatised’ nature of the internet is one of the important traits of this technology. For 
example, it can make watching TV a much more privatised experience. Also, it enables 
people to interact with each other. This is particularly important with regards to gender 
relations, as enables people to evade the traditional boundaries of sex segregation. As a result 
of their popularity, availability, and the unique capabilities of the DBS and the internet, this 
thesis will focus on these two media technologies.  
 
                                               
1 The term ‘influence’ will be explained in later in this thesis. Here the term is used to reflect Iraqi traditional 
institution’s perspective on media. 
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1.2   Gender and Media in MENA 
In 1996, Annabelle Sreberny called gender one of the blind-spots of international 
communication studies (Sakr 2004). This is particularly true when it comes to gender and 
media in MENA. Since then, more attention has been paid to the field of gender and media 
studies in the region. Even so, there is a dearth of research in this area; in particular, empirical 
studies are hard to come by. Therefore, this research is an attempt to shed light on some 
aspects of this increasingly important field. The importance of this work also lies in the fact 
that very few studies have so far looked at the dynamics between media and gender in Iraq 
after the quick proliferation of media post-2003. In the broader region this expansion started 
almost a decade earlier. Although not enough attention has been paid to research into media 
and gender in MENA, some of the literature has highlighted various important aspects of 
this field. Some authors have looked at media to see if it has opened up opportunities for 
women that were not available before. Bearing in mind that media is part of the wider power 
relations in any society, the following questions seem to be essential in unravelling gender 
and media issues: To what extent is media an agent of change when it comes to gender 
dynamics? Is it an emancipatory force that helps women challenge patriarchal restrictions? 
Or is it helping to consolidate patriarchy, for example because the elites have better access 
to media and because old-established institutions that promote patriarchy can exploit media 
to reinforce and reproduce patriarchal structures, further dominating women?  
The satellite TV expansion that started in the 1990s, undoubtedly gave women in 
various MENA countries an opportunity to increase their presence in public spheres. Public 
spheres are restricted for citizens of MENA, due to the threat that the ruling elites feel from 
the public participation of their citizens. These restrictions are even more severe for female 
citizens, as the patriarchal structures in society prefer to push women into the private spaces 
of the home. In these societies, where the public sphere is dominated by men, TV has given 
 13 
women the opportunity to challenge gender norms and to enter spaces that were very difficult 
to enter in the past. One area is women’s presence as media professionals, such as reporters 
and presenters, and so on, on TV. With the arrival of satellite TV in the 1990s, women’s sex 
appeal was used to ‘woo’ viewers to the increasing number of commercial channels. Even 
so, successful female anchors and reporters reporting from war zones, and also on political, 
social and economic matters, defied the conservative gender norms of society that encourage 
women’s confinement to private spheres and female only environments. Their participation 
in an increasing dangerous media environment, where journalists have been killed across the 
region, set an example for other women (Sakr 2007). With the expansion of the media, came 
the inclusion of increasing numbers of women working in these outlets. Satellite channels 
certainly employ an increasing number of female workers, and some of them are producing 
programmes that explore very important, yet sensitive, gender-related topics such as 
domestic violence, sexual exploitations, polygamy, Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), and 
so on, which were considered taboo to discuss until recently. By discussing these matters 
and others, such as gender equality and self-determination, these shows give women a voice 
to discuss the issues that frame their lives to a great extent. In these programmes, female 
experts, professionals and commentators are invited to debate these important gender-related 
topics. In many cases viewers are allowed to contact the show via telephone, Skype or email 
to ask questions, or use social media platforms such as Facebook to comment on the debates. 
This has allowed women to comment on very sensitive issues, in many cases anonymously 
to avoid the possible repercussions of their comments. This is very important in achieving 
gender equality as “[a] big part of empowering women lies in ensuring that they have the 
means through the media to express their own opinions about inequalities on their own 
behalf” (Sakr 2004: 7). 
In societies where the narrative of ‘emphasised femininity’ presents women as feeble 
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beings, women’s success in the media environment was a message to women as well as men 
to believe in women’s capabilities and potential equality with men. In some cases, the 
presence of women as producers and editors has resulted in an increase in the number of 
women appearing as guests and contributors. Although conservative sections of society 
prefer gender-related matters to be dealt with through less visible traditional channels, the 
publicity of matters such as domestic violence, rape, and self-determination on satellite TV, 
with women talking about women’s experiences, has helped break the taboo around these 
matters and catch the attention of the public, encouraging more women to discuss these 
matters. Magazines and periodicals that were concerned with the ‘women question’ started 
raising these issues years ago, but their scope was much more limited than at the present 
time. The nature of the outlet and the fact that it was only used by a limited section of the 
population, due to high rates of illiteracy, especially among women in the MENA, limited 
their reach. New media technologies, however, provided an environment where a wider 
swathe of the population was now able to not only receive these messages, but also 
participate in the ongoing process of their production. It should also be noted that other 
socio-political and economic developments, such as the increase in women’s literacy in 
recent decades, in some countries in the region has also helped to increase the audiences for 
these programmes. These types of shows have, however, faced problems, and some of them 
have been taken off air due to a lack of interest from the audience, who prefer more 
glamorous talk shows rather than serious shows. As a result, in some cases, TV channels 
have created women-related talk-shows that are closer to a ‘chatfest’ among a group of 
women who have already gained some fame in the media in an attempt to attract more 
viewers (Sakr 2007). Over the past two decades, women’s access to media as the audience 
and their roles in media as professionals have increased, resulting in a more balanced 
representation in the media. One aspect, however, needs to be considered carefully. As the 
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increasing presence of women in media in the MENA is not matched with women’s presence 
in other spheres of society, this media presence “could actually have the effect of masking 
women’s absence from other positions” (Sakr 2007: 106). 
Nevertheless, media professionals are not the only group who have been able to 
capitalise on the expansion of media in the region. By using media technologies, women’s 
movements have also been able to challenge patriarchal norms by devising creative 
initiatives to increase women’s presence in the public sphere (Skalli 2006). The internet in 
particular provides a cheap platform for women’s movements to communicate, publish 
content, whether in the form of articles and statements, or activities such as demonstrations 
and workshops, and videotapes uploaded onto websites such as YouTube and shared on 
social media platforms such as Facebook. This makes the content available to women for 
free and with relative ease.  
The limited literature on media and gender in MENA shows that women (including, 
but not limited to, women’s rights activists and female journalists and media professionals) 
have been successfully using new media technologies to fight for gender equality. They have 
been raising awareness around gender-based injustices in their societies, encouraging 
women to be more active in the defence of their rights, while equally encouraging men to 
realise the injustices that occur due to male privilege. Women have used media, old and new, 
as the vehicle to put pressure on governments to tackle gender inequality (Sreberny and 
Khiabany 2004). Female media workers have been defying the patriarchal boundaries that 
limit women’s presence in public spaces to make their voices heard. This is a fight for the 
public sphere.  
However, the private sphere is not less important. This is an area that has been even 
less explored in MENA and particularly Iraq. Domestic environments are a very important 
site for patriarchy. In this research, therefore, the question of media and gender in Iraq is 
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extended to the private sphere to see if and how women’s media consumption and use are 
helping to change gender relations in post-Saddam Iraq. This is an interesting and equally 
important area to look at, because “the media provide an interface between the private and 
public spheres, through which the categories of public and private can be contested” (Sakr 
2004: 13). Also, it is important because gender and culture is an important element of Iraqi 
cultural identity that is viewed as being under threat from Western/Westernised media. The 
opening up of the post-Saddam media environment brought with it a variety of media content 
to Iraqi homes. Satellite TV, as a very popular and commonly used technology, has played 
a huge role in this environment. However, the internet with its increasingly privatised nature 
and unique capabilities is also important in introducing a wide variety of ideologies and 
pictures into homes, while enabling communication between people in a variety of ways. 
“[T]he very fact that broadcast media recognize no boundaries and can pass through borders, 
means that within private space women can increasingly access a range of images and 
information, to be viewed together or alone, to be reacted to or acted upon” (Sreberny 2005: 
64). This is also true for the internet. The goal of this project is to explore this dimension, to 
see how media is used and how media content is consumed by women, as well as what the 
implications of this usage and consumption are for gender relations. How Iraqi cultural 
identity is in play when women’s access to media post-2003 is considered, as the abrupt 
opening up of the media environment post-2003 is seen as a threat to Iraqi cultural identity. 
This is because the sexualised content and feminist ideologies mediated through satellite TV 
and the internet present an alternative to what is seen as the traditional gender culture. To 
put it simply, there is a sentiment that states that the media is changing women and causing 
them to adopt Western lifestyles. It will be argued that while media has indeed provided 
Iraqi women with alternative ideas about gender relations, and has also provided them with 
tools that enable them to partially bypass boundaries set by their male kin, this does not mean 
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that Iraqi women have embraced them or that Iraqi gender relations have been transformed 
as a result. Iraqi gender relations are rooted and promoted by what are perceived as the 
traditional values of society- values that are respected widely by men as well as women. 
Embracing these alternatives, which are portrayed in the media, means deviating from the 
values that form part of the Iraqi people’s morality, perceived as rendering them immoral. 
Additionally, the local ‘realities’ of the power balance give men the power to sustain 
patriarchy, mainly through controlling women’s sexuality. Simply being exposed to the 
media does not eliminate these power relations. On the contrary, as men see these alternative 
narratives as being available to their female kin, they may resort to their traditional gender 
relations even more so for fear of losing control over women. To explore these areas, this 
research will investigate the questions set out in the next section. 
 
1.3   Research Questions 
Based on what has been explained above, the overarching question in this thesis is:  
1. What is the nature of the evolving relationship between media and gender culture in post-
Saddam Iraq? The relationship between media and gender is multidimensional. On the one 
hand, “[t]he media are clearly instruments of modernity” (Sreberny 2005: 66), but on the 
other hand, Iraqi gender relations are greatly shaped by tradition. Media “can be harnessed 
for traditionalist purposes, used both to redefine and maintain tradition as well as to 
destabilize it” (ibid), but at the same time it introduces modern ideology, including those 
pertinent to gender relations. The dimensions of tradition and modernity, therefore, are key 
to understanding the relationship between media and gender in Iraq. This brings us to the 
second question:  2. How has tradition and modernity shaped Iraqi society? Then the next 
question is an attempt to understand the exact ways in which traditions and modern ideas 
have shaped gender culture in Iraq: 3. What factors have shaped gender relations in Iraq 
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since the overthrow of Saddam? Media consumption and use is a social activity and happens 
within the existing social dynamics. One of these social dynamics is gender relations. The 
next three questions are aimed at media consumption and its use in a gendered environment: 
4. How is media used and/or consumed in gendered domestic environments in Iraq? 5. What 
role does cultural identity play in this process? In this research, a question that is frequently 
asked in academic research on gender and media in MENA will also be asked: 6. Has media 
helped women achieve gender equality? This area will be addressed with regard to post-
Saddam Iraq. 
In order to find answers to these questions, an intentional effort will be made to avoid 
a media-centric approach. An attempt will be made to try to present a “thick description of 
internal processes” (Sreberny 2005: 55), while explaining the external forces.   
 
1.4   Research Rationale  
It is important to note that war, destruction, lawlessness and the resurgence of conservative 
ideologies are not the only stories in post-Saddam Iraq. Most of the literature on Iraq in the 
post-Saddam era, including gender studies, has focused on war and its consequences. No 
doubt the 2003 war has changed many aspects of Iraqi society, many for the worse, and 
therefore it is justifiable to focus on this very important development to try and understand 
Iraqi society. I argue, however, that there are other very important aspects of post-2003 Iraq 
that require attention as well and that overemphasising the impact of war at the cost of 
ignoring the internal processes and cultural contexts is a reductionist approach. Also, 
important developments happened ‘on the margin of’ all the war and destruction, and hence 
attracted less attention. These are important transformations that can potentially change 
many aspects of society, including gender dynamics. For example, in the realm of gender 
relations, women’s quota in the parliament and the local councils has helped a generation of 
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female politicians to grow in Iraq. This is a phenomenon that is happening for the first time 
in the history of this country. Another important post-2003 development worthy of attention 
is the rise of a middle class stratum. In the late 1980s, Iraq’s economy was in a dire situation 
after eight years of war with Iran. The occupation of Kuwait and the subsequent war and 
sanctions completely devastated the Iraqi economy, bringing millions of Iraqis to abject 
poverty (Al-Ali 2007). As shown in Chapter Three, the country’s revenue has seen great 
increase since 2003. Rampant corruption, mismanagement and continuous war and conflict 
hindered full scale economic development and, as a result, millions of Iraqis still live in 
poverty. Yet a large section of the society has benefited from the increase in government 
revenues. This is a development that may have consequences for gender relations in the 
country. Another development is the large scale migration that has occurred since 2003. The 
security situation and the insatiability of the country pushed millions of Iraqis to leave their 
country, expanding the already large Iraqi diaspora in the neighbouring country, but equally 
in Europe and North America. Such a diaspora inevitably introduces new cultural norms to 
the country, especially at a time when the internet facilitates the connection between people 
in different countries. The third important development that occurred as a result of the regime 
change in 2003 was the proliferation of the media in Iraq. This thesis focuses on this 
important development that has been largely ignored in all the noise around the war in Iraq. 
While acknowledging the impact of war at different levels, this thesis pays attention to 
cultural contexts in which media is used and consumed.  
 
1.5   Orientalism and Studying MENA 
It is always difficult to discuss social life in MENA and avoid the question of orientalism. I 
am not a Western citizen. I am from the country that I am studying, although I lived there 
only for the first two years of my life. I grew up in the neighbouring country, Iran. I am, 
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however, studying at a British institution, researching in English. I am also not sure if I am 
writing this thesis for the West. When I embarked on this project, I never thought that I 
would be writing for a Western audience. The main issue for me was to find answers to my 
questions. Some academics believe that “[as] long as we are writing for the West about “the 
other”, we are implicated in projects that establish Western authority and cultural difference” 
(Abu-Lughod 2001 :105). ‘The other’ is the key concept here. Am I writing about ‘the other’ 
or about ‘my people’? Who are us and them? Are we here talking about the West and the 
rest? I was raised in a society under an Islamic theocracy. I was taught using heavily Islamic 
materials both in school and at other institutions such as the mosque. The media content I 
was exposed to was also heavily Islamic. The society was greatly respectful of Islamic 
values. But at the same time, I grew up in a society with increasing urbanisation and literacy; 
within a developing economy with increasing speciality and division of labour; increasing 
individualism and heavy exposure to Western media. Am I a ‘product’ of the West, or the 
‘authentic’ culture of MENA? To what extent is it possible to talk about the West and the 
rest in an increasingly globalised world? Another angle in this complicated network of 
concepts is discourse. As a researcher at a Western university, heavily drawing upon ideas 
and theories developed in the West, am I relying on Western discourses to explain a non-
Western society? Or does the fact that I am bringing my own experience as someone from 
an Iraqi family who lived in Iran means that my research is ‘original’? When I am talking 
about gender relations, am I talking about values that I was socialised to respect and abide 
by? I know too well the consequences of ignoring these values in those societies. 
Additionally, I draw on interviews with people, the great majority of whom have never lived 
in the West and never learnt a Western language. Am I here falling into the trap of explaining 
social phenomena of an Eastern society, using a Western discourse that serves the unequal 
power-relations as a residue of the colonial era? These are surely very important questions, 
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which it is very difficult to find clear answers to. But for me, what is more important is what 
value system I, as a researcher, believe in. This is especially important when the research is 
about an issue deeply entangled with moral values, such as gender and sexuality. My value 
system will greatly shape my perspective on gender equality. If I, as a researcher, am a 
believer in the literal meaning of Islamic texts and think that Islam provides humans with 
the best guidance for happiness in this life and salvation in the afterlife, as millions of 
Muslims do, then I would agree that in some cases, determined by the Quran, a man is 
allowed to beat his wife. It is quite possible, then, that would I argue that gender equality is 
a human-made concept, that will ruin lives and families, rather than bringing them happiness. 
If on the other hand, I am a believer in Islam, but not in the literal meaning of its texts, like 
many Islamic feminists, I would try to find an explanation that is compatible with my 
understanding of gender equality and explain the verse in the Quran that talks about men 
beating their wives. But can this gender equality be the same as the understanding of a 
secular, supposedly Westernised person about gender equality? These positions will 
certainly alter the conclusions of any research into gender in MENA. The question here will 
be: is the researcher not Eastern because he believes in a version of gender equality that is 
mainly promoted by Western scholars and activists? Is he contributing to the discourse that 
helps consolidate Western supremacy by presenting Eastern religious values as being against 
gender equality and therefore inhumane?  
Having these complexities in mind in this research, an attempt will be made to avoid 
any stereotypical representation of people of Iraq. In order to achieve this goal, the richness 
of sociological studies in the West (many of them carried out by researchers originally from 
the region) will be brought together with the richness of the participants’ perspectives. An 
awareness of orientalist discourses will be maintained, with an attempt to exclude them from 
this research, bearing in mind that avoiding these discourses cannot be an excuse for shying 
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away from offering a critique of the local culture. In doing so, the complexities of gender 
relations in Iraq will be considered, and the flexibility and the fluidity of the concepts and 
values that form them. In addition, the diversity among Iraqi women and their agency will 
be appreciated, while always bearing in mind the structural restraints that limit their 
movement towards achieving equality.  
 
1.6   Summary of the Thesis’ Chapters 
In the rest of this thesis, the themes explored in this Introduction will be further developed. 
In Chapter Two, tradition and modernity in Iraq will be investigated, starting with reviewing 
the literature on modernity. It will then move on to give a historical overview of the processes 
of the creation of the Iraqi state and the struggle to determine the identity of the country. 
Through these processes the country has been exposed to modern ideas such as the nation 
state, nationalism, Marxism, and so on. Next, an account of the modern forces in Iraq will 
be provided, but mainly focusing on old-established traditional institutions in the country. 
Tribal and religious institutions yield a great deal of influence in Iraq. This chapter will 
unravel their power structure and explain in what manner they shape social life in Iraq. It 
will be argued that the simplistic dichotomy of tradition vs. modernity is not suitable for 
explaining Iraqi society, as both traditional and modern forces live alongside each other, 
creating a hybrid context. Chapter Three will focus on the media and globalisation. It will 
start with an overview of the literature on globalisation, before positioning post-Saddam Iraq 
in this globalising world. It will discuss the communication dimension of globalisation, 
putting the Iraqi media environment into the global context. It then moves to explore media 
environment in MENA. Chapter Four will shed light on gender relations in Iraq. It will 
provide a theoretical account of gender and patriarchy, particularly focusing on important 
patriarchal sites. It will then move on to explain the historical developments that have shaped 
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patriarchal structures in the region. It will give a historical account of the developments in 
gender relations since the establishment of modern Iraq in 1921. This section will focus in 
particular on gender relations in post-Saddam Iraq to explain how the opposing forces that 
were introduced to the country, as a result of war, shaped gender relations. In this chapter I 
argue that sexuality is the most important area of Iraqi patriarchy. I also argue that sexual 
honour is a hegemonic masculine system that works with other concepts and sites to sustain 
patriarchy. Unlike much of the research on sexual honour in MENA, I do not see violence 
as the most important dimension of sexual honour. I argue that this masculine hegemonic 
system relies on a variety of concepts and strategies to sustain patriarchy; these include the 
threat of violence, violence itself, and importantly, persuasion. A much ignored concept 
(‘ghira’, often translated as ‘jealousy’) will be introduced- a concept closely tied to honour 
in sustaining patriarchy. It will be explained in detail how hegemonic masculinity plays a 
vital role in constraining women’s sexual agency, and ultimately their agency in many other 
aspects of life, before moving on to show how other sites of patriarchy, such as violence, 
culture and state, work alongside sexuality to sustain patriarchy.  
My approach to the research is explicated in Chapter Five, where the methodology and 
the methods employed throughout the various stages of the research process are discussed. 
The aim of this chapter is to clarify the approach to qualitative research used, and it will 
argue that is a suitable method for media studies. Using data from the interviews, Chapters 
Six and Seven will focus on media use and consumption in post-Saddam Iraq. Chapter Six 
will show how media has become an integral part of people’s everyday lives, as Iraqi people 
embrace media technologies. It will be seen, however that the sexual content available in the 
media is usually rejected by Iraqis. This content is seen as damaging to Iraqi cultural identity 
as it is harmful to women. It will also be noted how messages that are sent through TV shows 
that focus on “women’s questions”, and also through entertainment shows, are seen as 
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encouraging women to enjoy agency and self-determination, and how they are a source of 
conflict. Additionally, the internet’s ability to facilitate women circumventing the limitations 
set by their male kin is seen as a threat to gender culture. Due to the wide-spread sexual 
double standards that limit women’s sexual agency, more so than men’s, the main concern 
is about women’s media consumption and use which has a sexual dimension to it. This is in 
line with the notion of Iraqi gender relations explained in Chapter Four. The last section of 
Chapter Six will provide evidence that illustrates how many of the values that Iraqi 
patriarchy draws upon are shared by Iraqi women as well. These are values that form the 
Iraqi identity revered by Iraqi men and women. This is why many Iraqi women reject the 
sexual content of what they call Western or Westernised shows, and also feminist values 
emphasising female agency and self-determination. I argue that this helps Iraqi patriarchy to 
successfully resort to one of the best strategies to sustain men’s dominance over women, and 
that is persuasion. 
Chapter Seven will discuss how Iraqi men respond to the ‘threat’ of the media. It will 
show how in a media environment that is ‘threatening’, their prerogative is to control 
women’s bodies, and in the absence of any government policy to mitigate this ‘harm’, men 
resort to their honour-based values and ‘rights’ to protect their cultural values. They try to 
domesticate the media to adapt it to the traditional cultural values of gender relations. In this 
regard, they use several strategies to ensure women are not exposed to sexual content that is 
seen as corrosive to their cultural values. I will then go on to demonstrate that media 
domestication implemented by men is not necessarily successful, and that Iraqi women resist 
it by bypassing the boundaries set by men to consume and use media. The data shows that 
this resistance is a source of conflict between men and women in Iraq. In these cases, men 
may resort to violence to sustain their control over women, although violence is usually the 
last strategy that men turn too. Women are complicit in maintaining patriarchy and, 
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therefore, men typically use persuasion as a less costly strategy to maintain their privileges. 
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Chapter 2: Modernity and Tradition in Iraq 
 
2.1   Introduction 
The modernity-tradition dichotomy has always been an important element in social enquiry. 
The birth of modern sociology is seen as an academic attempt to respond to the challenges 
of modernity that were emerging in parts of Europe during the 19th century. The processes 
of modernity, however, did not unfold only in Europe, as they are intrinsically global. Other 
parts of the world sooner or later were exposed to and influenced by modern currents and 
developments. Many of these non-European societies, such as societies of the MENA, were 
traditional societies that did not experience the types of developments that took place in 
Europe and that led to the advent of modernity. This, however, did not prevent them from 
being exposed to modern forces at social, political and economic levels. Since the late 19th 
century and especially after the British occupation of the regions that later comprised modern 
Iraq during the First World War, Iraq has experienced a situation where traditional forces 
exist alongside modern ones. The traditional institutions in the country were so influential 
that the British Empire had to recognise them and negotiate its plans with them, and in some 
cases give them especial powers to rule their areas. Since those days, Iraq, like other 
countries around the world, has witnessed colossal developments, many of which helped 
modernise different sectors of the country. This has led to a struggle over the identity of the 
nation that is still ongoing. Since the time of the establishment of Iraq, various regimes have 
tried to impose what they see as the true identity of Iraq. Communist, socialist, nationalistic, 
pan-Arab, Islamic with various strands, or a combination of these ideologies, were adopted 
and promoted by these regimes who all claimed that they planned to modernise the country. 
Moreover, almost a century later, the occupation forces led by the US had to respect the 
same traditional institutions and once again negotiate deals with them in order to achieve its 
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goal in Iraq. As an important aspect of this research is about gender, and since gender is an 
extremely sensitive issue that is very important for traditional forces in Iraq, it is inevitable 
that an investigation of Iraqi society should start by introducing its traditional institutions 
and forces. However, it is not possible to explore Iraq without considering its modern 
institutions or its links with modern processes such as globalisation. In order to understand 
contemporary Iraqi society, it is crucial to realise that although modern institutions are able 
to exert great influence, they are not the only preponderate force, as powerful traditional 
institutions rival those of the state. Therefore, this chapter will explain the dynamic between 
traditional and modern institutions in post-Saddam Iraq. 
In this chapter, it will be argued that Iraq has experienced a hybrid status where both 
traditional and modern forces co-exist together. They work together, they influence each 
other and, in some cases such as the lawlessness of the post-Saddam era, they eclipse each 
other. Different aspects of these modernising processes will be discussed, including ‘the 
beginning’ of modernity, what constitutes modernity, and whether the idea of modernities is 
a more appropriate concept for explaining the developments that have taken place in 
different parts of the world, including Iraq. The chapter will then proceed to shed light on 
the influential traditional institutions in Iraq and the way they function. Their role in Iraqi 
society will be discussed in detail, and how they shape different aspects of the society. First, 
aspects of the influential Najaf Seminary, one of the two most prominent Shia Seminaries in 
the world, will be illustrated, along with clarifying the basis according to which clerics are 
considered the legitimate traditional authority and are followed by millions of people in Iraq. 
Then, the second most influential traditional institution in Iraq will be addressed, namely the 
tribe, as the majority of Iraqi people have ties with tribes in one way or other. Tribal customs 
shape people’s lives in a variety of manners, and tribal chiefs are widely respected and able 
to exert great influence in all aspects of life in Iraq. In this section, the importance of the 
 28 
tribe in Iraqi people’s daily lives will be highlighted. In order to so, there will be a particular 
focus on the role the tribe plays as a customary judicial authority, rivalling the modern state 
courts.  
 
2.2   Modernity  
“..."modernity" refers to modes of social life or organisation which emerged in Europe from 
about the seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently became more or less 
worldwide in their influence” (Giddens 2013: 1). It was not until the Enlightenment in the 
eighteenth century that modernity was given a clear formulation. In this era “modernity 
became identified with industrialism and the sweeping social, economic and cultural changes 
associated with it” (Hall et al. 1993: 2) and modern institutions were consolidated (Giddens 
and Pierson 1998).  It has been extremely difficult to define exactly the characteristics of 
modern societies. Modernity theory has been given on a basic distinction from tradition; “it 
relies on a basic distinction between these [modern] social formations and ‘traditional’ 
societies” (Wagner 2003: 3). In this sense, it is implied that a ‘rupture’ has taken place that 
separates the modern era from the pre-modern or traditional times. However, it is very 
difficult to show exactly when modern societies of Europe actually broke with traditional 
social formations, especially as large sectors of European societies did not experience 
modernity well into the 20th century. The same is true about other modern nations that 
followed suit.  
A number of different historical processes, along with unique historical circumstances, 
gave birth to modernity. These processes were multidimensional, touching different aspects 
of society. On the political level, they meant the decline of the transcendental order and the 
rise of the secular polity, preponderance of bureaucratic authority through which rulers who 
were elevated to their position through the enactment of rational rules, regulations, statuses, 
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and laws are given legitimacy (Weber in Kalberg 2005). The rise of the nation-state and an 
international system of states amongst other developments are considered to be important 
processes that are associated with modernity. The emergence of a global dynamic and 
expansionist capitalist economic order based on private property with high levels of 
specialisation and advanced division of labour (Durkheim 1984) was the main process that 
took place on the economic level. The formation of classes, the rise of individualism, the 
growth of extensive administrative and bureaucratic systems of social organisation and 
regulation; the growth of materialist, rationalist and individualist cultural values; a shift from 
a religious to a secular culture, and also advanced sexual and social division of labour, 
happened in social and cultural life (Eisenstadt 1973; Hall et al. 1993). Another salient 
feature of modernity is its intrinsically globalising quality (Giddens, 2013). Globalisation is 
a process that started in the early stages of modernity, and it “continues to shape and reshape 
politics, economics and culture, at an accelerated pace and scale” (Hall et al. 1993: 4). This 
is an important characteristic of modernity that will be covered in detail in Chapter Three. 
Classic modernisation theory was centred on the idea of modernity as it developed in 
Europe, and the basic institutional constellations that appeared there would eventually 
prevail around the world. Marx, for example, famously stated: “the country that is more 
developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future” (Marx 
1954: 19 cited in Harrison 2003: 2). Emile Durkheim’s social solidarity theory in which the 
‘mechanical solidarity’ of traditional societies gives way to the ‘organic solidarity’ in 
modern societies with a highly specialised division of labour (Durkheim 1984) can also be 
placed in this category. It seems that this version of modernisation theory is no longer very 
appealing in sociological circles, not least because subsequent research and events have 
proven the linear, inevitable, irreversible version of modernisation theory to be problematic. 
This approach to the modernity thesis has also been critiqued by academics who see it 
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as Western-centric. They believe that although some general structural differentiations in 
social institutions took place in modern societies, in the structure of the family; economic 
and political structures; the introduction of mass communications; modern education 
systems; urbanisation, and the emergence of an individualist identity of people, different 
societies took different paths towards defining and organising these institutions. This 
viewpoint challenges the idea of modernity that is based on a “basic distinction between the 
social formations of ‘the West’ and ‘traditional’ or ‘pre-modern’ societies” (Bhambra 2007: 
3). 
As a result, this line of thought considers modernity not to be equal to Westernisation, 
and that we cannot talk about modernity; rather, we need to consider multiple modernities 
that evolved and are evolving in different parts of the world, each with its distinct 
characteristics (Eisenstadt 2000). These modernities that have appeared outside the West 
cannot be understood through concepts developed to understand Western modernity. In 
particular, they do not converge with modern Western institutional structures.  
East Asian sociologists have been particularly successful in shaping an alternative 
sociology of modernity. They argue that “modern Asian societies cannot be seen as ‘post-
traditional’, since modernization co-exists with the desire to retain ‘traditional self-identities 
in distinction from the modern West’” (Jackson et al. 2013: 669). Therefore, modernity is 
negotiated at a local level.  
The relationship between tradition and modernity in non-Western modernising nations 
is not necessarily similar to the experiences of the West. For example, “East Asian modernity 
has been built on a different history, with different cultures and traditions and also a different 
relationship between tradition and modernity” (Jackson et al. 2008: 6). It can be argued that 
the East followed the path take by the West in the modernising process. Yet, in order to 
preserve a distinct identity in relation to the West, it incorporated its tradition in modernity 
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and vice versa. This emphasis on a local distinction from the West is an important theme in 
this thesis, as Iraqis show an interest in modernising their society, while retaining their own 
‘traditions’ and identity and integrating them with modern ideas. Due to the important place 
that tradition retains in the East, these societies cannot be characterised as post-traditional; 
rather there is a “‘complex self-reflexive endeavour to position oneself [sic] for and against 
“European modernity” and “indigenous tradition”’ (Tanabe and Tokito-Tanabe 2003: 4, 
cited in Jackson et al. 2008: 6, Italic in original). 
Other scholars have also critiqued the idea of western modernity as endogenous to 
Europe; the idea that Europe is the ‘birthplace’ of modernity, from which travelled to other 
parts of the world. The problem with this thesis, it is argued, is that it does not consider the 
continuity of knowledge and ideas and presents Europe as an isolated part of the world, that 
was never in touch with, and hence influenced by, other civilisations. As Jackson argues 
“modernity itself is a product of historical interconnections between regions and nations 
rather than something that was originally endogenously European” (2015: 5).  
To emphasise the European origins of modernity is to ignore all the achievements of 
other civilisations that helped give rise to European modernity. The historical lands of 
contemporary Iraq, for example, introduced various human achievements in a variety of 
fields, from philosophy to mathematics, that was later used by European thinkers and 
scientists in further developing ideas, many of which are connected to European modernity 
(Falagas et al. 2006). 
The situation in Europe or East Asia, however, does not necessarily explain the 
situation in Iraq in terms of modernity. In Iraq, as will be seen in the next section, the story 
is completely different, since modern features live alongside traditional qualities in a hybrid 
manner that gives Iraq its unique condition. 
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2.3   Contemporary Iraq  
The Iraqi state came into existence in 1921. But unlike the modern nation states of Europe, 
its creation was not “forged by myriad contingent events from the loosely scattered order of 
post-feudal kingdoms and principalities” (Giddens 2013: 62) but rather by the disintegration 
of the three Ottoman Wilayas (provinces) of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, at the hands of the 
British and French Empires, and the creation of a new nation-state out of these provinces 
(Sluglett 2007). There was little modern about Iraq before its creation. Some limited modern 
ideas were introduced to regions that later constituted Iraq in the late Ottoman era. During 
the 19th Century, the rulers in Istanbul were convinced that their inefficient manner of 
dealing with Europe was due to the lack of central power in the empire, and that they needed 
a series of reforms to consolidate their power and to integrate the non-Muslim and non-
Turkish populations of the empire into Ottoman society. Between 1839 and 1876 these 
reforms, called Tanzimat (regulations), were introduced. The Tanzimat era is seen as an era 
of European modernity’s influence on the Ottoman Empire (Fattah 2009). “The principal 
aim of the reforms was to reassert the rights of the central government and to draw the 
provinces more closely under the control of the Imperial authorities” (Sluglett 2007: 164). 
Although these reforms were multidimensional, the main focus of Tanzimat was on 
modernising the military. In Iraq, conscription was introduced, though very limited in scope. 
It is estimated that by 1912, 1200 Iraqi officers were serving in the Ottoman army. During 
this period, a number of missionary schools were opened, delivering a broader curriculum 
that had strong emphasis on science, math and languages (Abdullah 2003). Printing press 
entered the country in 1860, and the steamship reduced the Baghdad-Basra return trip from 
one month to 10 days. In 1861, telegraph connected Baghdad to Istanbul. Some reform 
regarding bureaucracy and land ownership was carried out too. One of the goals of these 
reforms was to settle the nomadic tribes of Iraq. By the end of First World War, tribes were 
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an important segment of Iraqi society, especially in rural areas where 80% of the population 
lived. Modern industry was almost non-existent and the illiteracy rate was around 95% 
(Abdullah 2003). In general, Iraq was living in pre-modern conditions before the occupation 
of Iraq by the British Empire. This is when the first serious encounter with modernity in Iraq 
took place- when the British created a nation-state.  
 
2.3.1   Iraq: The Nation-State 
Modern Iraq comprises roughly of the area that was historically called Mesopotamia. For 
centuries, different people migrated and/or invaded and settled in this region; from the 
Sumerians, Akkadians, Babylonians, Greeks, Assyrians and Persians through to Arabs, 
Mongols, Turks and the British. However, the impact of the Arab invasion in the 7th Century 
has had a lasting print on the identity of the people of modern Iraq, for it brought with it the 
Arabic language and the religion of Islam and tribal norms, which until the present time have 
constituted important characteristics of the socio-political and cultural constitution of this 
country (Abdullah 2003). Additionally, four centuries of Ottoman rule in Iraq had a great 
impact on the shape of the new Iraq that was created by the victorious allies after the First 
World War. Also important is the influence of the British Empire and its legacy in 
establishing modern institutions in Iraq. 
Although the name Iraq has been used to refer to different regions during different 
historical periods (Abdullah 2003), the term was used to name this modern country created 
in 1921. According to the best available estimate, the population of Iraq at the end of the 
First World War was between 2.5 and 3 million. 75-80% was Arab, with Kurds the biggest 
minority in the newly established nation state. Islam was the dominant religion. Around 
ninety percent of the population were Muslim, from which 55% were Shia. Tribes formed 
an important segment of the society, especially in rural areas, where 80% of population lived.  
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In 1915 and during the First World War, the British Empire encouraged Sharif of 
Mecca2 to prompt a rebellion in the Arab lands3 that were at the time under the rule of the 
Ottoman Empire. In return for this rebellion, an independent Arab state in Arabia and the 
Fertile Crescent4 was pledged to the Sharif of Mecca. Whether this was supposed to be a 
unified Arab country covering all these territories or several Arab nation-states, is not clear. 
At the same time that the British were negotiating with the Arabs to help them organise 
the rebellion, the British negotiator, Sir Mark Sykes, was holding talks with the French 
representative, François Georges-Picot, on dividing Arab lands amongst themselves in the 
event of an Ottoman defeat. These negotiations, which took place between November 1915 
and March 1916, resulted in the Sykes–Picot Agreement. According to this treaty, territories 
that comprise today’s Syria, Lebanon and Mosul would be under French control. Equally, 
Baghdad, Basra and the territory stretching from this region to Palestine would be controlled 
by the British. Before these talks, British forces were already present in Basra (south of 
modern Iraq). When the Ottoman Empire decided to join the Central Powers in 1914, the 
British Empire decided to mobilise its forces in Basra to protect its communication routes 
and oil fields at the head of the Persian Gulf. By the end of the First World War, the British 
army had occupied most of the territories that constitute modern-day Iraq, including the three 
main cities of the region, Basra in the south, Baghdad in the middle and Mosul in the north 
(Marr 2012).  
In April 1920, the newly established League of Nations gathered at the San Remo 
Conference5 and decided that the Fertile Crescent should be divided into several countries. 
                                               
2 Sharif of Mecca was the steward of the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina. These two cities are located 
in modern Saudi Arabia. 
3 The term Arab land is opposed by some non-Arab minorities living in dominantly Arab countries such as 
Kurds in Iraq. This term is used in this thesis only to describe countries with an Arab majority population, and 
does not bear any ideological connotation.  
4 A region consisted of modern Iraq, Kuwait, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Palestine, and some parts 
of Egypt. 
5 The San Remo conference was an international meeting of the post-World War I Allied Supreme Council, 
held at Villa Devachan in Sanremo, Italy, from 19 to 26 April 1920. 
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France gave up its claim on Mosul that was promised in the Sykes–Picot Agreement. 
Therefore, a new nation-state, Iraq, comprising of the three Ottoman provinces of Basra, 
Baghdad and Mosul was born under the British mandate, with a promise that Iraq will 
eventually achieve independence (Abdullah 2003). 
The promise of independence in an undetermined future was not welcomed in Iraq, 
and the declaration of the San Remo Conference was widely denounced. In fact, this event 
gave momentum to the ever-increasing opposition to British rule in Iraq. In June 1920, a 
revolt broke out. The rebellion, a sign of new Iraqi identity and nationalism, lasted for three 
months, and affected all regions of Iraq and included Sunnis and Shias, urban and rural, 
Arabs and Kurds. Although this revolt was suppressed after the British used Air Force and 
other heavy weapons, and it did not succeed in expelling the occupiers, it did change British 
policy towards Iraq. It persuaded them to give away more power to the indigenous people 
of the region and was a blow to the Indian style of direct rule over Iraq implemented for 
some years (Abdullah 2003). As a result, the British high commissioner in Baghdad, Sir 
Percy Cox, set up an interim government and appointed Sayyid Abdul-Rahman al-Gaylani 
as its leader. 
In 1921 at the Cairo Conference6 the shape and identity of this new nation-state became 
clearer, and it was decided that a constitutional monarchy would be established in Iraq. In 
August 1921, Faisal, the third son of the Sharif of Mecca was appointed as the first king of 
modern Iraq. A new nation-state was born and the mandate was granted to Britain by the 
League of Nations (Marr 2012). In order to implement the new British policy of indirect rule 
in Iraq, the British authorities tried hard to keep Iraqi officials’ powers in check. This 
objective was supposed to be achieved through signing a treaty with Iraq that was ratified 
by the Iraqi Council of Ministers in 1922. The treaty that was to last twenty years, and it 
                                               
6 The 1921 Cairo Conference was convened in order to establish a unified British policy for the Middle East. 
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demanded that the Iraqi king consider Britain’s advice on all matters related to British 
interests in Iraq’s fiscal policy so long as Iraq was in debt to Britain. It also required Iraq to 
pay half the costs of the British Residency and other costs. In addition to that, Iraq agreed to 
assign British officials as advisors and inspectors in eighteen departments. The treaty, along 
with other British policies in Iraq, remained a source of resentment among Iraqi nationalists 
well throughout the life of the monarchy in Iraq. Iraqi nationalists perceived the new 
institutions as being a source of foreign interference, dependence and misery of the people 
of Iraq. 
In order to further secure its interests in Iraq, Britain resorted to another policy that 
was to influence the political as well as social structure of Iraq for years to come.  
Recognising the influence that tribal leaders enjoyed in these deeply tribal lands, the British 
authorities in Iraq made sure they had allies among them. For centuries, the Ottoman Empire 
faced serious challenges in expanding its rule over these areas. At the beginning of the 
occupation, the British were concerned about imposing order in vast rural areas. By pursuing 
this policy, they would prevent any assistance to the Ottoman Empire; equally, they could 
secure supplies for their army. To achieve this objective, they resorted to policies according 
to which pro-British tribal Sheikhs were given numerous powers in their territories in return 
for their loyalty to the British administration in Iraq. The Sheikhs were promised support 
and even arms, if necessary. Additionally, large areas of land were granted to these Sheikhs, 
creating a Sheikh-landlord stratum that was loyal to the British occupation. After an 
exhausting war, the British needed to decrease the number of their troops in Iraq and lower 
the expenditure. Ruling through loyal tribal chiefs was seen as an ideal way of exerting 
indirect power over a vast territory that was tribal-rural in nature (Efrati 2012). To make this 
plan work and to manage this alliance, the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation 
(TCCDR) was issued in 1916, and then reissued with some changes in 1918. In 1924 the 
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TCCDR became state law (Efrati 2012). TCCDR gave tribal chiefs judicial and 
administrative powers plus policing rights over their territories. It even gave them the right 
to collect tax (Abdullah 2003). The TCCDR “placed tribesmen in a separate system of law. 
It was designed to arrange for the speedy settlement of their civil and criminal dispute in 
accordance with tribal customs” (Efrati 2012: 21). As a result, citizens of Iraq were divided 
into two categories with two different legal systems. Rural/tribal people ruled under the 
TCCDR, and the urban population which was subject to civil and criminal courts, 
functioning through the Baghdad Penal Code enacted by the British in 1918 (Efrati 2012). 
The British policy regarding loyal tribal Sheikhs reversed the effects of the modernisation 
plans underway during the last phase of Ottoman rule, through which the power of tribal 
Sheikhs was gradually eroded. In addition to that, this policy greatly limited the state’s 
powers, because it helped the Sheikhs to gain near absolute power in their territories. They 
also managed to regularly secure parliamentary seats in dubious elections. Ironically, plans 
to transform the identity of Iraq into a modern nation-state were accompanied by the 
deepening of the influence of traditional authorities. Iraqi tribes had another source of power 
that helped them undermine the new Iraqi state, they owned an estimated 100,000 rifles, 
while the Iraqi government owned only 15000. The British government was reluctant to arm 
the Iraqi army throughout the years of mandate (Abdullah 2003). 
In 1929 the newly elected British labour government announced that it would end the 
mandate and would support the admission of Iraq into the League of Nations. This actually 
happened in October 1932. Although this development marked the end of the British 
mandate in Iraq and ushered in the independence of Iraq, British influence over Iraq 
remained high until the 1958 coup d’état that overthrew the monarchy. In order for Iraq to 
achieve its independence, it had to negotiate a new treaty with Britain. In 1930 the Iraqi 
parliament ratified a new treaty that was to last 25 years. According to this new treaty the 
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British mandate was abolished; however, Britain retained a right to all Iraqi facilities and 
kept all British advisors, although they were to leave Iraq eventually. Britain gained the right 
to veto all foreign policy decisions and a monopoly over training and supplying the Iraqi 
army. Britain also gained the right to use Iraqi territories in times of war. This essentially 
ended any possibility of neutrality from the Iraqi side in any future wars. The Royal Air 
Force was allowed to remain in two bases in Baghdad and Basra (Abdullah 2003).  
This treaty was seen as another sign of foreign interference and influence by many 
Iraqis, especially as it extended the British presence in Iraq for more years to come, and it 
helped fuel anti-Western, anti-British sentiment in Iraq. This was all going on while 
nationalist and pan-Arab feelings and movements were growing in many Middle Eastern 
countries, including Iraq. However, the British backed cabinet led by Nuri al-Sa’id managed 
to crack down on Iraqi nationalists, which in turn sparked more opposition to the British 
backed monarchy (Marr 2012). The anti-British resentment was not merely because of 
patriotic sentiment. The British influence was seen as a force that was impeding the social 
and economic development of the country through its continuous support of a narrow 
stratum of the political elite and tribal Sheikhs.  
On the 7th of September 1933, Faisal, the first King of Iraq, died and his 21-year-old 
son Ghazi assumed the throne. This event led to the diminishing of British influence, as 
Ghazi was much less willing to heed to British suggestions, not least because he was 
educated at the Military College and identified more with the nationalist military officers. 
This, in addition to other events such as the Assyrian revolt in 1933 and its suppression by 
the Iraqi army, and the sanction of a conscription bill in 1934, added to the increasing power 
and importance of the army in Iraq. In the three years from 1933 to 1936, the number of men 
in militarily service doubled to 23000. At the same time, the Iraqi air-force grew 
substantially (Marr 2012). After the brutal crackdown of the tribal insurgents of the early 
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30s by the army, sections of nationalist politicians fostered the sentiment that emphasised 
the interference of the army in politics. This sentiment was particularly influenced by the 
initial success of fascist regimes in Italy and Germany in bringing social and economic 
reforms, as well as social mobilisation, and it was supported by an increased sense of Iraqi-
ness in the country. Mustafa Kamal’s regime in Turkey was a source of inspiration amongst 
sections of Arab nationalists.  
The first major interference of the Iraqi army in politics happened in 1936. After the 
Prime Minister Hashimi showed some dictatorial tendencies and hinted at prolonging his 
term of office, the army took over (Marr 2012). On the 29th of October 1936, the army 
demanded the resignation of the Prime Minister Hashimi and as a result a reformist cabinet 
was formed. The new government, which removed most conservative and Arab nationalist 
politicians, was short-lived, as the resentment from different sectors of society, particularly 
that of Sheikhs-landlords and conservative pan-Arab politicians, grew. Ten months after the 
coup, Bakr Sidqi the main military figure behind the coup was assassinated by a solider 
affiliated with the Arab nationalists. This short-lived coup was unsuccessful in fulfilling its 
promises, including a more Iraqi oriented policy, as opposed to an Arab oriented policy. It 
also failed to abolish the discriminatory laws that affected the peasants. However, this coup 
was a turning point in the history of modern Iraq, since it gave way to a series of military 
interventions in politics that greatly shaped Iraqi politics for decades to come. 
On the 4th of April 1939, Ghazi King of Iraq died in a car accident and was survived 
by a two-year-old son. His cousin Abd al-Ilah was appointed as regent. Abd al-Ilah had a 
good relationship with the British, therefore they backed his appointment. During this time, 
Arab nationalism was on the rise in Iraq. International events such as the partition of 
Palestine and the rise of fascist groups in Europe helped intensify this sentiment. 
Additionally, inspired by the interference of the Army in political life in neighbouring 
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countries, a new generation of young army officers saw the role of the military as a crucial 
one in the development of the country. During this period, several silent coups succeeded in 
changing several government cabinets without much bloodshed (Marr 2012).  
During the Second World War, the Iraqi government was shaky and unstable. The pro-
British regent Abd al-Ilah and Prime-minister Nuri faced huge challenges from the 
increasing power and popularity of the anti-British nationalist forces who were supporting 
Nazi Germany as a way to counter the British. These conflicts prompted several cabinet 
resignation and bloodless coups, and eventually led to the second British occupation in 1941. 
When the all-nationalist government ousted the pro-British regent, the British army landed 
in Basra. The British army attacked the Iraqi Air Force without warning on second of May 
and entered Baghdad on the 29th of May 1941 (Tripp 2001). Four nationalist army officers 
who, along with some other politicians were the main figures behind the resurgence of 
nationalism in Iraqi politics, fled to Iran. The pro-British regent was brought back to power 
and a completely pro-British cabinet was formed (Marr 2012).  
The crackdown on the Arab nationalists was accompanied by the opening up the space 
for leftists during and shortly after the Second World War. Communist newspapers, which 
used to be published underground, were now published and distributed more freely. These 
developments offered an opportunity for the left-wing groups to reach out to the intellectual 
circles, as well as the working class in Iraq (Marr 2012). Although the Communist Party was 
not licensed, it was at the time the best-organised political party in Iraq. It mainly appealed 
to middle class educated people, Shias, as well as the Jewish and Christian minorities. 
In 1947, negotiations between Iraq and Britain started in order to amend the 1930 
Treaty. It concluded that Iraq would have control over its Air Force bases; however, the 
British retained the right to use these bases in the event of war. The treaty was extended to 
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1973 instead of the previous date of 1957. This triggered major demonstrations. Police 
cracked down on the protests, leaving tens of casualties.  
During the fifties, Iraqi streets were on fire. Many strikes, demonstrations and protests 
were organised by various groups such as workers and students. Most of these activities were 
led by the leftists and especially the Communist Party.  
The post war period saw the continuous influence of Tribal chiefs in Iraq. They 
constituted 45% of the members of all post-war parliaments (Marr 2012), showing how the 
monarchy was reliant on Sheikh-landlords, which created a significant source of resentment 
amongst many Iraqi strata, particularly the peasants who were still suffering from the ever-
increasing power of these Sheik-landlords.  
In August 1954, the government started a new round of political suppression. It 
particularly targeted the left in order to eliminate this important opposition force that was 
increasingly appealing to the intelligentsia of Iraq. Legislation allowing the Council of 
Ministers to deport advocates of the Communist Party was passed. This suppression forced 
the opposition to go underground and become united. In 1957, the main opposition political 
parties, including the Communist Party, created a unified front called the United National 
Front. This front included a new small party called the Ba’ath party that later played a huge 
role in the future of Iraq. This strategy of suppression did not help the government, as the 
whole regime was toppled in 1958. The Iraqi troops which were supposed to march to Jordan 
set Baghdad as their destination. They did not only bring down the government but the whole 
system. This swift coup d’état under the leadership of General Abul Karim Qasim brought 
an end to the Iraqi monarchy in the early hours of the 14th of July 1958 (Marr 2012).  
The new regime attempted to create a cabinet that represented the diversity of society 
in Iraq. It was also divided between military and civilian figures. However, the main power 
was in the hands of the military characters. Qasim assumed the main posts in the cabinet.  
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The dominant orientation of the new regime was anti-Western, in particular, anti-British.  
There was a clear ideological gap amongst the new ruling elite, with one group believing in 
integration with the Arab world as the way to unite Arabs to face the Western powers, and 
the other more Iraqi oriented and pushing for an Iraq independent from the West.  
Qasim’s regime promised a democratic constitution that never materialised. 
Revolutionary courts, essentially led by Qasim himself, managed to remove his enemies 
very quickly. Qasim was trying to strengthen his grip on power and by 1961 the cabinet had 
no civilian members anymore (Marr 2012). Qasim’s military dictatorship destroyed the old 
regime’s institutions, which although flawed in many aspects, were starting to take root in 
the country and to give this new-born nation an identity. Although Qasim’s regime was busy 
removing its enemies and consolidating the ‘sole leader’s’ powers, as well as dealing with 
several revolts, attempted coups and the attempted assassination of Qasim, it also took swift 
and dramatic measures to reform the country, some of which are still present in the country 
until this day. The new regime substantially increased the money spent on education, health 
and affordable housing for poorer people. Profits from oil were redirected from long-term 
infrastructure plans to short-term plans such as housing and education, and this was quickly 
felt by people, especially the poorer population. In health sector, by building more hospitals, 
the number of hospital beds available increased substantially, although this was not 
accompanied by an appropriate increase in the number of doctors and teachers (Tripp 2001). 
Also, the Family Status Law of 1959 improved women’s legal status. One of the main 
reforms of this era was the land reform. The TCCDR was abolished, followed by the 
introduction of a land reform law that broke down the feudal structure of the countryside 
and as a result diminished the political, social and economic influence of the Sheikh-
landlords.  
 43 
The increasing frustration of the opposition parties, especially the pan-Arab parties 
and the Ba’ath party, caused them to believe that the only way to forward their demands 
would be by assuming power after toppling Qasim. These parties, especially the Ba’ath 
Party, started to infiltrate important intuitions, especially the army, to recruit officers in 
support of their objectives. The Ba’ath party was a small party that was able to create a 
clandestine organisation that gained experience in underground activities and mobilising the 
streets. Its members were mainly young civilians. On the 8th of February 1963, officers loyal 
to the conspired parties attacked the airfield at Rashid military base and sent off their own 
military units to Baghdad to PM’s office. The nationalists and Ba’ath party members took 
to the streets as well. On the 9th of February 1963 Qasim was arrested in his office, tried and 
summarily shot dead, ending five years of his regime (Tripp 2001). 
Shortly after the conspirers assumed power, a cabinet of twenty-one members replaced 
the ousted regime. Ba’athist figures assumed all key posts. The main power however was in 
the hands of a newly formed council, called the National Council of the Revolutionary 
Command (NCRC). This council, which was run by the Ba’athists, had the power to remove 
cabinets and also assumed the powers of the Commander in Chief of the military. Abd al-
Salam Arif, though not a Ba’athist, received the presidency. This post was supposed to be a 
symbolic one. His Vice-President and the Prime Minister was the Ba’athist Ahmad Hasan 
al-Bakr. (Tripp 2001). 
As soon as the Ba’athists and other Arab nationalists came to power, their differences 
over the direction in which the country should be heading towards, which were put aside to 
achieve the common goal of removing Qasim’s regime, came to the surface. These 
differences were evident not only between different parties and political movements, but 
also amongst different factions within parties themselves. They caused these different groups 
to clash with each other over power soon after. The parties all, however, agreed on removing 
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the supporters of the old regime. As a result, many Iraqi Communist Party members and 
supporters were arrested, brutally tortured and executed (Tripp 2001).  
In November 1963, the internal conflicts amongst the leadership of the Ba’ath Party 
paved the way for Arif and his nationalist supporters in the army to take over.  On the 18th 
of November, Arif announced that the army would take control of the country. He gave some 
posts to the Ba’athist military figures that helped with the coup, but it did not take him long 
to get rid of them. By early 1964 the Ba’ath party was completely removed from power 
(Marr 2012). 
Now Arif found the opportunity to monopolise power according to his own interests, 
sharing it only with some Arab nationalist associates (mainly Nasserites7) in whom he had 
trust. In order to deter any possible military coups, President Arif formed an elite military 
unit, the Republican Guard, under the command of one of his kinsmen from his own tribe, 
Al-Jumaila. In doing so, he established a trend under which “he openly relied on established 
systems of patronage, kinship and tribal affiliation to cement the core of his power in the 
armed forces” (Tripp 2001: 177). This trend remained dominant in Iraqi politics until the 
end of Saddam’s regime in 2003 and beyond. This was despite the fact that all the republic 
regimes that took over after the overthrow of the monarchy introduced themselves as 
progressive and modernists. They indeed adopted some formal programmes to marginalise 
tribes.  
Under Arif, relative freedom of speech was allowed. Nasserite elements in the regime 
pushed for more integration with the Egyptian regime, and this resulted in a preliminary 
agreement with Nasser to unite the two countries. A provisional constitution was announced 
on the 3rd of May 1964 that promised a future National Assembly. The new constitution 
                                               
7  People who believed in a political ideology based on Jamal Abdel Nasser’s (President of Egypt (1956-1970)) 
thinking. 
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introduced the identity of the country as democratic, socialist, Arab, and Islamic. The 
emphasis on Islam was mostly due to the impact of the conservative and religious 
characteristics of President Arif himself (Marr 2012). It is worth noting, however, that 
President Arif started another trend in Iraqi politics- trying to return to civil rule in order to 
curb the power of the military to prevent future coup d’états. (Marr 2012). 
On the 13th of April 1966, during a tour of the country, President Arif’s helicopter 
crashed and all the people on board were killed, including President Arif. Soon after, the 
National Defence Council and the cabinet elected Abd al-Rahman Arif, Abd al-Salam Arif’s 
brother, as the new president. During Arif the second’s rule, military power again grew, 
forcing Arif the second to appoint a cabinet dominated by military figures. This regime, like 
its predecessors, failed to establish institutions to work as its backbone. Worse of all, the 
regime was functioning without a parliament. The Arabs’ defeat in the Arab-Israeli war of 
1967 increased the anti-Western sentiment in Iraq, and increased dissatisfaction with the 
military rule, mainly because of Iraq’s feeble participation in the war. Arif the second’s weak 
character encouraged a range of political groups to think about assuming power, from the 
Communists to military politicians. However, the Ba’ath Party, which had already lost 
power once, was better prepared to capture the opportunity to seize power once again. 
Therefore, the Ba’ath Party conspired with some figures inside Arif’s inner circle, and in the 
early hours of the morning of July the 17th 1968, some of the conspiratorial forces occupied 
the Ministry of Defence and the broadcasting station. At the Republican Palace, Ba’athists’ 
collaborators opened the gates for Ba’athist forces. President Arif surrendered and was sent 
to exile (Marr 2012). 
The first year of the new Ba’ath regime was precarious, but by the mid-1970s the party 
had succeeded in building the foundations of a totalitarian regime that removed all dissenting 
voices from the political scene. Soon after the coup, President Bakr was appointed as Prime 
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Minister and Commander in Chief of the armed forces, and Saddam Hussein became his 
deputy. The provisional constitution was announced and “declared Islam to be the religion 
of the state, ‘socialism’ as the foundation of the economy, and the [the Revolutionary 
Command Council] RCC (and, by extension, its chairman) as the supreme legislative and 
executive authority” (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2001: 118). Soon after the declaration of 
the constitution, the regime started a terror campaign against all left and right forces. The 
scale of terror brought about by the Ba’ath regime was unprecedented. As the anti-Western 
rhetoric in the country was on the rise, especially after the Arab defeat of 1967, the 
environment was ripe for a movement that was seen as nationalist.  
Relying on rising oil prices, the regime also started a full-scale development 
programme in a variety of sectors under the rubric of socialism. Free education and 
healthcare was developing. The regime also had a large scale economic plan and started an 
industrialisation programme that was especially developing the military industry (Marr 
2012). The Iraqi people’s economic status, particularly in urban areas, started to improve, 
and the GDP per capita was on the rise. By the early 1980s, 75 percent of the Iraqi population 
were connected to the national grid. Urbanisation intensified, and by 1983, 75 percent of the 
population was living in cities (Abdullah 2003).  
On the other hand, in order to consolidate its power, the Ba’ath regime started building 
a multi-layered security apparatus, and a police state was in creation. By 1978, 20 percent 
of all state employees were working within one of the many security forces. By this time, 
freedom of expression was at its worst status. The only ideology that was accepted was the 
nationalist, socialist, progressive ideology of the Ba’ath Party- Iraq’s identity was defined 
by the Ba’ath.  
By the end of the 1970s, the distinction between party and government was blurred. 
Ba’thist indoctrination was applied to the regular army…the school curriculum was changed 
 47 
to include a strong element of Ba’thist indoctrination emphasizing militancy, a “love for 
order”, suspicion of “foreigners” and, above all else, loyalty to the regime (Abdullah 2003: 
173). 
The Ba’athification of the whole society was underway. Since the coup d'etat of 1968, 
Saddam Hussein had secured his position as one of the most influential figures in the Ba’ath 
Party and the regime. On the 16th of July 1979, President Bakr appeared on Television to 
announce his resignation, citing health problems. Soon after, Saddam was sworn in as the 
new President (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2001). Saddam started an extensive purge inside 
the party to make sure that only people loyal to him were allowed to be in the party. Soon 
after Saddam took over, the Islamic revolution in Iran shook the whole region. One of the 
most powerful regimes in the Middle East was toppled and Ayatollah Khomeini, a cleric 
whose opposition to the Ba’ath regime in Iraq was known, came to power. The already 
problematic situation between the neighbouring countries escalated and, finally, in 
September 1980, the Iran-Iraq war started (Marr 2012). This devastating war lasted for eight 
years during which a variety of socio-political and economic developments happened. 
During the first years of the war, the regime implemented a policy of ‘guns and butter’ 
providing both the military needs of the war, but also making sure that the economic status 
of Iraqi citizens was not adversely affected by the war. It did not take long for the regime to 
realise that this policy was not sustainable, especially as no end to the war was in sight. 
Austerity programmes followed, but Liberal policies were also implemented. In fact, the 
imperative of the war forced the regime to abandon many of its socialist policies. 
Deregulation of the labour market, privatisation of the agricultural sector, and removing 
subsidies to various sectors all occurred as a result of the economic pressures that arose due 
to the heavy costs of the war. By the end of the war in 1988, the Iraqi economy war in a dire 
situation. In 1988, the year the war ended, Iraq’s foreign debt was between $100 and $120 
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billion dollars (Abdullah 2003). The infrastructures, particularly Iraqi ports and in the oil 
sector in the south, were also severely damaged.  
On the social level, the militarisation of society affected many aspects of people’s 
lives. Government offices, schools and universities, even the health sector, was dragged into 
the military programmes. The fact that Iran had the upper hand in terms of numbers (because 
of its bigger population), meant that the regime in Iraq had to force more and more men to 
go to war. This affected the workforce, which was mainly in the public sector. These 
vacancies were filled by women (Al-Ali 2007). On the other hand, the regime worked hard 
to Ba’athify all aspects of society. Ba’ath was imposed as the main identity of people during 
this period. More and more people were pressurised to join the party. The police state was 
expanding and tens of thousands of people were recruited as spies. Thousands of dissidents 
were sent to prison or executed. (Marr 2012). 
The Islamic revolution in Iran gave a space for the Shia religious parties and 
movements to grow. These parties that were marginal during the years of the monarchy and 
the first republics gradually grew, and the Iranian Islamic regime provided them with the 
ideology, as well as the logistical support, to expand. During the Iran-Iraq war some of these 
groups joined the war effort to fight Iraq. These groups formed the backbone of the new 
regime after Saddam was toppled in 2003.  
In 1988, the devastating war finally ended. Iraq was left with a much stronger army 
but a weaker economy. Iraq badly needed its oil revenue to recover from the war, and saw 
its neighbours as a hurdle to achieving this goal. Kuwait was particularly seen as a problem 
after Iraq accused its southern neighbour of draining the shared oilfields. The relations 
between the two countries deteriorated, and in August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait and swiftly 
occupied the country. The international community and Security Council demanded Iraq 
withdraw its troops from Kuwait. Iraq did not comply, and so the Security Council adopted 
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a resolution that put Iraq under economic sanctions. In February 1991, a collation led by the 
US expelled Iraqi troops from Kuwait. The Iraqi army was in retreat when a popular uprising 
in the majority Shia southern provinces and majority Kurd northern provinces started. The 
regime lost control of several provinces and eventually managed to take back control through 
a brutal campaign that killed thousands of Iraqis in the south. In the North, however, the 
international community imposed a no-fly zone that provided the Kurds with an autonomous 
region (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2001). During the years of harsh economic sanctions, 
the infrastructure of the country was severely damaged. The provision of education as well 
as healthcare deteriorated markedly. Malnutrition, particularly among children, was widely 
reported. The Iraqi regime lost its main source of revenue (oil) and was not able to satisfy 
its population by providing them with economic prosperity. As a result, the regime resorted 
to traditional sectors of society, particularly tribal and religious leaders. A resurge in tribal 
and religious values was reported during this period (Ismael and Ismael 2007)-a 
development that greatly influenced gender culture in the country, as will be shown in 
Chapter Four. In 2003, the US-led collation toppled the Ba’ath regime to start a new era in 
the history of Iraq. 
 
2.4   Post-Saddam: Traditional or Modern? 
After being part of an Islamic caliphate for centuries, Iraq struggled to create an identity for 
its new status as a nations-state. Since the days of its establishment in 1921 Iraq has 
experienced many modernising attempts and has been exposed to a myriad of modern 
ideologies. Yet, by the time the US and its allies occupied Iraq in 2003, almost one hundred 
years after the occupation of Iraq by the British Empire, it seems that Iraq had retained its 
traditional qualities to a great extent. Tribe, as an institution, still play a significant role in 
contemporary Iraq. Tribal customary law, which is widely used to settle conflicts and feuds, 
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is a manifestation of this influence. On the other hand, religious institutions are respected 
widely amongst Iraqi people. Religious leaders represent legitimate moral, and even political 
authority and are followed by millions of people. 
Although Iraq has moved a long way from the era of British occupation, there is a 
mixed picture in Iraq when it comes to the tendencies towards tradition and modernity.  
Instead of 5%, around 78.5% of the population is now literate, for example, and the country 
is much more urbanised. In 2011, 66.5 % of the population lived in urban environments and 
the urbanisation rate for the period 2010-2015 is estimated to be 3.05 (CIA, The World 
Factbook). Iraq’s economy is no longer agrarian, but a rentier one, hugely dependent on 
crude oil exports, and it is greatly linked to the global market. Iraq’s national income is more 
dependent on a single natural resource than the population of any other country in the world. 
In 2010, natural resources (mainly crude oil) accounted for around 70% of Iraq’s GDP 
(Gunter, 2013)8. Although Iraq’s economy is integrated into the global market, it is 
considered to be an underdeveloped one, as Iraq has not been able to modernise its industry, 
services and finance sectors, and as a result the division of labour and the level of 
specialisation in Iraq is much more limited than in industrialised countries. Sexual division 
of labour is not modern either, as women mainly assume the traditional roles of child bearing 
and rearing, as well as other domestic responsibilities. Only 14% of Iraqi women are either 
working or actively seeking employment (United Nations Joint Analysis Unit Iraq 2012). 
Nowadays, two very influential traditional institutions in Iraq work alongside the 
modern bureaucracy of the state: religious institutions in their Sunni and Shia forms, and 
tribal institutions in their Arabic and Kurdish9 types. Each of these of institutions work 
according to their own laws; religious institutions draw on Sharia, which shapes social life 
                                               
8 This figure fluctuates largely depending on the price of oil, which is very unstable, but it is considered to be 
very high for Iraq even when the prices of oil drop dramatically. 
9 It can be argued that tribe is weaker now in Kurdish regions than in Arabic ones, but still is an important 
institution, especially in rural areas.  
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in Iraq, whereas tribal institutions rely on tribal customary law to resolve its people’s daily 
life issues as well as macro matters, especially in the political sphere. These two traditional 
laws, which have been influenced by each other for centuries, work side by side in the 
modern legal system of the Iraqi state; in some cases, they even influence state law, exerting 
their authority over the state. The influence of the institution of the tribe is so strong that 
Saleem al-Jubouri, the Iraqi Parliament Speaker, announced on November the 3rd   2014 that 
the Iraqi parliament is trying to sanction a law to incorporate tribal institutions into state law 
(H.H, Almada Press 2014). It is hard to tell whether this is an effort to satisfy the tribal 
leaders by sanctioning their authority through state law, or to bring them under the 
surveillance of state bureaucracy; however, it shows the amount of authority that the tribe 
bears in today’s Iraqi society. Additionally, the Iraqi constitution gives special status to the 
institution of the tribe. Article 45(2) of the Iraqi constitution stipulates, “The State shall seek 
the advancement of the Iraqi clans and tribes…”. The constitution also states that Islam is a 
major source of legislation and that no law that opposes Islam will be sanctioned in the 
country: “Islam is the official religion of the State and is a foundation source of legislation... 
No law may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of Islam” (Article 2(1)). 
The constitution even gives the authority to create laws to religious figures, and as a 
consequence, to religious institutions. Article 92(2) stipulates: “The Federal Supreme Court 
shall be made up of a number of judges, experts in Islamic jurisprudence, and legal 
scholars…”. The federal Supreme Court is an influential body that “Oversee[s] the 
constitutionality of laws and regulations in effect” and “Interpret[s] the provisions of the 
Constitution” (Iraqi constitution, Article 93(1 and 2)). 
The Iraqi state institutions, on the other hand, exert their authority over millions of 
people in Iraq through extended bureaucracy, despite the fact that it has to acknowledge the 
authority of traditional institutions that function outside its jurisdiction. Iraq is considered a 
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nation-state, with a seat in the United Nations. It has clear jurisdiction and recognised 
borders, although these are currently being seriously challenged by the Islamic State (IS), 
which has carved out a Caliphate through erasing the borders between Iraq and Syria since 
2014. A parliamentary democracy is working in Iraq with a written constitution that was 
voted on by the majority of Iraqi people in 2005. Article One of this constitution describes 
the Republic of Iraq as being ‘fully sovereign’. Sovereignty is one of the most important 
characteristics of a modern state. It essentially indicates that within the limits of its 
jurisdiction no other actor may refute the authority of the state (Pierson 2004). Authority has 
always been a critical feature in any polity, however, there is a fundamental difference 
between the authority of pre-modern states with that of modern states. That is, sovereignty 
which is “the idea that there is a final and absolute authority in the political community” 
provided that “no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere” (Hinsley 198: 26). Despite 
the fact that there are questions around the nature and the extent of this authority, especially 
as a result of the intensification of globalised processes in recent decades (an issue that will 
be returned to in Chapter Three), the concept of the monopolistic authority of the modern 
state is widely acknowledged. 
One of the main roles of the modern state, like any other political system, is to maintain 
social order within its jurisdiction. This is done through the exercise of the ultimate authority 
that the state possesses (Hinsley 1986). In a sovereign state the means of violence is the 
monopoly of the state; even when the state gives away part of its control over the means of 
violence, for example in the United States where people are allowed to possess guns, it does 
so on its own terms (Green 1988). Although coercion and violence have always been 
effective tools in the hands of the state to enforce social order, this objective is best achieved 
through legitimate authority where people obey the authorities on a voluntary basis. 
According to Weber, authority is the “empirical probability that a definable group of 
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individuals (as a result of various motives) will orient their social action to giving directives 
or commands, that another definable group (as a result of various motives) will orient their 
social action to obedience” (Weber in Kalberg 2005: 174).  Authority, according to Weber, 
is different from power; he defines power as “the likelihood that one person in a social 
relationship will be able, even despite resistance, to carry out his own will” (ibid.), while 
people voluntarily submit to authority. People follow orders because they believe in the 
legitimacy of the authorities to issue orders; “[i]n general, it should be kept clearly in mind 
that the basis of every authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, 
is a belief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige” (Weber 
1978: 263). In other words, the authority needs to have a degree of legitimacy to evoke the 
minimum necessary compliance from the subordinates’ side. 
Weber argues that all ruling powers can be understood as appealing to three types of 
principles of legitimation: rational-legal or bureaucratic, traditional, or charismatic. 
Charismatic leaders derive a ‘right to rule’ from their extraordinary personal traits and the 
belief that they enjoy superhuman capabilities. These charismatic characters defy the past 
and claim to bring about a new set of values, traditions and laws. On the other hand, 
traditional authority (patriarchal, religious, feudal, and patrimonial/monarchical, etc.) stems 
from a founded notion that believes in the sanctity of long-established traditions. This type 
of authority is dominant in traditional societies. The third source of legitimacy for rulers, 
rational-legal, is concerned with how it is considered legal in the eyes of people. In other 
words, this type of authority derives its legitimacy from a belief that rules, regulations, 
statuses, and laws have been, through objective procedure, appropriately enacted. According 
to this viewpoint, those who have been elevated to the position of authority under these rules 
are considered legitimate. While in any given society all models of authority might be 
present in some form of mixture, in modern societies, legal-rational authority has become 
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the preponderant authority and it challenges the other forms of authority. “Bureaucratic 
authority becomes all-pervasive in modern societies and stands in radical opposition to both 
charismatic and traditional rulership” (Weber in Kalsbergm 2005: 175).  
The question here is whether Iraq is a sovereign modern state with a strong 
bureaucratic authority, or whether there are other types of authority that challenge the state’s 
authority. Iraq is a war-torn country that faces real challenges in upholding its sovereignty. 
The state has been unable to maintain its borders, and this makes the claim of full sovereignty 
in its constitution a myth. However, the authority of the Iraqi state is not just challenged by 
the militant groups which are attempting to disintegrate the country. It is also challenged by 
traditional institutions, which unlike groups such as IS, do not necessarily intend to destroy 
Iraq. The traditional institutions of religion and tribe exercise a huge amount of authority 
outside the jurisdiction of the state. This status is in contrast with the modern notion of 
sovereignty where a state exerts its ultimate authority through modern bureaucracy.  
In the next section the two influential authorities of tribe and religion in Iraq will be 
examined in more detail. 
 
2.5   Religious Authority 
Due to the lack of reliable updated data10 to produce a demographic map of Iraq, we can 
only make an estimate of the population of Iraq, as well as the religion of its people. It is 
estimated that around 99% of the Iraqi population is Muslim. Shia Muslims make up around 
60%-65% of the population, and around 32%-37% of people in Iraq are Sunni Muslims11 
(CIA, The World Factbook). There are differences in the way Sunni religious institutions 
organise and function when compared to Shia religious institutions; mainly due to different 
                                               
10 The last nationwide census was in 1987. 
11 These figures are highly contested, but it is widely accepted that Shia Muslims constitute the majority of the 
population in Iraq. 
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historical trajectories, and as each of these religions has been affected by the different power 
balance in the Muslim world that was usually in favour of Sunni Muslims. Additionally, in 
Iraq after 2003, Arab Sunni clerics have been placed in a different position in comparison to 
their Kurdish Sunni counterparts, due to political differences in the regions that Arab and 
Kurd Sunnis occupy. However, there is a common trend in all Iraq, and that is the importance 
of the religious institutions’ authority throughout the whole country. The influence of this 
authority clearly varies from community to community, and even from person to person, 
depending on many factors such as how religious that community or person is, the influence 
of modern state institutions on a particular community, or even other traditional institutions 
such as tribe. Though it varies from region to region, but the importance of the dominance 
of religious institutions in Iraqi society is undeniable. In this section, the focus will be on the 
Shia religious institutions, not least because it is believed that Shia Muslims comprise the 
majority of the population in Iraq. 
In modern Shia Islam, religious authority is concentrated in the hands of a few highly 
respected marjas12 who are mainly based in Najaf Seminary in Iraq, or the Qum Seminary 
of Iran13. For the last two centuries, religious authority in Shia Islam has been known as 
marjaiya. Marjaiya “describes “the position of a living Shiite [Shia] supreme legal 
authority” who supposedly possesses the exclusive authority to interpret sharia” (Khalaji 
2006: 1).  Marja is also the main authority who takes the responsibility for collecting and 
managing religious taxations, and he is the main administrator of religious foundations. 
Additionally, Marja has the authority to direct rituals, rites, and religious ceremonies. In 
fact, Marjaiya is the upper stratum of a hierarchical system within the mujtahids, who are 
                                               
12  Marja‘ at-taqlid (The Source of Imitation), in short known as marja. 
13 There are a considerable number of mujtahids around the world who have the authority to interpret sharia 
and can be followed by non-mujtahid people. But in practice, only a handful of high-ranking marjas, most of 
them based in the seminaries of Najaf and Qum, can exert significant authority and have thousands and in some 
cases millions of followers. 
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Shia Islamic jurists that possess the authority to interpret sharia and give directives to the 
rest of the Shias who are non-mujtahids on how to lead their lives.  
In the Shia branch of Islam, every sane adult has to follow a mujtahid, and they must 
submit to his directives in their daily activities. This is known as taqlid (literally means 
imitation). Anyone who is financially able is obliged to pay an Islamic taxation to the 
mujtahid. Four major marjas in Najaf14 have the most muqalids (followers) in Iraq, and 
amongst them Grand Ayatollah Al-Sistani has the biggest proportion (Khalaji 2006). Sistani 
is currently the most reverted marja in Iraq, so much so that sometimes in Iraq the word 
marjaya is used synonymously with Sistani.  
Marjayia in Najaf claims a traditional authority based on the Shia version of Islam. It 
“possesses the authority to seize control of the sanctity in society by directing rituals, rites, 
and religious ceremonies” (Khalaji 2006: 1). In fact, any traditional authority is “resting on 
an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those 
exercising authority under rule” (Weber 1978: 215).  Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Said Al-
Hakim, one of the major marjas in Najaf, believes that “his responsibility is to be sure that 
he doing what he can to save his people. Those who follow him depend on his scholarship 
to direct them to the right path”, he states “I preserve the law” (Norton 2011: 141).  
It is important to bear in mind that it is not always easy to determine which value, 
norm or custom is really ‘immemorial’, that is, has been passed to current generations from 
a far past. In any culture, certain values, norms or customs are branded as ‘traditional’ but 
when their roots are explored it becomes clear that they were ‘invented’ during a much more 
recent period than many would have expected. Their ‘invention’ and dissemination takes 
place for a variety for reasons, including political agendas (see Hobsbawm and Ranger 
                                               
14 Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Said al-Hakim; Grand Ayatollah Bashir 
Hussein al-Najafi; and Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Ishaq al-Fayyad 
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2000). The fact that it is sometimes really hard to tell between traditions that are rooted in 
ancient times and those ‘invented’ in recent periods, is one of the problems of the modern-
traditional dichotomy. Another problem is that the current traditional authorities live in a 
modern globalised era in which it is not conceivable to think that they have not been 
influenced by modern ideologies and developments. As will be shown in the next chapter, 
Iraqi religious authorities, who claim to preserve the traditions of the nation, actively use the 
most modern media technologies to reach out to their followers. As a result, in this thesis, 
by traditional authorities I mean people who are in positions that claim they preserve 
traditions, as in the case of Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Said Al-Hakim, mentioned above. 
Also, those people who are followed by other people for the assumption that they preserve 
traditions. It will be explained in detail how Iraqi religious leaders are followed by millions 
of people on a voluntary basis- not because they are in power or distribute funds to their 
followers. The same can be said of tribal leaders. They run customary courts and their rulings 
are respected by millions of Iraqis, due to the fact that they are viewed as people who are 
acting according to the traditions of the nation.  
Sistani’s authority, and indeed all Shia marjas and mujtahids, is based “upon alleged 
absolute duty to obey” (Weber 1978: 934). According to Shia Islam, it is the duty of people 
to obey the Prophet Muhammad, and after the prophet, they are obliged to obey the 12 imams 
who are the descendants of Prophet Muhammad. It is believed that the last Imam has gone 
into hidden existence and will come back again to bring justice to earth. Until that time the 
ulama (Islamic scholars) are the representatives of the hidden Imam and are the legitimate 
authority that all Muslims must obey (Rahimi 2007). According to this ideology, the ulama 
possess the legitimate authority to lead people by interpreting God’s law (sharia). Shias are 
supposed to direct all their acts according to sharia presented by religious scholars, if they 
want to achieve happiness in this world and salvation in the after world. 
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In order for an authority to be sustained, it needs to be legitimised so that people obey 
it on a voluntary basis (Weber 1978). In persuading people to follow him, a mujtahid relies 
on compliance from the people’s side, rather than coercive power. In fact, “since authority 
entails voluntary compliance with the superior’s directive, it obviates the need for coercive 
force or sanctions” (Balu 1963: 307). This is a system of legitimisation through which 
mujtahids give themselves exclusive authority to interpret sharia, and they then use that same 
authority to interpret Islamic sources and come to the conclusion that everyone who is not a 
mujtahid has to follow one, or else s/he is not a proper Shia Muslim. In essence, Shia 
mujtadids like any other “authorities seek to convince themselves of the right to exert 
authority and attempt to implant the view, in demarcated groups of people, that this right is 
deserved” (Weber in Kalberg 2005: 174). 
Najaf Seminary’s, and especially Sistani’s influence, is growing in the Shia world and 
specifically in Iraq. Since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, Sistani has been able 
to expand his network of followers, and consequently his financial power, leading to an 
increase in his prestige as a major Shia religious leader. Sistani is the top man in his network 
of organisations, and he:  
 
oversees a loyal body of activists, students, ministers, representatives, and wakils 
(agents) who operate and administer his vast, multimillion-dollar transnational 
network of seminaries, mosques, and welfare-based organizations from India to 
Nigeria, from London to New York, and from Qom to Najaf, arguably representing 
the most organised religious association in post-Ba’athist Iraq (Rahimi 2007: 3-4).  
 
This vast organisation is an ‘administration by notables’ which work through trusted wakils, 
ministers and representatives around the world who collect religious taxations and supervise 
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spending on helping the needy, establishing and running religious centres such as libraries 
and publication centres, establishing and running welfare institutions such as hospitals, as 
well as funding the seminaries and paying the religious students (talaba), among other 
activities. There are hundreds of Shia clerics associated with these organisations who are 
disseminating Islamic thoughts through local mosques around the world, including Iraq. 
These clerics are not necessarily mujtahids and, therefore, they have to rely on mujtahids’ 
and especially big marjas’ publications in their sermons. Furthermore, organisations under 
Sistani and other big marjas run tens of TV channels and websites (apart from the marjas’ 
main websites) in which Shia clerics of various rank give religious sermons and discuss 
Islamic matters. Therefore “it is no exaggeration to say that for many Shia Muslims their 
understanding of piety and practice derives from … Najaf” (Norton 2011: 134). 
These organisations function through the division of labour in a bureaucratic and 
hierarchical manner; however, it is not a modern bureaucracy- it is a traditional institution. 
Unlike modern institutions, Shia seminaries, including Najaf, have not been able to “orient 
action toward general rules and regulation” in an environment where “procedures maximize 
calculation” (Weber in Kalberg 2005: 175). Wakils’ viewpoints on how to administer 
religious tax revenue varies, and they often have competing and conflicting methods 
concerning how the money should be spent and who should spend it. This has led to a 
decentralised and self-governing network of organisations working under one big marja. 
Unlike modern bureaucracies, these networks, including networks that are managed by 
Ayatollah Sistani, function in an ambiguous manner where there exists no system of abstract 
rules for determining the regulations of the organisations; hence they lack a clear list of 
duties for different positions within these organisations. Furthermore, the employees, 
especially the trusted wakils, are not employed through clear procedures based on speciality, 
qualifications and merit, but rather through traditional contacts amongst influential people 
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inside seminaries that are far from impersonal. For example, three of the most important 
wakils of Sistani are his family members and relatives. Muhammad Reda Sistani, Sistani’s 
son, and Sistani’s two sons-in-law, Shahrestani, and Murtada Kashmiri, are the most senior 
of his wakils (Rahimi 2007).  Additionally, contrary to modern bureaucracies, which are 
“endowed with legitimacy by a belief that rules, regulations, statues, and laws have been 
properly enacted; that is through “objective” modes of procedure” (Weber in Kalberg 2005: 
175), Najaf Seminary derives its legitimacy from its traditional values. 
Through these networks, which incorporate a mixture of religious, social, political as 
well as economic activities, Najaf Seminary exerts a great amount of authority and 
domination over millions of Iraqis by way of consent and compliance. In order to wield 
influence over such a considerable number of people, a considerable number of staff is 
required. Various types of staff work for Najaf marjas, but in particular, wakils are “trusted 
to execute the general policy as well as the specific commands”. Wakils are “bound to 
obedience to their superior (or superiors) by custom, by affectual ties, by... material complex 
of interests, or by value-based motives” (Weber in Kalberg 2005: 191-2) or a combination 
of these factors. By obeying the marja, wakils are submitting to tradition. At the same time, 
other factors such as family ties, for example as in the case of the senior wakils of Sistani 
mentioned previously, as well as materialistic interests such as a good salary and also social 
prestige and status, play a role in sustaining the seminary system. However, what makes this 
system so powerful is its legitimacy. Marjaiya is a legitimate authority in the eyes of millions 
of Shias and this makes them, at least to a certain degree, voluntarily submit to this authority.  
Najaf’s main marjas, and especially Ayatollah Sistani’s power, is by no means limited 
to the seemingly trivial affairs of everyday life. They are also able to exert great power in 
the political domain. For example, Sistani issued a fatwa to take up arms against the IS, 
effectively forming an army. There is no state law that gives him this power, and he does 
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not occupy any bureaucratic position that allows him or his institutions to manage this. 
Despite all that, after the surge of the IS in June 2014 which led to the fall of several cities 
and towns into the hands of the militants, Ayatollah Sistani issued a fatwa ordering all able-
bodied men to take up arms against IS. Tens of thousands of men answered Sistani’s call 
(BBC News 2014; Chivers 2014). This move was supported by many politicians in Iraq, and 
was widely seen by the Shia population as a wise act that halted IS’s advance, a threat that 
at the time was directly affecting Baghdad.  
The traditional authority of the Najaf Seminary, and especially its main figure, 
Ayatollah Sistani, is on par with the authority of the Iraqi state. Sistani is able to influence 
people’s behaviour and moralities; he was also able to influence American policy in Iraq. 
He can recruit soldiers; he collects tax, and is even capable of changing the candidate for 
premiership. Ali al-Allagh, one of the 11 main leaders of the Islamic Dawa Party, in an 
interview with Iraqi Alsumaria TV published on YouTube, explains how when the internal 
and external pressures mounted on the party to change their candidate for premiership, they 
decided to consult Sistani. He explained how when Sistani made it clear in a written letter 
that he takes the idea that the candidate, which at the time was the then Prime Minister Nouri 
al-Maliki, needs to be replaced, nine members of the board voted for a change, and Haidar 
al-Ebadi the current Prime Minister of Iraq was nominated (Alsumaria  2014). 
This is a testament to the fact that the Iraqi state does not possess a monopoly of 
authority as a sovereign state; it has to share its authority with the traditional authority of 
religion and tribe, as will be explained in the next section. 
 
2.6   Tribal Authority 
Religious institutions are not the only bearers of traditional authority in Iraq. Tribe as a pre-
modern institution also has a strong presence as a traditional authority in this country. Tribal 
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identity is a prominent element in Iraqi society. It is estimated that around 80% of Iraqis 
retain some kind of tribal ties. Tribes in Iraq are comprised of segmentary lineage groups, 
with beit as the smallest segment and qabilha the largest one. These segmentary groups are 
organised on the basis of kinship. Beit, in essence, is an extended family composed of 
hundreds of members. On a higher level, fakhdh (clan) includes several beits. A number of 
fakhdhs make up an ashira (tribe); these two segments have political and military roles. An 
ashira might have from few thousand to more than one hundred thousand members. The 
largest segment is a qabilah, which is a confederation of tribes (Asfura-Heim 2014).  
This type of social organisation is characteristic of pre-modern tribal societies. In these 
clan-based societies of homogenous masses, solidarity is based on resemblance. These are 
segmental societies, which are “characterised by the repetition of similar groupings, rather 
like the rings of an earthworm” (Durkheim in Giddens 1998: 142). These groupings (the 
clans) are structured around blood bonds. In other words, familial ties relate members of the 
clans to each other. Social activities within these clans are similar to one another, which 
points to the division of labour in these societies being very limited. Hence, each of these 
clans functions in nearly the same manner and is self-sufficient (Durkheim 1984). One of 
the products of a simple division of labour is a strong collective conscience. In pre-modern 
societies with little occupational differentiation, a deep-rooted and repressive collective 
conscience dominates each society member’s mind over the individual’s constituent 
consciousness (Wallwork 1972). However, this does not mean that in these societies the only 
conscience is common conscience; individual conscience exists too, although in a weak and 
vague state compared to the strong collective conscience (Pope and Johnson 1983). 
Homogeneity in occupations results in similarity in people’s interests and goals; this in turn 
brings about the development of a similar set of norms and values that is shared by almost 
every member of that society (Durkheim 1984). Individuals in such societies have to abide 
 63 
by collectively enforced social laws and must attach themselves to other members of that 
society through these rules of conduct; this is the manifestation of a strong conscience 
collective (Wallwork 1972). This dominant collective conscience connects each member of 
society together and helps the individual to integrate within that society; indeed, in pre-
modern societies collective conscience was the source of social solidarity that “creates 
solidarity out of similarities between members” (Muller 1994: 79).   
Iraqi society contains strong elements of a pre-modern tribal society. The segmentary 
structure of the Iraqi tribes, which is organised around lineage bonds, is a characteristic of 
Iraqi society. In addition, a strong collective conscious exists in the form of “the high 
premium put on in group solidarity (‘asabiyya), which finds expression in loyalty to the 
family, clan…and pride in ancestry (nasb)” (Eisenstadt 2007: 17). Kinship, real or fictive, is 
the basis of the Iraqi tribes; as a result, the notion of clan and family is central to Iraqi society.   
It should be noted, however, that Iraqi society is not a nomadic tribal society that 
functions only along tribal ties. People in Iraq live a hybrid life; a civil life with all its 
imperatives and a tribal life with its consequences. People are greatly influenced by the state, 
especially when it comes to the economy. In a rentier economy such as that of Iraq, the state 
is the main patron. The Iraqi government, as the biggest employer in the country, employs 
millions of people. “Almost 50 percent of Iraq’s labor force is currently directly or indirectly 
on the public payroll” (Gunter 2013: 183). Even private businesses are mainly dependent on 
the government, whether directly through government tenders, or indirectly by increasing 
the purchasing power of people through salaries, as public-sector payments form the main 
source of income for millions of people in Iraq. Additionally, food rations, which is a basket 
of several food items distributed monthly amongst the population, is a major source of food 
security for millions of Iraqis, since coverage of this system is almost universal (Gunter 
2013). The education system is another sector that shows the presence of the state as millions 
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of Iraqi children go to school. People have to deal with the state on a daily basis; from schools 
and universities to police and security forces, the Iraqi state is present in Iraqi people’s 
everyday lives. However, all the above-mentioned functions of the state are influenced by 
the traditional authority of the tribe. From the top level, such as when a politician wants to 
run for election and tribal ties come in play, to smaller matters such as employment in the 
public sector where tribal ties show themselves in the form of nepotism. It is fair then to say 
that “[t]ribal values remain deeply ingrained in Iraqi society and have had a profound 
influence on Iraqi social mores and political culture” (Eisenstadt 2007: 17). 
The influence of the tribe over people also depends on where they are located. In rural 
areas, a more tribal lifestyle is adopted by people; whereas in bigger cities the presence of 
the tribe is weaker. However, even in the most urban parts of Iraq, tribal presence and 
influence is still strong and visible. Modern Iraqi tribes are settled in villages and cities, 
therefore people maintain tribal ties and customs, thereby living according to both tribal 
customs and modern civil lifestyles.  
 
Today’s contemporary rural-urban hybrids are held together by the traditional tribal 
characteristics of solidarity (asabiyya), true (and more often fictitious) kinship ties, 
patron-client relationships, and tribal customs and laws. Although traditional tribal 
organisation is disappearing in the urban setting, modern tribes maintain elements of 
tribal culture and retain the ability to mobilise both politically and militarily. In modern 
Iraq, tribalism lives in symbiosis with contemporary ideologies and social and political 
movements (Asfura-Heim 2014: 3).  
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2.6.1   Tribe as a Legal Authority 
As a result of the strong notion of tribal bonds and collective consciousness, the traditional 
authority of the tribe is widely respected in Iraq, to the point that tribe is even given legal 
authority and challenging Iraqi modern institutions. 
 
Arab states have had notorious difficulties in establishing regularized and legitimate 
legal processes and in imposing them throughout their territories. The result has often 
been a form of legal pluralism in which religious, tribal, or even rival political forces 
render decisions on matters that would be, in Western conceptions of the state, under 
its purview alone. In particular, well-developed systems of tribal law originating in the 
pre-Islamic era have continued to function in the modern Arab world. Sometimes a 
state’s challenger and sometimes its crutch, the role of tribal law in the Arab world 
today is best understood as a fluid product of ongoing negotiation between state and 
tribal actors (Carrol 2011: 11). 
 
Tribes in Iraq have their own customary law. Nowadays in Iraq, most of these laws are 
written in formal documents and can be voted on by tribal notables. These tribal customary 
laws are there to resolve conflicts between people from the same tribe. Similarity these laws 
has made it easy to arbitrate when a conflict occurs between members of two different tribes 
(Carroll 2011). Across Iraq people go to tribal courts that work according to tribal customary 
law to settle their problems. The judges in these courts are tribal Sheikhs.  
People refer to these tribal courts for a variety of reasons. Iraq’s justice system suffers 
from fundamental problems, which have undermined its trust and respect in the eyes of many 
Iraqis. Availability of the state court is another issue. The adverse security situation has 
caused the Iraqi state justice system to deteriorate even more. In some areas in Iraq, state 
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courts are not available at all. In the areas under IS, for example, militia courts are the only 
justice system available. Even in areas that are under the control of the Iraqi state, access to 
the courts is limited, at least for some groups of people. According to the Access to Justice 
Program administered by USAID-Iraq “[o]nly 12% of Iraq’s vulnerable people have access 
to the formal justice system” (USAID-Iraq). Many people, especially in more remote rural 
areas, are not even aware of their rights and do not know how to approach a state court. 
Tribal authorities are more relevant to their daily lives than the complicated bureaucracy of 
the modern state justice system. This becomes clearer when we consider the fact that an 
estimated 23% of Iraqi people were illiterate in 2011 (CIA, The World Factbook). Tribal 
courts are quicker and more practical for a large proportion of the population in Iraq. Sheikhs 
who take the responsibility of judges are familiar with the cultural nuances and the problems 
that might arise in this culture. These courts are cheaper, less complicated, and the language 
is easier to understand for many people, than the complicated language and concepts of state 
courts. More importantly, tribe and tribal Sheikhs represent a traditional authority for people 
in Iraq. They respect the sanctity of ancient tribal customs and values, and are happy to 
submit to the authority of the tribe and the Sheikhs who are responsible for preserving them. 
That is why despite the fact that during the 1970s and 1980s when the state was powerful 
and the state court system was operational throughout the country, although the operation of 
tribal customary law became limited, especially in urban areas, it never disappeared (Carroll 
2011). 
Different political systems in Iraq have appreciated the importance of tribal authorities. 
The British rulers of Iraq after the First World War realised that in order to rule Iraq they 
would have to buy tribes’ allegiance. This was achieved through the sanctioning of TCCDR, 
explained previously. By the same token, when the Americans faced a huge insurgency in 
Iraq, they had to approach tribal authorities to pursue their plans. The counterinsurgency 
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successes in 2006-2007 were achieved due to the participation of Sunni tribes in Iraq when 
tribal Sheikhs started the Anbar Awakening movement, which was a widespread rebellion 
against al-Qaeda’s presence by tribal leaders of the Anbar province who took up arms against 
the Islamic militant group (Eisenstadt 2007). 
Tribal influence is preponderant from any Iraqi social aspect, and although many 
people refer to tribal customary courts to resolve their conflicts according to tribal customary 
law, tribal ties do not just come in handy in times of conflicts and problems. Tribal ties are 
present everywhere, even in state institutions. Strong tribal ties can guarantee higher social 
status, better economic opportunities, and even the improved prospect of being elected in a 
local or national election.  
Essentially, Iraqi people, especially in more tribal communities, “are more strongly 
bound by these tribal ties and a strict honor code than by ethnic background or religion” 
(Hassan 2007: 1). 
 
2.7   Conclusion 
When the Iraqi state was established in 1921 at the hands of the British Empire, the country 
was largely isolated from modern developments. The British introduced many modern ideas, 
including a constitutional monarchy ruling a nation state. At the time, the country was deeply 
traditional with tribal and religious institutions able to exert tremendous influence in society. 
Almost a century later, these two institutions are still powerful. Successive regimes in Iraq 
have attempted to modernise the country by adopting modern ideologies such as Marxism, 
Socialism, Nationalism, etc., and also building modern institutions such as universal 
education and health systems. They also pursued this goal through bringing the traditional 
institutions under the control of the state. The autocratic regimes, especially during the last 
half of the century, marginalised the traditional institutions, rendering state institutions as 
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the major ones, but the ‘democratic’ process post-2003 and the weak state institutions of this 
era, brought the traditional institutions of tribe and religion to the fore once again. The 
religious institutions have great power as they are respected by millions of Iraqis. People are 
obliged by God to follow the traditional religious leaders as they are considered to be the 
protectors of ancient values. Leaders such as Ayatollah Sistani are so respected that people 
followed his fatwa to go to war. The tribal leaders, on the other hand, have judicial powers 
and are effectively considered to be legitimate judges who can decide on the most critical 
matters, even murder. However, Iraqi society is not a purely tribal society. Many modern 
institutions, state-related and not, have an important role to play. This has given Iraq a hybrid 
status in which modern institutions work alongside traditional institutions. The next chapter 
will show how Iraq became reconnected to the globalisation process in 2003, after years of 
isolation as a result of sanctions and how this raises concerns about the traditions of the 
country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 69 
Chapter 3: Globalisation and the Media in Iraq 
 
3.1   Introduction 
The term globalisation is widely used nowadays in the media, and has even entered the daily 
conversations of people. The academic debates around this phenomenon are still ongoing, 
particularly among the proponents and sceptics of the concept. The question is whether this 
increasing global interconnectedness is bringing the world as we know it closer, or is it 
intrinsically transforming it? In this chapter I will argue that globalisation has ushered in a 
distinct modern era with structural transformations in the political, economic, and cultural 
realms. It will then be shown how Iraq became ‘reconnected’ to the global processes through 
the 2003 invasion. Iraq was largely isolated from global developments as a result of the 
nature of Saddam’s regime and, importantly, due to the harsh sanctions imposed on the 
country after 1990. This chapter is particularly interested in the globalisation of 
communications and the role this plays in Iraqi society. Technology, and particularly 
communication technology, has always been an integral part of the globalisation processes. 
Using electromagnetic waves in communication devices took the communications to the 
next level. The internet then connected the world like never before. These technologies bring 
with them different ideologies and images. They create spaces for people to exchange ideas. 
As will be shown in this chapter, this capability is viewed as being particularly dangerous 
by most MENA regimes. As the public sphere has traditionally been under the control of the 
regimes, they have been very sensitive to communication technologies’ ability to create 
virtual public spaces. Hence, through a variety of mechanisms, they have attempted to 
monitor and control TV and online spaces. However, state agencies in post-Saddam Iraq are 
not monitoring or controlling this system. This does not mean the political and social elites 
are not concerned about the ideas and images being transferred through globalised media. 
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The public has also shown concern, particularly over Western or Westernised media contents 
that are viewed as endangering their ‘original’ cultural values of the country. 
 
3.2   Globalisation 
Although contested, many see globalisation as being a modern phenomenon. Terms such as 
‘globalisation’, ‘globalise’ and ‘globalising’ were not commonly used amongst the public or 
even the media until about the 1960s. Webster was the first major dictionary to offer 
definitions of the words globalism and globalisation in 1961 (Waters 2001). It took the 
concept several more years to gain currency in academia; it was not until the 1980s that 
‘globalisation studies’ started to grow (Robertson 1992). Since then, coming up with a 
definitive definition of globalisation has proven difficult for social scientists, as the “concept 
is too fuzzy” (Lechner and Boli 2015: 5). It can refer to a process or processes, or to ideas 
that justify and explain these processes, or a viewpoint that interprets them. Therefore, when 
it comes to understanding globalisation, “multiple conversations coexist (although few real 
dialogues), which do not readily afford a coherent or definitive characterization” (Held and 
McGrew 2005: 2). 
Nonetheless, there is a concrete and tangible material aspect within the notion of 
globalisation that can help us explain the concept. For example, flows of people, capital and 
trade across the globe, which are facilitated by a variety of modern infrastructures and 
technologies. These infrastructures come in different forms. They can be physical such as 
the infrastructure in the transport sector or banking systems. They can be normative such as 
trade rules. They can also come in symbolic forms, such as English as a lingua franca. These 
infrastructures “establish the preconditions for regularized and relatively enduring forms of 
global interconnectedness” (Held and McGrew 2005: 3). This interconnectedness is not a 
random encounter; rather, it is deep-rooted, enduring, and worldwide. Thus, the concept 
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globalisation refers to much more than extending social relations and activities across 
different regions and countries. It denotes a growing magnitude or intensity of global flows 
in a way that states and societies find themselves increasingly enmeshed in global systems 
and networks of interaction. There are clear consequences for this increasing enmeshment 
of societies in worldwide networks. For example, an event that happens in a very distant 
place can easily have a great impact on the domestic environment of other countries and vice 
versa. The famous terrorist attacks of 9/11 are clear examples of a distant occurrence with 
great impact on local circumstances in Iraq, as will be explained later. This shows that 
“globalization represents a significant shift in the spatial reach of social relations and 
organization towards the interregional or intercontinental scale” (ibid). It should be 
emphasised that this does not mean that the local, national or regional order of social life 
will be displaced by the global; rather, that the local becomes embedded within growing 
interregional interconnectedness.  
 
3.3   Iraq in a Globalising World 
Iraq has also been part of the globalising processes. In recent years Iraq’s fate has been 
greatly shaped by incidents that took place thousands of miles away. The 9/11 New York 
terrorist attacks in 2001 have had great consequences for Iraq, and have altered every single 
aspect of Iraq’s social, political, economic and cultural life. In 2002, the government of the 
United States of America announced that Iraq was one component of the ‘axis of evil’; this 
was part of ‘the global war on terrorism’ campaign that was triggered by the 9/11 attacks. 
Consequently, it was decided that its regime must change, resulting in the 2003 US-led 
invasion of Iraq that toppled Saddam Hussein (Anghie 2005; Kellner 2003) and ushered in 
a new era for Iraqis- an era of huge chaos, but also increasing integration into the 
globalisation processes. As a major oil exporter, for decades, Iraq has been a part of global 
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markets. Iraq has failed to diversify its economy and as a result is hugely dependent on oil 
revenues. Oil prices are determined in international energy markets, which places the fate of 
Iraq dependent on many external factors, such as global economic growth and conflicts in 
other parts of the world. On the other hand, Iraq’s ability (or inability) to supply oil is an 
important factor in global oil prices, affecting the livelihood of billions of people around the 
world. For 12 years after the invasion, and the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 and the 
consequent war that expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait, until the overthrowing of Saddam’s 
regime in 2003, Iraq’s integration into the global arena has been severely disrupted. During 
this period, Iraq was under crippling sanctions that greatly cut the country off from many 
global processes (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2001). Although one can argue that the whole 
embargo enforced on Iraq was the result of a consensus achieved by the major global powers 
operating according to a modern global system represented by the UN Security Council, it 
is not possible to ignore the consequences of these sanctions in terms of isolating Iraq from 
the globalisation processes that were occurring at that time in other parts of the world.  
As a result of Iraq’s aggression towards Kuwait, on the 6th of August 1990, the United 
Nations passed Resolution 661 and accordingly “froze Iraqi financial assets abroad and 
banned imports and exports, allowing only medical supplies to be imported without 
restrictions, and, “in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs”’ (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 
2001: 290). As a result, Iraq was prevented from its major source of revenue, oil, and this 
had serious ramifications for the economy of the country as well as the well-being of its 
people (Arnove 2002). This meant that Iraq would be isolated from the global markets to a 
great extent, as its diminishing revenue and the embargo on exports to Iraq meant that this 
country, which was heavily dependent on foreign goods, would be isolated from global 
markets. The resolution made sure that Iraq could not benefit from any global economic 
systems and stipulated “…all States shall not make available to the Government of Iraq or 
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to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, any funds or 
any other financial or economic resources…”. To even further isolate Iraq, on the 25th of 
September 1990, the Security Council adopted resolution 670, which emphasised that all 
states:  
 
shall deny permission to any aircraft to take off from their territory if the aircraft would 
carry any cargo to or from Iraq or Kuwait other than food in humanitarian 
circumstances, subject to authorization by the Council or the Committee established 
by resolution 661 (1990) and in accordance with resolution 666 (1990), or supplies 
intended strictly for medical purposes or solely for UNIIMOG…  
 
There were also “Calls upon all States to detain any ships of Iraqi registry which enter their 
ports…”.  (United Nations, 2016, for details of the sanctions regime see the United Nations 
Website, Security Council Resolutions). During the 12 years of sanctions, Iraqi people 
suffered severely as a result of the collapse of an economy that was disconnected from the 
outside world. The only link was through the Oil for Food programme. With growing 
concern over the humanitarian situation in the country, the United Nations came to an 
agreement with Iraq to implement measures to enable Iraq to sell limited quantities of oil to 
meet its humanitarian needs. The programme started to operate in late 1996 and ended in 
2003. Under this programme, which was strictly controlled and administrated by the UN, 
Iraq was able to buy only humanitarian goods and to pay war compensation and expenses to 
some UN committees (For more details see Office of the Iraq Programme-Oil-for-Food). 
Not only did these sanctions and embargoes restrict the movement of capital and 
goods, but also people. As an indirect consequence of these sanctions, the flow of knowledge 
was also severely disrupted, as Iraq’s knowledge centres and educational institutions were 
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isolated during this period, due to lack of funds, as well as due to lack of communication 
with the outside world. The flow of information facilitated by Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) was very limited, mainly as a result of Iraq’s policies 
on the flow of information, as will be explained later. The movement of Iraqi citizens was 
further restricted by the Iraqi regime’s policies on travelling abroad. The regime required 
Iraqis to obtain expensive exit visas to be able to travel abroad. The fees were so high that 
the majority of people could not afford them, especially as most Iraqis had slipped into 
extreme poverty due to the damaged economy. People could not travel abroad more than 
twice a year, and some even were asked to post collateral to make sure they returned 
(Cordesman and Hashim 1997). So, all in all, people’s movement from inside Iraq to outside 
was very restricted and limited, and also, due to the on-going hostilities between the Iraqi 
regime and most of its neighbouring countries and the international community, foreign 
nationals found it difficult to travel to Iraq too.  
 
3.4   The 2003 Regime Change: Major Developments 
As mentioned previously, the main global event that changed the face of Iraq was the 9/11 
attacks and the consequent ‘war of terror’, announced by the then president of the United 
States, George W Bush. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, a sizable percentage of the 
American people believed that there was a connection between Saddam Hussein’s regime 
and the attacks. This, in addition to an overwhelming majority of U.S Congress, who 
supported the military intervention in Iraq, helped the Bush administration to launch its plan 
of regime change in Iraq. On March the 18th 2003, an ultimatum was issued by Bush ordering 
Saddam and his two sons to leave Iraq within 48 hours. Saddam refused and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom began on March the 20th 2003. Saddam was toppled after 21 days (Fattah and Caso 
2009). Since then the old political system that was in place for decades and revolved around 
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Saddam Hussein and his network of power has been replaced by an entirely unstable and 
chaotic new system, with various power centres that was meant, in theory, to be a 
representative democracy. For 35 years prior to 2003, the Ba’ath Party, and especially 
Saddam Hussein, ruled the country according to a closed system through a brutal and 
notorious secret police system. The regime was a brutal dictatorship with no free elections, 
no freedom of expression, no free press; as a result, the country witnessed rampant human 
rights abuses. During the reign of the Ba’ath Party, “[i]ntelligence services proliferated, the 
numbers of secret police and spies multiplied, and party militia roamed the streets” (Dawisha 
2009: 215). Any opposition, even in the slightest form, was not tolerated and was treated 
with utmost brutality. During Saddam’s rule (1979-2003) he was the only leader of the 
country; every ideology or school of thought that was not in line with his, was utterly 
suppressed. The regime revolved around Saddam and his team, many of them his family or 
tribe members from his hometown (Marr 2012). The Revolutionary Command Council 
headed by Saddam was the ultimate decision making institution in Iraq, taking the 
responsibility for both legislative and executive decision making, ensuring that Saddam was 
the ultimate unquestionable authority in the country. The country was ruled with an iron fist 
(Makiya and Samir 1989). Thousands of political dissidents were imprisoned, exiled or 
executed. The rest fled the country. Any uprising was also brutally crushed. For example, in 
the intifada uprising of 1991 “[t]housands were killed or executed, with bodies left in the 
street” (Marr 2012: 228).  
The picture has now changed dramatically. Since 2005 three general elections have 
taken place, and although they have been described as rigged by some Iraqi political groups, 
they are considered amongst the freest in the region. International agencies consider many 
aspects of the elections as “consistent with international standards (International Mission for 
Iraqi Elections (IMIE) 2006: 28) and that “national parliamentary elections generally met 
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international standards of free and fair elections and saw the peaceful transition of power 
from former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki to Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi” (U.S. 
Department of State 2014: 1). Unlike most neighbouring countries, a range of ethno-
religious and political groups are represented in the parliament. Women enjoy a 25 percent 
quota, which is 30 percent for the Kurdistan region’s local parliament.  
After years of largely secular parties’ rule in Iraq, this chaotic democracy brought 
mainly religious parties to power. This is particularly true about the central government, as 
well as the national parliament in Baghdad. Since the invasion, the Islamic sentiment has 
been the preponderant one in Iraq, and this has had many consequences for the country. The 
rise of Islamic parties and groups have been particularly consequential for women’s status 
in Iraq, as these groups have tried to consolidate a more traditional patriarchal system.  
After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the sanctions and embargoes were removed (see the 
United Nations website, Security Council Resolutions for details of the resolutions regarding 
the removal of sanctions after 2003), resulting in the increasing integration of Iraq into 
globalisation processes. Iraq was once again able to sell its oil freely on the global market, 
and the Iraqi Central Bank was linked to the global banking system to be able to transfer 
hundreds of billions of dollars during the past 13 years. Iraq is now the second biggest crude 
oil producer in OPEC, with production at over four million barrels a day (Razzouk 2015), 
and it is an important player in the global energy market. Furthermore, after 2003, 
international markets opened their doors to Iraq, and it is estimated that Iraq imported $42.94 
billion worth of commodities from markets around the world (CIA 2016). Hundreds of 
international companies and corporations entered Iraq mainly to work on the ambitious plans 
for development of the oil and gas sector in the country. Giant energy companies from 
around the globe, such as British Petroleum (BP), Shell, Total, Lukoil, Eni, ExxonMobil, 
Petronas, and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), are currently working on 
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multi-billion dollar projects in Iraq to develop the oil sector (Donovan et al. 2010). This is a 
clear sign of the free flow of capital, people, expertise, knowledge, goods, and so on, and 
how integrated into the global processes Iraq became after the fall of Saddam Hussein. On 
the other hand, Iraq has established extensive relationships with global financial institutions 
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Word Bank. An indicator of this 
relationship is the loans Iraq has received and is projected to receive, provided that it follows 
liberal financial and economic policies (see, the World Bank 2015; Torchia 2015; 
International Monetary Fund 2016).  
This means that Saddam’s socialist system, which was centrally planned and 
controlled, gave way to a new system that, although still largely run by the state and 
dominated by the oil sector, which provides a very large proportion of the country’s revenue 
and Gross Domestic Product (GDP), has opened its doors to domestic and foreign private 
investments. In effect, Iraq’s economy has “partially evolved from central planning to state-
guided capitalism” (Gunter 2013: 5). This partial and half-done transformation has 
contributed towards the rampant corruption and incompetence that exists in the economy. 
Although Iraq’s revenue has jumped dramatically, especially during the high oil-price period 
of 2013 and 2014, the services provided to people and the infrastructure, are in a miserable 
condition, especially outside Kurdistan. The 2003 war and the consequent looting, as well 
as the continuous conflicts and war, terrorist attacks, and military operations, have added to 
the destruction and left Iraqis in a disastrous situation. Like the political transition, the 
economic transition has also been chaotic for a variety of reasons, including politicians’ 
inability to update the legal framework, which is desperately needed to modernise the 
economy. This has been mainly due to their deep disagreements, but also because many 
political parties benefit financially from this non-transparent environment. However, the 
regime change has allowed Iraq to produce four million barrels of oil a day, as explained 
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earlier, and that has meant that Iraq’s GDP jumped to $223.5 billion in 2014 (the World 
Bank 2016) from $29 billion in 2001 (CIA 2007). Although poverty is widespread 
throughout Iraq, mainly due to rampant corruption and malfunction of the state institutions 
(Gunter, 2013), this rapid growth in wealth has meant that millions of Iraqis are now part of 
the consumer culture in a way never before seen in Iraq, as the centrally controlled socialist 
system restricted the growth of a capitalist free market. Moreover, the years of sanctions 
made it impossible for Iraq to be part of the free market in any way. But now people are 
exposed to a variety of products and services that they never had before, and they are 
bombarded with advertisements from the media, helping create a new lifestyle for many 
Iraqis.   
In terms of the movement of people, the picture is currently completely different from 
Iraq under sanctions. It is estimated that 2.5 million tourists (mainly religious tourists) visit 
Iraq every year (Gunter 2013), a far cry from the days of sanctions. In addition, hundreds of 
thousands of Iraqi people travel abroad for work, education and tourism15. In an interview 
with the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), the Iranian Vice President and Head of the 
Cultural Heritage, Handicrafts, and Tourism Organization, Masoud Soltani-Far said that two 
million Iraqi tourists visit Iran annually (IRNA 2014). Iraq has clearly become connected to 
the world after years of strict isolation, as Iraqis are not only travelling to Iran in their 
millions, but to other destinations; this is clear from the Baghdad International Airport 
arrivals and departures board (Baghdad International Airport 2016). Furthermore, in an 
attempt to connect Iraq to the global flow of ideas and knowledge, the Iraqi central 
government, as well the Kurdistan Region Government (KRG), has spent hundreds of 
millions of dollars on sending thousands of students to study abroad (ICEF Monitor 2013).  
                                               
15 These people mainly reside in areas that are either under the central government or the Kurdistan regional 
government’s control and are considered to be more stable and secure. Millions of Iraqis who live in areas 
occupied by IS, have left their homes as displaced people. 
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Iraq’s intensified integration into the globalisation processes has meant that socio-
political, economic and cultural spheres have been shaped, at least partially, by these 
processes. Equally, Iraq’s internal conditions are also shaping global processes, as is clear 
from the energy market; the rise of jihadi terrorism in Iraq, and the flow of migration towards 
Europe.  
On the other hand, the toppling of Saddam ignited an on-going war that has resulted 
in tens of thousands of casualties. Since 2003, 242,000 people have been killed in Iraq, as a 
direct result of successive wars and military operations; the vast majority of them are 
civilians, including 16000 civilians since March 2015 (Hamourtziadou 2016). In addition to 
that, these on-going conflicts have forced millions of Iraqis to flee their homes. According 
to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) there are around four 
million internally displaced people in Iraq (UNHCR-Iraq 2016). These dramatic changes 
have disturbed the fabric of Iraqi society. In areas that have been under the rule of the IS 
since 2014, massacres and atrocities have taken place. These regions are ruled according to 
strict Islamic sharia16 that extremely restricts individual choices, especially for women. It is 
important to note that the wars and military operations did not affect all regions of Iraq 
equally. The majority of the Shia south and the majority of the Kurdish north are less 
damaged. While areas with a majority Sunni population in the middle of the country, or 
mixed Sunni-Shia areas such as Baghdad, have suffered a lot from the conflicts. Therefore, 
it is fair to say that Iraq as a country has suffered a lot from the ongoing war. Hundreds of 
Kurdish fighters from Kurdistan were killed during the war against IS (Rudaw 2015). The 
number of Shia fighters from the southern Shia majority provinces is reported to be in the 
thousands (Aljazeera net). Additionally, non-terrorist crimes such as armed robbery, 
kidnapping and murder have been on the rise in many Iraqi cities (al-Jaffal 2015).  
                                               
16 Many Muslim scholars as well as ordinary Muslims don’t consider these rules to be Islamic. 
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As a result of the above, stability on many different levels, has been very shaky and 
poor. As Table 1 (Cordesman 2011: 21) clearly shows, by 2011, eight years after the regime 
change, basic services are in a very poor condition. Even in the Kurdistan region, which has 
the best status in terms of basic services, the services have been described as unstable. Other 
indicators such as government effectiveness, political effectiveness, economic development 
and rule of law, are mainly unstable. There is not a single indicator in a single province or 
region that is considered to be stable. All of this was before the IS swept through one third 
of the country in 2014, and before Iraq was hit by a severe economic downturn due to the 
dramatic fall in oil prices. There has also been a stalemate in the political process in 
Kurdistan as a result of an internal political crisis that led to the dissolving of the local 
parliament unilaterally by the will of one of the major political parties in Kurdistan 
(Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)) in 2015 (Salih 2015). No wonder Iraq is the least happy 
nation amongst the 65 countries included in a Gallup poll (WIN/Gallup 2014). 
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Table 1 (Source: Center for Strategic and International studies) 
 
This widespread instability has led to the distrust of their state institutions by Iraqi 
citizens, and has allowed tribal as well as religious sway to grow. As explained in the 
previous chapter, the adverse security conditions in Iraq, lack of legitimacy or efficacy, and 
the inability of state institutions to protect citizens in the face of security threats, has 
encouraged Iraqis to strengthen their tribal ties and resort to tribal customary law instead of 
state courts. In some cases, the U.S. military adopted a strategy to empower the tribes in 
order to gain their support in the fight against the insurgency (Asfura-Heim 2011). 
21
Stability by Province: 4/21/2011 
SIGIR, Quarterly Report, April 2011, p. 76
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Additionally, the electoral system in Iraq has meant that people with stronger social contacts 
can win elections, and that means that in order to win, politicians have to have the backing 
of tribal notables and religious leaders to match the necessary support in election campaigns, 
resulting in the increasing importance of tribal figures. On the other hand, as explained in 
Chapter Two, the old-established religious institutions such as Najaf seminary, which for 
decades was contained by the state (Rahimi 2007), have now gained enormous power in 
society, giving them the unique status of being able to influence social and political 
atmospheres. The Islamic militias and insurgents, on the other hand, have been able to 
capitalise on the power vacuum in the post-Saddam era and to impose their own version of 
Islam on people in many parts of the country (Williams, 2009). These developments have 
greatly influenced social life in the country. One of the areas that have seen tangible change 
is gender relations, since these groups have tried to encourage and to promote a more 
traditional patriarchal system. 
This growth in influence of traditional institutions has been accompanied by an 
increasing emphasis on the importance of modern secular, individualistic and democratic 
values and norms. One of the channels that is introducing these values and norms is the 
media, as since 2003 Iraq has witnessed a remarkable integration into the processes of the 
globalisation of communications; a development that has introduced, mainly, what are 
perceived to be Western values into this deeply traditional society. These complicated and 
in some cases contradictory developments, seem to have taken Iraq in opposite directions. 
For example, modern ideas17 around gender and sexuality are diffused through the media, 
while at the same time traditionalists, who have found the opportunity to consolidate their 
influence as a result of a foreign intervention, try to impose a very strict reading of gender 
and sexuality. They too use media as one of their tools to reach out to the population. This 
                                               
17 These modern ideas are not necessarily emancipatory.  
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is an interesting phenomenon, and one that will be focused on throughout the remainder of 
this thesis. 
 
3.5   Globalisation of Communications 
Processes of the globalisation of communication took hold in the nineteen-century. Although 
transmitting messages across far regions has a much older history, it was not until the 
nineteen century that communication networks started to be systematically organised on a 
global scale. The main driving force behind this phenomenon was the advent of new 
technologies, while other economic, political as well as military developments played a role 
in this process too. These new technologies “enabled communication to be dissociated from 
physical transportation” (Thompson 2001: 152) for the first time in the modern era. 
Three major developments took place in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century that ushered in the globalisation of communications. The first development was the 
invention and expansion of underwater cable systems by the imperial European powers. 
Secondly, the establishment of international news agencies that “managed to monopolize the 
flow of news and form a cartel that divided up the world” (Machin and van Leeuwen 2007: 
7). And finally, the use of electromagnetic waves and the creation of international 
organisations that are responsible for the allocation of the electromagnetic spectrum; a 
development that is still greatly relevant to global communication today, and one that has 
played important role in the intensification of the globalisation of communication by 
facilitating Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS). 
In 1837, Dr. C.G. Page of Massachusetts invented the first electromagnetic device, 
which converted electrical waves into sound (Winston 1998). Since then these waves have 
revolutionised the way human beings communicate and have enabled the development of 
new means of transmitting information such as telephone, radio, television, and satellite 
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communications. Electromagnetic waves allow the transmission of increasing quantities of 
information across large distances in a much more flexible and cost-efficient way, almost 
instantaneously without the need to extend fixed cables across sizable swathes of land or 
under sea. Another benefit that electromagnetic radiation brought is the fact that it is 
accessible by everyone who is within the range of signals, provided that they have the right 
equipment to receive them; a quality that helped expand the potential audience and receivers 
of the information to degrees that were never possible before.  
As mentioned above, one of the technologies that uses electromagnetic waves to send 
information is satellite broadcasting, which in post-Saddam Iraq is amongst the most popular 
forms of media, especially in the absence of cable TV. Satellite TV is also much more 
popular than radio in Iraq (Gallup 2015). The launching of the first geo-stationary 
communication satellites in the 1960s expanded communication via electromagnetic waves 
to a global scope. The first DBS systems started to transmit programmes in 1975 in the US. 
By the early 1990s these systems were operating in other parts of the world, making 
communication truly global, due to the fact that they are transnational systems of distribution 
that are not limited inside the borders of nation states (Thompson, 2001). Satellite 
broadcasting created a market that soon attracted movies and TV programmes, mainly from 
the United States, to the new markets.  
On the other hand, in the late 20th and at the beginning of the 21st century, and with the 
proliferation of the internet, the processes of globalisation of communication accelerated 
even more.  The cold war era prior to 1989 witnessed the development of the Internet. “The 
'Net' developed out of a system used in the Pentagon, the headquarters of the American 
military, from 1969” (Giddens 2009: 726). In the beginning it was a Pentagon project used 
to enable its staff to share their expensive equipment, but after a while some universities 
started enjoying the benefits of the internet. Finally, the internet became a commercialised 
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service, offered to other sectors in society. But it was not until the 1990s that the internet 
started expanding rapidly, connecting households and companies together. Internet access is 
not evenly distributed around the world. Wealthier countries in Europe, North America and 
the Far East are much better connected than poorer regions in Africa and the Middle East. 
Within one region the connection is not homogeneous either. In 1995, less that one percent 
of the population worldwide was connected to the internet; today the estimated number is 
40 per cent. “The number of internet users has increased tenfold from 1999 to 2013” (Internet 
Live Stats, 2016a). This is according to a not very broad definition of internet user that 
defines them as an “individual who can access the Internet at home, via any device type and 
connection” (ibid), a solid proof that the internet has become an indispensable tool of the 
modern world that will quickly cover almost all of the world’s population.  
In the MENA there are sharp disparities and a deep digital divide. Oil-rich countries 
such as Qatar and the UAE have much higher internet connection than, for example, the 
impoverished Yemen. However, one fact is clear: internet connections are on the rise in 
almost all regions and countries of the world, including MENA. This is in addition to the 
much expanded and popular satellite TV channels in the region. 
 
3.6   Media as a Political and Cultural Forum in MENA 
For years, various regimes in MENA have shown great sensitivity towards public access to 
the ever-evolving media technologies in their countries. This alertness is particularly aimed 
at TV and the internet. TV has the ability to reach vast swathes of the population for a variety 
of reasons. Also, with the growth of satellite TV channels, citizens are exposed to discourses 
that are difficult to be modified by the state. On the other hand, the internet can facilitate 
communication between people and mobilise populations away from state surveillance. As 
stated in Chapter One this is why this thesis has focused on satellite TV and the internet. 
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3.6.1   The Expansion of DBS in MENA 
The 1990s witnessed the expansion of DBS in the region. The media environment in this 
decade is “characterized by media abundance, diversity, and globalism” (Ayish 2002: 138). 
In this decade the processes of ending forty years of state monopoly over media ownership 
started, with Lebanon being the first country to end the media monopoly. This process was 
intensified over the next decade, allowing for an abundance of commercial services to appear 
alongside the state-controlled media. On the other hand, the increasing affordability of TV 
sets and satellite TV receivers meant that the majority of the population in MENA have been 
able to acquire them. This becomes clearer when we know that there are hundreds of satellite 
TV channels available for free, including the very popular channels of the Middle East 
Broadcasting Center (MBC), which introduced the first private Arab satellite TV in 1991. 
There are two models for providing free satellite TV in the region. One is the dual-product 
model. In this model the content is financed through revenues acquired through 
advertisements during programme breaks. In fact, this model let “television owners supply 
programmes to viewers as a means of supplying viewers to advertisers” (Sakr 2007: 4). In 
the second model, audiences are considered not as consumers, but as citizens. The 
governments, thus, run TV channels using public funds. In both of these models, viewers 
are not required to pay a subscription to be able to continue watching programmes, making 
TV content a very cheap product in MENA. The model of pay-TV is not very popular in the 
region, mainly because of the competition from free TV. Even when pay-TV acquires a 
monopoly over a specific type of programmes (such as popular football tournaments), people 
resort to techniques that are available at a cheap price that allow them to bypass the coding 
systems of the pay-TVs. As a result of these factors, it is normal for middle class urban Iraqis 
to possess multiple TV sets and Satellite TV receivers. One of the participants in this 
research stated that they have six of them at home. Iraq is far from the richest country in the 
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region, but still, TV ownership is close to 100%. Additionally, the sheer number of satellite 
TV programmes broadcast in Arabic (also in Farsi, Turkish and increasingly Kurdish), which 
is now in the hundreds, means that it can attract a variety of groups. Also, the diversity of 
programmes that have been available on TV 24 hours a day since the 1990s cater for a variety 
of cultural, social and economic backgrounds. On these TV channels one can find a wide 
variety of entertainment, news and current affairs, and religious content. Many of these 
programmes can easily attract less educated people, in a region with high illiteracy rates in 
some countries. As a result, TV has constructed “a national public space that addresses men 
and women, old and young, educated and poorly educated, urban and rural” (Sreberny 2005: 
64). This picture is in sharp contrast with the relatively low TV set ownership of previous 
decades, and the total monopoly of the state over TV channel ownership. As will be shown 
below, during the 1990s, many countries in the region started to abandon their monopoly 
over TV channel ownership, opening the door for other players to enter the market. In fact, 
“the Middle East has moved from a situation of very limited access to television which was 
virtually all government controlled, to a market where there is a vast number of channels to 
choose between, often more than that of many European countries” (Callard 1997, cited in 
Sreberny- Mohammadi 1998: 179-180).  
These developments, however, have not occurred across the whole region. The Islamic 
regime in Iran, for example, has never allowed private ownership of the media. It has also 
criminalised owning satellite TV receivers, in an effort to maintain its monopoly over TV 
channels. Although the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) started to broadcast 
satellite TV channels in foreign languages such as Arabic, English, Spanish, and also in Farsi 
for the Iranian diaspora, the regime maintained its policy of banning Satellite TV inside the 
country. It is important to bear in mind that this policy has greatly failed and that millions of 
Iranians, including people considered to be part of the regime or close to it, consume satellite 
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TV at home and the sporadic campaigns to ‘eradicate’ satellite receivers have greatly failed 
(Sepehri and Salehi 2015). The ban in pre-2003 Iraq, however, was much more successful 
and Iraqi people, with the exception of the post-1991 Kurdistan region, only had access to a 
limited number of state–owned channels. In some other parts of MENA, the picture is very 
different. Lebanon, for example, was the first to move away from the citizen approach to 
media and adopted a much more liberal and market-oriented approach towards TV 
ownership, where audiences were regarded as customers.   
The first years of the expansion of satellite TV in the Middle East, was accompanied 
with the hope that this development would challenge the status quo and trigger socio-
political change in the region. This line of thought concerning the media is not a new one. 
The paradigm of media and development that came out of Daniel Lerner’s controversial 
book ‘The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East’ (1958) talks about 
the modernisation and democratisation of the Middle East, and the pivotal role that the media 
plays in this regard. The book has received serious critique in academic circles, mainly due 
to its unilinear and stagist model that ignores all the cultural complexities of the countries 
under study (Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria), while imposing the historic developments of the 
West on these societies. This model considers the media to be a liberating, modernising and 
democratising force. It stresses that the spread of the media in traditional societies with 
autocratic regimes makes people familiar with the modern world and gives them ideas about 
how to ask for developments in their own countries. Also, the fact that people can participate 
in public spaces facilitated by media is a factor that will help people to fight the autocratic 
regimes and establish democracies in these countries. This research intentionally avoids this 
model; it endeavours to consider media consumption in the specific cultural and historical 
context of Iraqi society in the post-Saddam era. 
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The excitement that came with the expansion of satellite TV in the 1990s, however, was 
soon replaced by the feeling that this expansion is in the benefit of the elite and not 
necessarily democratising. The ruling elites were the people who had the resources to make 
use of this technology, to pursue their own goals and agendas.  
 
In theory, the technology of cross-border broadcasting allowed viewers to see material 
critical of governments and to take part in uncensored public debates. In practice, there 
was no sudden rush to exploit such freedom, as the resources required for transnational 
broadcasting initially put the activity out of reach of almost everyone outside the 
existing ruling elites (Sakr 2004: 2). 
 
However, one cannot ignore the fact that the new environment allowed more players to enter 
the media market with a variety of objectives, contributing towards the competition at a level 
never before seen in the region. With viewers enjoying more choices, producers have been 
pushed to produce programmes that are more interactive and relevant to the viewers’ lives, 
resulting in people’s voices being heard in the media like never before. Additionally, the 
increasing competition from satellite TV placed pressure on governments to change the 
regulations of media ownership to remove the state monopoly over terrestrial TV as well. In 
the mid-2000s, a trend started to emerge across the monarchies and the republics in the 
region to change the regulations and end the state monopoly over media ownership and 
control. In practice, however, many governments restricted the license to launch TV to a 
limited number of people who were mainly connected to the ruling elite, preventing 
dissenting voices from having an independent public space on TV (Sakr 2009).  As a result, 
during the 2000s, there was still a limited ownership base in the region. This is the same 
trend that has been going on for decades in the MENA where governments view the media 
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as a threat to their power. Media is seen as a public space that can empower dissenting groups 
and help them recruit followers, by challenging the formal narrative presented by the state, 
and also helping them to organise their anti-establishment activities, especially through the 
internet, as will be discussed below. Although the days of the old style state monopoly where 
a very limited numbers of channels were completely controlled and operated by the state are 
gone, and new technologies such as DBS pose new challenges to governments to fight anti-
establishment and alternative narratives, governments are still very concerned with the 
content available to their citizens.  
 
3.6.2   Internet in MENA 
The dynamics around the internet are, however, different. To begin with, the technology is 
more expensive, and it is more difficult for many people from poorer backgrounds to acquire 
computers, tablets or smartphones, and also to pay for the internet connection which in many 
countries in the region, including Iraq, is more expensive than in developed countries. Also, 
in order to be able to use the internet, one needs to have the know-how of computers and 
internet usage, which is sophisticated for less educated people. This explains why the 
internet is mainly used by younger and more educated people who are from middle class and 
urban backgrounds. As a result of these factors, internet penetration in the region is much 
lower than satellite TV access rates. It is also much more uneven than satellite TV access. 
In rich countries of the Persian Gulf, internet penetration in 2016 reached 92% of the 
population, in countries such as Bahrain or UAE, while in poor countries is much lower- in 
Yemen it barely reached 25% (Internet World Stats 2016). The lower accessibility of the 
internet, at least in some parts of MENA, does not mean that MENA regimes are less 
concerned with people’s free access to the internet, as internet provides capacities that are 
not available on TV. Not only does the internet allow access to news and information that is 
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not available through state supported channels, and therefore like satellite TV it helps 
alternative narratives critical of status quo to circulate, but it also allows users to organise 
for collective action. This organising capability is particularly important, as it was seen in 
the Iranian Green Movement of 2009 and the Arab Spring that started in 2011. It also allows 
citizens to report to the traditional media through apps such as Skype. Before the age of the 
internet and the development of social networking apps such as Viber, WhatsApp, Skype, 
Facebook messenger, and so on, only people such as journalists who had access to satellite 
broadcasting systems were able to broadcast live on the ground for TV channels. These apps, 
however, have made it possible for citizens with an internet connected device to be able to 
broadcast live events on the grounds, and also give live video interviews to TV channels, 
transmitting the information from the local to the international level. Facebook and Twitter 
have also recently added features that allow users to live broadcast to friends and followers. 
All these features and capabilities provide the opportunity for citizens to make their voices 
heard like never before, and to engage with a large audience, something that was previously 
exclusive to the few. The internet, along with satellite TV, has helped with the emergence 
of a public sphere that is able to erode the government’s ability to monopolise information. 
This is not to say that the full potential of the internet has been unleashed, and that activists 
can capitalise on the internet in a hassle-free environment. Governments in the region have 
put strategies in place to curtail citizens’ ability to bypass state boundaries. Even so, while 
the internet has definitely been one of the drivers of change, it is important to bear in mind 
that states have also been able to use the internet (and other media technologies) to their own 
end (Lynch 2011: 307).  
The Green Movement in Iran witnessed heavy internet usage by the protesters who 
would post footages of the demonstrations and the crack down that followed, using social 
media websites. This was the first time this amount of footage was available on public unrest 
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since the 1980s. As journalists, including foreign journalists, were barred from covering the 
demonstrations, traditional media relied heavily on the new media content provided by 
citizen journalists to cover the events (Shirky 2011). Social media in particular turned to 
public spaces where citizens who rarely had access to the regime-controlled media made 
their voices, concerns and aspirations heard. They were able to participate in political life, 
by posting news, footage and banners, and discussing the events. Social media became a 
platform for instantaneous and continuous flows of news and information that bypassed 
borders, showing the world what was happening on the ground at an unprecedented speed. 
This helped the diaspora to participate in political events inside the country as never before, 
and to connect with people inside the country in protest. But also, it enabled protesters’ 
voices to be heard in other parts of the world such as the US and the UK. Additionally, 
protesters would use social media to organise their activities, to determine places the protests 
would start from and the strategies to be used during the protest. In one case, the activists 
decided that the protest would be silent and so they posted information about the time, place 
and strategy of the protest on social media.  
Similar strategies were used in the Arab Spring, where activists turned to citizen 
journalists and social media became one of the main news and information sources for 
traditional media (Lotan, et al. 2011). In Libya, pictures of the peaceful demonstrations of 
people in Benghazi combined with the threat of Gaddafi to go after them ‘zanga zanga’ and 
catch them like rats, played an important role in mobilising public opinion, not only across 
the region but around the world. It can be argued that this made the decision about NATO’s 
military intervention easier for the leaders, showing the importance of the internet and social 
media in these events. This is not to say that revolutions and demonstrations happen because 
of the media, or that media usage alone toppled the regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and 
Yemen and seriously challenged the Syrian regime. It is not to give all the credit to the media 
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and call these uprisings the Twitter revolutions, as some have done, but to emphasise that 
the new media has created spaces and possibilities that did not exist before for the activists 
and the public to challenge the status quo, and causing the autocratic regimes to come up 
with new solutions to counter this phenomenon. The Islamic Republic regime in Iran, for 
example, clearly sees the internet as a threat to its hegemony; a medium that gives dissidents 
a platform for public participation. As a result, the regime has fought hard to deny them this 
space. It is, however, important to note that the reaction to the advent of media technologies 
has not been a simple rejection. Even the most closed regimes of the region, Saddam’s 
Hussein Ba’ath regime, provided access to a very limited number of Iraqi citizens with close 
ties to the regime in the early 2000s. In the case of Iran, as Khiabany and Sreberny show, 
the regime has a “desire to orchestrate and manage the slow development of the private 
sector and the inhibitions placed on entrepreneurial ICT activity in a field that has made 
Internet millionaires in other parts of the world” (2009: 196). It has also realised the potential 
of the internet as a propaganda tool for the regime, as it has done with satellite TV. Powerful 
factions inside the regime, such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, which is not merely a 
military and security force, but has a huge presence in the economic activities of the country, 
are well aware that without the internet it is very difficult to maintain a rigorous economic 
policy in an increasingly globalised world. They have also realised the importance of the 
internet in diffusing science, something the regime is keen to improve in many areas, 
including its nuclear and missile programmes. By controlling the virtual environment, the 
regime hopes to benefit from these advantages that the internet provides, while denying the 
dissident voices a platform to express themselves. Despite all the concerted efforts of the 
Iranian regime to monopolise the traditional and new media environment, through internet 
censorship and criminalising possessing satellite TV receivers, Iranians have been able to 
increasingly use media technologies as channels for political and cultural participation, 
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sometimes paying a heavy price, such as imprisonment.  
 
3.6.3   Media and Cultural Protectionism in MENA 
Political mobilisation is not the only threat MENA regimes feel when it comes to media 
technology. Cultural protectionism is also at the heart of the concerns of some of the regimes. 
Political activities that challenge the regimes are treated more or less in a similar manner 
across the region. Suppression, oppression, political exclusion, denying them the public 
space and media are policies implemented by autocratic regimes across the region to 
maintain the status quo and consolidate their power. The cultural policies pursued by these 
regimes, however, vary widely. Since the revolution of 1979, the Iranian regime has pursued 
a policy of cultural protectionism aimed at countering the ‘cultural invasion’ of the West and 
a return to ‘authentic’ Iranian-Islamic culture. The two aims of the cultural policy of the new 
state are based on the destruction of an imposed “”Western” and “alien” culture, and its 
replacement with a dignified, indigenous, and authentic Islamic culture, which they claimed 
had declined under the previous monarchical regime” (Khiabany and Sreberny 2009: 201). 
Thirty-seven years after the revolution, this struggle is still at the heart of the rhetoric of the 
Iranian regime. Using a variety of methods and investing huge resources, the regime and 
organisations with close ties to the regime such as the Qum Seminary, have tried to provide 
an alternative to Western cultural products and narratives. Media is an important aspect in 
this struggle. It is seen as a backdoor through which Western imperialism tries to dominate 
the nation, by indoctrinating the nation through media, leaving a ‘hollow’ culture not able to 
resist the erosion of the authentic Iranian-Islamic traditions of the country. This concern with 
media, however, is seen to be linked more to the first one (the political use of media), as 
political activists and dissidents have always been accused of following a Western agenda. 
So, even the cultural concerns around the media are linked to the fear of changing the status 
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quo and challenging the regime; hence the need to monitor and control the internet, as well 
as other forms of media. 
Other countries in the region, however, have taken a different path. Successive 
Egyptian governments, for example, showed less sensitivity towards Western influence. 
This is especially true about the post-Nasser era when the state’s cultural policies encouraged 
the privatisation of the art market and the promotion of liberal culture (Winegar 2006), which 
is widely viewed as Western by more conservative sections of society, such as the Salafists 
and the Muslim Brotherhood. I want to emphasise that there is a need to avoid simplistic 
explanations of these phenomena and processes that are going on in the region. For example, 
although the formal rhetoric of the Iranian regime since the 1979 revolution has been an anti-
Western one in all areas, including culture, many processes have been going on during these 
years that can be considered to be Western. The problem lies in determining what Western 
itself actually means. There have always been differences between different factions within 
the regime about what constitutes Western. These are people and organisations who took 
part in the revolution and are part of the regime, yet in many cases they cannot agree which 
cultural practices are acceptable. For example, for years there has been a struggle between 
the reformists/moderate faction and the conservatives around music concerts. While 
President Rouhani’s government is willing to allow singers to hold concerts in a relatively 
smooth way, conservatives tried to stop them. But one needs to be also careful about this 
dichotomy. There are policies implemented by the conservatives themselves, which used to 
be frowned upon by conservatives and the clergy, as being Western. IRIB, which is run by 
conservatives and is under direct control of the Supreme Leader, has implemented a free 
market advertisement policy. This attitude towards revenue making was frowned upon for 
years and considered decadent, as it encourages Western consumerism.  
The debate about Western cultural influence and preserving the ‘authentic’ national 
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culture is not peculiar to the Islamic regime in Iran. This debate has been going on amongst 
political activists, intellectuals and artists from all political spectrums in the region. This is 
also a matter of concern for people from all backgrounds and not limited to the ruling or 
cultural elites. Media is at the heart of this debate. The increasing intensification of the 
processes involving the globalisation of communications makes this debate even more 
heated. Media is viewed as the transmitter of Western culture, and the influence of 
Hollywood and American Television entertainment on the media industry is undeniable. 
People across MENA have embraced Western or what they perceive as Westernised media 
contents. Millions of people watch Hollywood movies, and many, especially amongst the 
youth, are fans of Hollywood stars. They watch American dramas and entertainment 
programmes brought to them by tens of satellite TV channels for free. Even so, they are 
worried about the influence of these media products on their culture. They do not want to 
lose their ‘authentic’ culture. There is a growing concern over “culturally sensitive 
programming,” an issue which is claimed to enjoy government and public agreement: “the 
biggest concern from open access to highly attractive and superior quality programming 
from the outside world is fear of its effect on the national language and the values and 
traditions of the society” (Al-Umran 1996: 22, cited in Sreberny 2005: 63).  
This research focuses on the cultural aspect of media consumption in Iraq (as opposed 
to media as a public sphere for socio-political transformations) and it presents evidence of 
public concern about the ‘authentic’ culture, and the traditions and values of the society that 
are seen as being threatened by Western or Westernised media contents brought about by 
the globalisation of communication. It also shows that members of the elites, such as 
politicians, are voicing similar concerns. The focus of this research is on gender relations, at 
it shows that although Iraqi people are embracing media technologies in the post-Saddam 
era, they have real concerns about the influence of media on their gender culture. 
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3.7   Conclusion  
Globalisation has transformed the world we live in. Iraq was largely isolated from the 
globalisation processes as a result of the autocratic nature of the regime, but equally the UN 
sanctions in the 1990s. the 2003 regime change reconnected Iraq to these globalised 
processes. Modern technology, including communication technology, has played a 
significant role in the intensification of the processes of globalisation. These technologies 
have changed the concept of the public sphere. In MENA the media environment was 
transformed since the 1990s. the regimes in the region used to have absolute monopoly over 
media ownership. The introduction of satellite TV and commercial TV and also the advent 
of the internet transformed this scene. The autocratic regimes of MENA have always been 
wary of this public space, as they fear that dissidents use them to counter the narrative of 
their regimes. As a result, they have always strived to monitor and control the public sphere. 
Media technologies have created new public spaces. This is viewed by regimes in the region 
as a challenge. While they use media to disseminate their own narrative, they fear that the 
public sphere created by the media enables other voices to bypass state boundaries. This was 
certainly the case in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, but the invasion of 2003 changed the equation 
in Iraq and the new regime is not as concerned with the public sphere created by the media 
as it was before. There is, however, another source of concern for the elites in the region, 
including Iraq. This is the cultural ‘influence’ of the West creating challenges through the 
media. This concern is shared by the public in Iraq, and that the main concern is in regard to 
the culture of gender, and the values and traditions around it. The next chapter will discuss 
gender relations in Iraq, in particular demonstrating how tradition shapes gender in this 
country.  
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Chapter 4: Gender Relations in Iraq 
 
4.1   Introduction 
In Chapter Two, I argued that the traditional institutions of tribe and religion play a 
significant role in many aspects of Iraqi society, to the extent that they rival the modern 
institutions of the state. This chapter will examine the extent to which, and the way in which, 
these traditional institutions and the values they promote shape gender relations in Iraq. 
Gender relations in the majority of known human societies are and have been shaped by 
patriarchal structures. These structures, which are based on unequal power relations, 
function in a way that ensures men’s dominance over women and children, but they are far 
from homogeneous. Like any other social structures, patriarchal structures are fluid and 
prone to change. Sometimes they are challenged by opposing forces and retreat in their 
influence, and sometimes they transform and take a different form, yet remain influential. 
Patriarchal structures in Iraq have also witnessed transformations since the establishment of 
modern Iraq in 1921. The various socio-political and economic developments of the last 100 
years have transformed many notions around gender relations in the country; yet Iraq 
remains a deeply patriarchal society. This chapter will examine gender relations in Iraq, 
starting with a review of the literature on patriarchy. It will then present a brief overview of 
gender relations in ancient Arabia in order to track the traces of centuries-old social 
structures that till the present day have had a strong presence in Iraqi society. As the story 
of gender relations in Iraq is not one of tradition only, the theme will turn to modern currents 
that have to some extent been transforming gender relations since the early 20th century. The 
section will explore how in their effort to modernise the nation, successive Iraqi regimes 
have tried to undermine the traditional institutions that promote Iraqi patriarchy. As 
autocratic regimes, they attempted to weaken this form of patriarchy in the name of 
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emancipating women and freeing them from ‘reactionary’ traditions, but they in fact 
introduced another form of patriarchy: one that is for the benefit of the regime and a form of 
dependence upon the state. It will be shown how the regimes have used gender relations as 
a bargaining chip to further their goals. The main part of this chapter is designated to 
investigate Iraqi patriarchy. This section will demonstrate how the tribal concept of ird, and 
its pertinent codes and values, work with other patriarchal sites to sustain men’s ascendancy 
over women. I will argue that sexuality is the main site of Iraqi patriarchy. Sexuality is 
supported by other sites, such as violence, culture and the state. I argue that ird, through 
denying women their sexual agency, works as hegemonic masculine system in order to 
sustain patriarchy and undermine their agency in almost all aspects of their lives.  
 
4.2   Patriarchy  
Iraq is a deeply patriarchal society where there are clear and deep gender inequalities that 
allow men to dominate women in a variety of social, economic as well as political arenas. 
The literal meaning of patriarchy is rule by the fathers. Before the advent of radical feminism 
in the late 1960s, the term was used mainly by anthropologists who were interested in 
studying “Old Testament-type pastoral nomads” (Jaggar 1983: 102). In these societies, the 
main social unit comprises of a family in which an older man possesses absolute power over 
the rest of family members who are normally wives, children, herds and other dependents, 
including younger men. Radical feminists, however, give the term a much broader meaning; 
for them, patriarchy refers to “all systems of male dominance” (Jaggar 1983: 103). The 
nature and the root cause of these systems of male dominance, however, is a contested issue. 
Walby emphasises that patriarchy is “a system of social structures and practices” (1997: 20). 
She is keen to avoid the more biological determinist view of patriarchy by emphasising the 
social aspect of patriarchy and equally talking about the structures involved, which can be 
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defined as “[e]nduring or widespread patterns among social relations” (Connell 2009: 10). 
This viewpoint of patriarchy emphasises the social and cultural role in shaping one’s gender, 
and sees ideas about masculinity and femininity as “part of the actions which go to make up 
the patriarchal structure” (Walby 1997: 90). 
The French philosopher Simone de Beauvoir’s famous quotation encapsulates this 
viewpoint eloquently. “One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman” (De Beauvoir 1956: 
273). Although de Beauvoir did not use the term gender in her famous book ‘The Second 
Sex’, her ideas of the centrality of culture in shaping the power relations between men and 
women have greatly shaped the second wave feminism, which started to have an influence 
on gender relation debates in Britain, France and the US from the 1960’s onwards (Rahman 
and Jackson 2010). Different strands of second wave feminism- liberal, socialist and radical- 
have played a role in the development of the concept of gender. If sex is seen as biologically 
given, determined by genitalia, hormones and procreation functions, gender is culturally 
constructed in a way that divides people into two strands: masculine or feminine. Therefore, 
masculinity and femininity are viewed as social attributes rather than natural ones (See also, 
Oakley 1985; Abercrombie et al. 2006; Butler 1986).  By taking this stance, one must agree 
that “[b]eing a man or a woman, then, is not a pre-determined state. It is a becoming, a 
condition actively under construction” (Connell 2009: 5). This viewpoint is in deep 
disagreement with the one that explains gender on the basis of a presumed biological and/or 
psychological divide that exists between males and females. 
If one agrees with the social definition of gender, it does not necessarily follow that 
the construction of gender, which starts in childhood, is necessarily imposed on people from 
outside by social codes or authorities or other pressures. People play an active role in 
obtaining their desired gender identity. They construct their identity as masculine or 
feminine. We as individuals “claim a place in the gender order – or respond to the place we 
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have been given - by the way we conduct ourselves in everyday life” (Connell 2009: 6). 
Therefore, gender arrangements can be a source of pleasure, but also of harm and inequality, 
as we will see later in this chapter. Hence, gender is intrinsically political.  
One of the most important implications of taking this stance is that there is nothing 
natural about gender, and this includes gender inequality. Hence, “[t]he division of labour 
and the hierarchy between men and women, therefore, began to be accorded a cultural 
character” (Delphy 1993: 2). It is culture that has historically defined what men and women 
could become and dictated the domination of men through the exclusion of women from 
power, education, work, and so on, and by being sure to control many aspects of women’s 
lives, including sexuality. 
Consequently, in order to understand gender inequality, it is necessary to look for the 
cause root of patriarchy in areas other than human biology. Walby argues that on a less 
abstract level there is no one single patriarchal structure; rather, in order to understand 
patriarchy one needs to look at six different structures. These are “the patriarchal mode of 
production, patriarchal relations in paid work, patriarchal relations in the state, male 
violence, patriarchal relations in sexuality, and patriarchal relations in cultural institutions” 
(1997: 20). These patriarchal sites and structures do not operate in abstract of other ones; 
rather, they influence each other in a variety of manners. They sometimes reinforce and 
support each other, and work in the same direction in order to sustain men’s dominance. 
Some thinkers believe that the theory of patriarchy is seriously challenged in modern 
societies, due to rapid developments in family structures and “the rise of an informational, 
global economy, technological changes in the reproduction of the human species, and the 
powerful surge of women’s struggles, and of a multifaceted feminist movement” (Castells 
2010: 193). Women were massively incorporated in paid work, increasing their bargaining 
power in relation to men. The transformation of women’s consciousness has also played a 
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key role in this development. Kandiyoti (1988) argues that the classic patriarchy which “lies 
in the operations of the patrilocally extended household” (in which older men dominate 
women and younger men), (278) is crumbling “under the impact of new market forces, 
capital penetration in rural areas” (281). This, she argues, leads to the demise of the 
domination of older men over younger men and women, as these forces render men’s 
economic protection of women a myth.  
In this thesis, I argue that the concept of patriarchy is very much relevant in the Iraqi 
context. Iraqi society is still largely a tribal society with emphasised kin relations. 
‘Patrilocally extended households’, are prevalent in Iraq. It is true that due to economic 
developments in contemporary Iraq, increasing numbers of Iraqi women have been 
incorporated into paid work. Yet, only 14% of Iraqi women are either working or actively 
seeking employment (United Nations Joint Analysis Unit Iraq 2012), whilst the vast majority 
of Iraqi women still take traditional responsibilities. This renders most women still 
dependent on men’s economic protection. As I showed before, even during the periods of 
war, when lack of male labour forced the state to incorporate increasing number of women 
into paid work, the notion of women’s subordination to men did not change. This is 
especially true when considering that according to the system of honour, almost all aspects 
of a woman’s life is controlled by male kin to protect the honour and reputation of the family. 
This gives men the power to control women’s right to work, threatening to deprive them 
from this right in the event of disobedience.  
As for the idea of ‘transformation of women’s consciousness’, I would argue that while 
new ideas about women’s roles in a modern society have reached Iraqi society, particularly 
after the regime change of 2003 and the opening up of media environment, as I show in the 
following chapters, the ‘realities of life’ have greatly prevented women from asking for new 
rights in Iraqi society. Also, as many patriarchal concepts in Iraq are associated with moral 
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values and religious codes, many women find it hard to break away from them, preventing 
a transformation in their consciousness. As I will show later many of my female participants 
did not believe in gender equality and think of themselves as subordinate to men. This is 
why I use the concept of patriarchy to explain gender relations in Iraq.  
Although patriarchy is a system of gender domination, it is important to note that there 
is not one single type of patriarchy. Depending on temporal and geographical situations, 
patriarchy can have a variety of forms. Additionally, the degree of the power of patriarchy 
is also subject to change from society to society and from one epoch to another. This chapter 
will focus on post-Saddam Iraqi patriarchy. This is a type of patriarchy that is prevalent in 
Iraq. This is a patriarchy that is supported, prompted and promoted by religious, tribal values 
and is observed and implemented mainly by male kin. In heavily tribal communities, the 
extended family (even remote cousins) can have a say on how the values and concepts 
around this patriarchy must be observed. In other communities, male members of the nuclear 
family only are involved. In this thesis, this type of patriarchy will be referred to as Iraqi 
patriarchy. Although there are other notions of patriarchy that have been promoted by 
successive Iraqi regimes over the past 100 years that rival this traditional patriarchy, the 
main focus will remain on the form of patriarchy explained above. In addition, similar values 
and concepts can be found in many other societies, particularly those of the MENA region, 
thus, calling this form of patriarchy Iraqi does not exclude other societies. I argue that 
sexuality is the major site for Iraqi patriarchy. However, there are other areas of Iraqi 
patriarchy, such as patriarchal relations in the state, male violence, and patriarchal relations 
in cultural institutions, which work hand in hand with the main site in order to promote and 
reinforce patriarchal order. 
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4.2.1   Sexuality 
Centuries old concepts and values around sexuality are key to understanding Iraqi patriarchy. 
In order to explain these long-lasting qualities that shape Iraqi gender relations, some 
discussion of historical accounts and developments are necessary. As a result, this section 
will draw on theories of evolutionary psychology as well as biosocial theory. 
Some theorists believe that sexuality is the foundation of men’s domination over 
women (MacKinnon 1982). For example, some evolutionary psychologists have argued that 
“male power over women so often revolves around female sexuality” (Smuts 1995: 2), and 
that male sexual control is a universal phenomenon and the root of patriarchy. Evolutionary 
psychology maintains that sex-specific psychological dispositions shape sex-differentiated 
social behaviours. These psychological dispositions were presumably built into the human 
species through genetically mediated adaptation to primeval conditions (Wood and Eagly 
2002). Different reproductive pressures that ancestral males and females faced throughout 
the history of the human species are responsible for the existing sex differences in behaviour, 
according to this theory. Trivers (1972), explains how the imbalances in parental investment 
are key to understanding current male and female behaviours. The term parental investment 
refers to the “time and effort spent producing germ cells, and in incubating and protecting 
eggs and young” (Archer and Lloyd 2002: 44). Evolutionary psychologists state that the 
sexual selection pressures that are responsible for psychological sex differences appeared 
due to an imbalance in the sexes’ parental investment. Females invest more than males in 
their offspring, through gestation and nursing, and therefore became selective about potential 
mates, and preferred mates who were inclined to invest more in supporting them and their 
offspring, for example by providing resources. On the other hand, men developed a less 
choosy tendency in their mating strategy, because they invested much less in offspring. This 
brought about competition between ancestral males over sexual access to females. 
 105 
According to evolutionary psychology, this competition is the reason why men tend to be 
more aggressive, competitive and risk taking.  
On the other hand, due to females’ internal fertilisation, ancestral males did not have 
paternity certainty. Therefore, to make sure they were investing in their own biological 
offspring, so the argument goes, men “developed a disposition to control women’s sexuality 
and to experience sexual jealousy” (Wood and Eagly 2002: 700). The more resources males 
invest in their mates and their children, the more concerned they become with paternity 
certainty, and tend to ensure that the children in whom they are investing are their own. This 
in turn increases their motivation to control their mates’ sexuality (Dickemann 1981). 
According to evolutionary psychology, therefore, female sexual control by males and sexual 
double standards is a universal disposition developed due to sexual selection pressures.  
However, evidence from the cross cultural analysis of the behaviour of men and 
women, shows that although sexual jealousy and double standards restrict women more so 
than men and is common in many societies around the world, it is not a form of universal 
cross-cultural conduct. In some societies, women engaging in extramarital sex is not only 
widespread, but an accepted norm. Norms such as wife sharing is common practice in some 
societies in the world, and this challenges the assumptions made by evolutionary psychology 
“that men’s evolved disposition to ensure paternity certainty underlies a universal tendency 
for men to control women’s sexuality” (Wood and Eagly 2002: 715).  
Biosocial theory, which “focuses on the interactive relations between the physical 
attributes of men and women and the social contexts in which they live” (Wood and Eagly 
2002: 701), presents a more convincing explanation of female sexual restrictions. It argues 
that economic benefits are behind the consolidation of control over women’s sexuality. This 
happens “[w]hen children yield economic benefits for men” (Wood and Eagly 2002: 716) 
and hence paternity certainty makes economic sense. In these circumstances men tend to 
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restrict women’s sexual conduct. The importance of the economic dimension in female 
sexual control receives support from Reiss’s (1986) findings for 80 societies in the Standard 
Cross-Cultural Sample. It shows that several indexes of patriarchy (e.g., patrilineal 
inheritance, patrilocal residence, importance of private property) predict the tendency of 
husbands towards manifesting sexual jealousy (see also Hupka & Ryan 1990). Private 
property is particularly important in explaining several aspects of patriarchy, including male 
sexual jealousy.  
On the other hand, classic Marxism posits that some economic developments, 
including the ownership of private property, are behind the oppression of women. This view 
argues that control of goods helped establish paternal rights to children and patrilineal 
inheritance (Engels 2010). In his classic book ‘The status of women in preindustrial 
societies’ (1978/2015) Whyte examines 93 nonindustrial societies and concludes that sexual 
control over women is associated with ownership of private property among other factors. 
The ownership of private property gives importance to paternity certainty when “property is 
inherited through male lines, and control over women’s sexuality becomes one way for men 
to ensure such certainty and consequent economic advantage” (Wood and Eagly 2002: 715). 
Therefore, it is fair to say that control of female sexuality appeared with the development of 
particular economic structures, especially those in which inheritance ran through male lines. 
As will be seen later, the advent of private property ownership in ancient Arabia consolidated 
male sexual jealously through the development of the concept of ird, which is fundamental 
to MENA and Iraqi patriarchy.  
 
4.2.2   Culture 
Sexuality is not the only site for patriarchy in Iraq. The preponderate sexual double 
standards, which allow male supremacy to continue in Iraq, are reinforced by cultural 
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institutions such as religion and tribe. This is not peculiar to Iraq. Culture constitutes an 
important structure that is “composed of a set of institutions which create the representation 
of women within a patriarchal gaze in a variety of arenas, such as religions, education and 
the media” (Walby 1997: 21). 
Without the support of culture as a major patriarchal site, patriarchy would not be able 
to function as effectively as it does at the moment in Iraq. Cultural notions of femininities 
and masculinities can be found in various aspects of social life. Patriarchal discourses are 
created and maintained in a variety of cultural texts. In the case of Iraq, the main texts that 
inform Iraqi culture are religious texts as well as tribal ones. These traditional cultural 
institutions (that also take on a political role) are very powerful and efficient in Iraq, as 
shown before, shaping many aspects of Iraqi people’s lives, whether through the spread of 
cultural values or through their unique judicial powers. Some of these cultural texts are 
written, as will be shown below, whereas some are oral, constructing a discourse in which 
the ‘appropriate masculinities and femininities’ are propagated in society. The language used 
in these texts is a masculine one, as the leaders of these institutions are all male, and it 
propagates a masculine view of the world, particularly when it comes to women’s sexuality. 
In these texts, the sexual double standards that allow men to restrict women’s sexuality, as 
well as other aspects of their lives, are promoted and justified.  
 
4.2.3   Violence 
Violence forms another basis of patriarchy in Iraq and many other societies around the world. 
Gendered violence towards women that aims at dominating them is widespread around the 
world, and women are sufficiently aware of it in a way that makes them modify their 
behaviour: “…the effect of violence on women’s behavior is mediated by women’s fear of 
violence as well as the actuality of it” (Walby 1997: 140). 
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Honour related violence is a reality of everyday life for women in Iraq. Even a rumour 
about the violation of sexual honour by a woman may result in serious violence against her. 
“Within the context of this restrictive way of life for girls and women lurked the specter of 
honor killings. Most of my female interlocutors who were of childbearing age (but not those 
younger or older) seemed to live in constant fear of them” (King 2008: 322).  
Later I will show how the threat of violence, or the use of it, functions as basis for men 
in Iraq to make sure that women’s sexuality is controlled in a way that assures male 
ascendancy.  
 
4.2.4   State 
Central to the continuation of violence and its role as the basis for patriarchy is the state. As 
explained in the previous section, male violence is critical in the maintenance of the 
oppression of women. The state’s reaction to this violence is an important indicator of 
another site of patriarchy, the state.  In the case of male violence against females: “lack of 
intervention of …the state condemns women to subordination” (Walb 1997: 157). This lack 
of intervention by state institutions to deal with cases of honour related violence in Iraq is 
explained later on in this chapter. It is important to note that some of the functions that are 
expected to be performed by a modern state are actually partially controlled by the traditional 
authorities and institutions of tribe and religion. Tribe and religion can play a policing as 
well as judicial role in Iraq. Not only do these institutions not use their policing and judicial 
powers to intervene and restrict cases of violence against women, they sometimes use these 
powers to promote it.  
I am not restricting Iraqi patriarchal sites to the one explained above, rather I argue 
that sexuality is the main site, and culture, violence and state are supportive of sexuality as 
a patriarchal site in Iraq. Sexuality, as an important dimension of gender relations, is 
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specifically important for traditional authorities and institutions, and is strictly regulated 
through a set of values and customs introduced and enforced by tribe (including its smallest 
segment, the traditional family) and religion. One of these cultural concepts is ird. Ird is one 
of the connotations of the concept of honour18 in Iraq (and indeed many other Arab and 
Muslim societies). Honour is a key concept in gender relations in Iraq and it is certainly not 
possible to research this field without understanding what role honour plays in these 
relations. 
Ird is a pre-Islamic tribal concept that can refer to different meanings and manners. 
One of the most prominent of its connotations, however, is related to the sexual conduct of 
female members of a male’s family (Khayyat 1990) and their chastity and continence. Ird 
and the social concepts, cultural values, customs, moral codes and customary laws around it 
are developed (as will be explained later) in a way that allows a sexual double-standard to 
become prevalent in society and males to control females’ sexuality, that is, to ensure their 
‘premarital virginity and marital fidelity’ (Dickemann 1981: 417, italic in original). This 
makes sexuality the main site for patriarchy in Iraq. Ird and its pertinent concepts work as a 
system to sustain patriarchy. I call it a 'system' because it does not stand on its own, but 
works in conjunction with other concepts with which it forms a set, for example ghira and 
áar. But it also is supported and promoted by other patriarchal sites such as cultural 
institutions and also by the state.  
Before going into detail about these concepts, gender relations in Iraq will be 
discussed, starting with a quick look at Ancient Arabia. The reason for starting with this 
period in time is that both the main traditional institutions in Iraq, tribe and religion, have 
historically been shaped by currents from Arabia to a great extent. The invasion of the lands 
                                               
18 The other equivalent is Sharaf that refers to a wider sense of honour, including ird. Sometimes Sharf is used 
as the equivalent of ird. 
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that comprise today’s Iraq by Muslims who came from Arabia had a lasting influence on 
this country as it is evident from the dominance of Arabic language and the religion of Islam 
in Iraq. Next, the transformation of gender relations since the establishment of the country 
in 1921 will be discussed in more detail. 
 
4.3   Gender Relations in Ancient Arabia 
In the fifth century Arabia, before the time of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad (circa 
570), there were a variety of arrangements around gender. Unlike other countries in the 
broader region where patrilineal, patriarchal marriage was the sole legitimate form of 
marriage, matrilineal, matrilocal, polyandrous marriages were among the types of marriages 
practiced in Arabia19.   
Watt (1956) argues that at the time Arabia was undergoing a social evolution into a 
patrilineal society for two main reasons: Firstly, the increasing importance of commerce in 
Mecca during the fifth and sixth centuries, and secondly, due to the fact that the Quraish, 
Prophet Muhammad’s tribe, which was Meccas’s most important tribe, was increasingly 
choosing a sedentary lifestyle. These transformations resulted in the breakdown of tribal 
values, including the concept of communal property and the rise of a new economic order, 
including private property. The rise of private property resulted in the increasing importance 
of paternity certainty, as men wished to pass on their property to their biological children. 
This “led eventually to the displacement of matriliy by patriliny” (Ahmed 1992: 43).  In 
addition to the internal dynamics that influenced the evolving of gender relations in Arabia, 
external factors also played a significant role in the transformation of Arabian society into a 
patrilineal society. The infiltration of Iranian, Syrian and Byzantine cultures exposed Arabia 
                                               
19 This does not necessarily indicate an absence of misogyny, but it correlates with the fact that women enjoyed 
greater sexual choices before the advent of Islam. 
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gender culture to these neighbouring societies.  
 
A form of monotheism, characteristic of the predominant religions in these adjoining 
regions, as well as patrilineal marriage, in which men controlled women’s sexuality 
had also begun to gain ground in a hitherto polytheistic Arabia before Muhammad 
began to preach Islam (Ahmed 1992: 45). 
 
The advent of Islam helped consolidate this patriarchal system, making paternity certainty 
even more important, and resulting in the increased importance of control over women’s 
sexuality. Islam did not necessarily bring a new system that completely abolished the cultural 
values and practices of pre-Islamic Arabia. In fact, many Islamic rules were actually cultural 
values and forms of conduct practiced widely in pre-Islamic Arabia. Prophet Muhammad 
abolished some of these pre-Islamic practices and ratified others, unifying the scattered and 
various codes practiced by different tribes under one umbrella- Islam. With regard to gender 
relations, Islam abolished20 sanctioned customs found among some Arabian tribes and 
legitimised only one type of marriage; Islamic marriage21 is a patriarchal, patrilineal, 
polygamous marriage that was practiced in pre-Islamic Arabia by some tribes, including 
Muhammad’s tribe, the Quraish. With the advent of Islam, this patriarchal institution, which 
is based on “the vesting in the male of proprietary rights to female sexuality” (ibid), turned 
to a holy religious code that has been passed down to Muslim societies for centuries.  
                                               
20 This does not mean that all the tribal customs that were abolished by Islam disappeared, as many gender-
specific tribal customs practiced in the 20th century and even practiced nowadays are considered un-Islamic by 
Islamic jurisprudents (See ﻓﻘﮫ اﻟﻌﺸﺎﺋﺮ،  :2010). 
21 Islamic traditional patriarchal family shapes women’s life to a great extent, including their social roles. Hence 
I am focusing on marriage to explain Islamic gender culture. Another important aspect of the advent and the 
subsequent expansion of Islam in the Middle East, which is key to understanding Islamic gender culture, is the 
right to acquire concubines. I am not focusing on this aspect of Islamic gender culture because this practice is 
obsolete and illegal in areas that are under the control of the central government in Baghdad and KRG. Since 
June 2014, the Islamic State however has allowed men to acquire concubines in areas under its control in Iraq. 
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For centuries Islam was one of the main sources that informed gender relations in the 
MENA societies. The emergence of modern currents in the region have changed this 
equation by introducing new ideas about gender relations. “The meaning of gender as 
elaborated by establishment Islam remained the controlling discourse in the Muslim Middle 
East until about the beginning of the nineteenth century” (Ahmed 1992: 240). 
 
4.4   Gender Relations and Modern Currents in Contemporary Iraq 
The 20th Century was particularly important for Iraq when it comes to gender relations, 
mainly due to the exposure of the country to modern forces and ideologies. In the early years 
of the 20th Century, gender power relations were utterly imbalanced, as women in Iraq, 
especially women in rural/tribal areas, where the majority of Iraqi women lived during the 
newly established monarchy (1921-1958), were subject to a variety of discriminatory 
customs that in many cases were degrading, humiliating and lowered their status to a tribal 
possession managed by men. For example, tribal customs deprived women of the right to 
inherit land properties. They also allowed the use of women as compensation in tribal feuds. 
Women were forced to marry for the settlement of tribal feuds, especially blood feuds, where 
a woman was handed over as compensation to the victim’s family or tribe. Efrati (2012), 
reports that in 1929 the settlement of sixty-two tribal cases resulted in the handing over of 
125 women from one tribe to another in the al-Amara region only. In addition to that, the 
prevalence of honour killings in rural areas, to wash away the dishonour brought about by a 
female relative as a result of having sex with a non-husband man, even if it was without their 
consent in the form of rape, shows how strictly women’s sexuality was regulated and 
monitored by men. Patriarchal tribal customs also determined that women had to either 
marry their paternal cousins or receive their permission to marry another man, and if they 
were to ignore this rule, the cousin had the right to kill either the woman or the man who 
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married her. The plight of women in Iraq, mainly a result of their subordination to men and 
a diminished self-determination, especially in rural/tribal areas, was not limited to the 
reinforcement of these discriminatory tribal customs; poverty and destitution had also left 
an ugly scar on the face of women’s lives. Although poverty’s negative effect was not limited 
to women, women suffered the most, due to their child bearing and rearing role in the family. 
The lack of midwives in rural areas, in particular, had a stark impact on women and 
children’s welfare. In some areas, a third of children would die at birth. In these harsh 
conditions women were working hard, not only in child bearing and rearing or household 
activities, but also on farms and in cultivation and growing livestock; despite this, the 
patriarchal rules meant that they did not have any say over their own lives. Rural women 
were clearly seen as assets by their fathers and husbands to the extent that polygyny was 
considered by some a way of increasing the labour force. Rural women knew that objection 
to this servitude had dire consequences for them. Divorce could turn them into an outcast, 
as their family and relatives might abandon them. This would have had serious implications 
for them, such as dying out of hunger or even being murdered to wash away their ‘stain’ on 
family and tribe. In this difficult situation women were not given a chance to be educated. 
The illiteracy rate in Iraq was high amongst all sectors of society, but women suffered the 
most. Illiteracy was extremely high amongst women and especially rural women. In 1957 
the literacy rate among rural women was only 1%; urban women’s situation was 
considerably better as 21% of them were literate (Efrati 2012). Gender relations in Iraq in 
the early twentieth century are summarised by al-Ani (1972) as follows:  
 
• Popular antipathy toward the education or employment of women 
• General acceptance of the inferiority of women and their subordination to men 
• Lack of women’s rights in matters of marriage and divorce (a male prerogative) 
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• Cultural acceptance that the killing of women was legal under codes of honour 
killing- a practice based on pre-Islamic tribal customs 
• General acceptance of the practice of polygamy as a man’s right 
• Women’s segregation from men in both the private and public domain. The 
congregation of women was assigned to separate quarters, haramlic; and a male-
dominated social order imposed on women a dress code which demanded the veiling 
of the face and shrouding of the body (Cited in Ismael and Ismael 2007: 248; Italic 
in original). 
 
Modern ideas around gender equality were introduced and intellectual debate on women’s 
status in society began in 20th Century Iraq. Reforms of the recent Ottoman years in Iraq 
included gender relations as well, when calls for women’s presence in the public sphere, and 
especially the education sector, were heard and a debate on women’s status within society 
began. It is widely accepted that the first people who advocated gender equality were male 
intellectuals, particularly two poets, Jamil Sidqi al-Zahawi (1863-1939) and Ma’ruf al-
Rasafi (1875-1945). They put gender equality into the broader picture of the modernisation 
of the nation, emphasising that the nation would not develop if half of its population, namely 
the women, remained illiterate and deprived from participation in public life (Efrati 2004). 
The early years of the 20th Century was a vital time in the history of Iraq and other countries 
in the region. Many ideas were in the making. The idea of nation and national development 
was at the centre of this remaking. Advocates of modernisation argued that women are key 
to national development. Women and their roles were reproduced through the introduction 
of new ideas. By publishing their poetry and newspaper articles opposing patriarchal 
customs and norms, such as veiling and the seclusion of women, polygyny, forced marriage 
and child marriage, and by emphasising the importance of women’s education and marriage 
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through love, they created a fury in Iraq. In 1922, and during the very early years of the Iraqi 
monarchy, Al-Rusafi published a poem in a newspaper, criticising the treatment of women 
in the country. As a reaction to this poem some clerics in Iraq issued a fatwa against him, 
mainly because his approach was seen as against the traditional cultural values of the society, 
particularly the Islamic ones, which did not welcome women’s participation in public life 
and supported sex segregation and traditional gender relations based on traditional 
patriarchal marriage. The press gave a platform to women to articulate their views in a world 
where other platforms were exclusively male dominated. The first Iraqi women’s magazine, 
Layla, was published in October 1923. However, it was only in the 1930s and 1940s that a 
vibrant women’s press evolved (Efrati 2004). In the same year that Layla was published, the 
first Iraqi women’s organisation, Women’s Awakening Club (Nadi al-Nahda al-Nisa’iyya) 
was born. This club was found by women from influential families such as Na’lima, the wife 
of Nuri al-Sa’id22, the then Minister of Defence. The club was meant to “foster self 
improvement and awareness in women and girls in preparation to better perform the duties 
‘expected by the nation’” (Efrati 2004: 159). As the country started to digest modern notions 
about nation and state, women’s ‘improvement’ became an integral part of the progression 
of the nation. This opened doors for women to fight the gendered power relations that denied 
them their agency, but at the same time it presented new forms of restraints for them. The 
Women’s Awakening Club opened literacy classes for women, and provided education for 
orphan girls. King Faysal also expressed support of the club. Members of the club were 
mainly from the middle and upper-middle classes, and their approach to social inequality 
was one of the uncritical viewpoints (Efrati 2004), mainly due to the fact that they were close 
to the ruling elite. This prevented them from criticising the government’s policies that 
consolidated discriminatory patriarchal systems, such as the endorsement of Tribal Criminal 
                                               
22 Nuri al-Sa’id was one of the most prominent politicians of the Monarchy era. 
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and Civil Disputes Regulation (TCCDR). This move legitimised tribal patriarchal customs 
and norms and had a devastating impact on rural women, as it stripped them of any state 
protection and put them under the tribesmen’s full control.  
Many women’s organisations (especially charitable organisations) in the 1930s were 
established with the goal of promoting women’s public participation through education and 
professional training, and improving women’s and children’s health and welfare. These 
organisations experienced considerable growth during the 1940s, especially after the end of 
the Second World War. Although by promoting women’s participation in public life, 
women’s organisations defied gender relations based on sex segregations, they lacked a clear 
political and feminist dimension. By the 1940s and especially the 1950s, some of these 
organisations started to pursue political objectives. For instance, during the Second World 
War a women’s organisation called the [Women’s] League Against Nazism and Fascism 
(Jam’iyyat Mukafahat al-Naziyya wa-l-Fashiyya) dedicated its activities to combating 
Nazism and Fascism.  
In 1945 the Iraqi Women’s Union, with a more distinct feminist trait, was founded. 
This was an umbrella organisation under which many other existing women’s organisations 
came together. Although a large proportion of its activities were still aimed at fighting female 
poverty, illiteracy, and women’s and children’s healthcare and welfare, it started to go 
beyond this scope by demanding the reform of laws such as the criminalisation of 
prostitution. It also started to touch upon core issues regarding gender relations, such as 
submitting a request to parliament to discuss issues around divorce, and requesting a law 
that would restrict divorce as much as possible and amend child custody law in the event of 
divorce, so that children’s custody would be granted to the most competent parent rather 
than fathers, regardless of their status. The Union also worked to improve working women’s 
conditions and strived to protect women’s property rights. These demands were against the 
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traditional gender relations in Iraq, organised by clerics and tribal leaders. During the 1950s, 
the Iraqi Women’s Union was the leading force campaigning for women’s political rights 
and gender equality. It is worth noting that during these years, the women who participated 
in activities mainly came from educated, urban, middle and upper middle class, and were 
often related to politicians or influential officials. This reality, along with the fact that 
women’s organisations like any other organisations needed to be licensed by the 
government, limited the scope of these organisation’s activities and geared them towards a 
more conservative, uncritical agenda (Efrati 2004). Even so, many of the demands made by 
these organisations challenged the traditional patriarchal structures of Iraqi society. 
Women’s public participation in the form of education and employment defied the 
conservative notions of sex-segregation and the God-designated role of women serving their 
husbands and children. The prospect of financial independence also challenged the 
traditional concept of women’s dependency on men as members of the family that are 
supposed to observe obedience. It is important to note that the scope of women’s 
organisations’ actives was limited for a variety of reasons. As mentioned previously, during 
the first decades after the establishment of modern day Iraq, most people lived in rural areas 
where many of these modern ideas about gender equality could not easily reach the 
population. Illiteracy constituted the main obstacle. Al-Ali reports that “[t]he majority of the 
population clearly had no access to any form of education” (2007: 63). 
Some women’s activists, across the political spectrum, but particularly leftists, had 
more critical voices and participated in demonstrations and strikes and sit-ins against the 
establishment. Nationalist strands amongst women’s rights activists were evident too. Since 
the days of monarchy, many Iraqis viewed nationalism as an ideology that had the potential 
to better Iraq’s conditions and to liberate Iraq from foreign influence, which was seen as the 
main source of its plights. Some women’s activists adopted this political rhetoric as their 
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discourse. However, these groups amongst women’s rights activists faced many obstacles, 
particularly from the government. Some women’s organisations and women’s magazines 
and newspapers failed to obtain the licence necessary to operate; in other cases, licensed 
press were shut down due to their critical approach (Efrati 2004). Similar trends were 
happening in other countries in the region. While education, unveiling and the political 
participation of women were advocated in the region, women’s roles as mothers, wives and 
citizens were debated as well. Abu-Lughod argues that “to be a wife and mother as these 
modernizers conceived of it was to be a very different kind of subject from the wife and 
mother of before” (1998: 8). The confusing trend in the first half of the 20ths Century was 
the emphasis on women’s public participation, while at the same time the intensification of 
their domestic roles. Women, as the citizens who had the responsibility for rearing the future 
generation, were dragged into nationalist projects. Now it was expected from women to fulfil 
their domestic duties, as mothers and wives serving their husbands and children, and 
consequently the nation. At the same time, they were expected to participate in public life, 
and take on a job for the sake of modernising the nation. These new duties, roles and 
expectations, and the opportunities provided to women, started to undermine patriarchal 
concepts, and subjected them to new forms of control and discipline, many of them self-
imposed, such as producing their unveiled body as disciplined and chaste. Interestingly, 
traditional patriarchal values such as sex-segregation and veiling were challenged, but the 
expectations of sexual decency stayed largely intact. In other words, the ‘modern’ Iraqis did 
not consider veiling as a necessary custom to keep women ‘decent’ and prevent them from 
falling into sexual obscenity. This led to a change in gender norms in specific communities 
in Iraq. What has remained largely untouched is women’s right to sexual agency. Therefore, 
women were still expected to be ‘decent’ and chaste, but not necessarily through adhering 
to customs and notions such as veiling and sex-segregation. That is why they were expected 
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to conduct themselves in a ‘disciplined’ manner while participating in public life, in a way 
that was not expected of men. This sexual double-standard and women’s sexual agency was 
hardly discussed in the public domain.   
Depending on their agenda, successive ‘secular’ regimes in Iraq showed interest in the 
improvement of women’s status; yet they never approached female sexual agency, as this 
was considered a matter of the family. Their main concern was that in doing so they would 
lose a lot of support, particularly among men and influential traditional institutions (Al-Ali 
2007). It is interesting to note that ‘progressive’ movements in Iraq, such as communist 
groups also never touched on this issue, proving the sensitivity of it in Iraqi society. This 
issue is key to Iraqi patriarchy, as will be explained later. 
In 1958 the TCCDR was abolished (Abdullah 2003), in a move that was a blow to 
traditional patriarchal structures. This was followed by the introduction of the Family Status 
Law of 1959, which is to this day considered a progressive law in the region. This law is 
mainly seen as the result of Prime Minister Abd al-Karim Qasim’s aspiration to improve 
women’s status in society, combined with women’s rights activists participating in the 
legislative process. Naziha al-Dulaymi, the then Minister of Municipalities, who was the 
first female minister in the Arab world and the head of an active women’s rights group, the 
League for the Defence of Women’s Rights, was a member of the committee responsible for 
drafting the law (Efrati 2005). The law was meant to put an end to various traditional Islamic 
courts that used to handle family cases differently and according to religion, and essentially 
eliminated different treatment of Sunnis and Shias in family courts. The law restricted 
polygyny and protected women against arbitrary divorce. It set the legal age of marriage at 
18. Equally important was the inheritance privilege. The law gave an equal share of 
inheritance to men and women (Marr 2012). Many religious leaders considered these legal 
codes as being against the Sharia. 
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On the other hand, investments in education, in addition to the encouragement of 
women participating in public life resulted in a substantial increase in the number of schools 
for girls. The number of elementary schools for girls in 1957, one year before Qasim took 
over, was 274, accommodating 108,603 pupils. In 1963, the last year of Qasim’s regime, the 
number of these schools increased to 542- almost doubling in six years, and educating 
244,709 female pupils (Al-Kassir 1965).  
The Ba’ath Party, which took over after a Coup d’état in 1963, introduced itself as a 
progressive socialist party. However, its first actions in power proved to be more 
conservative, mainly because conservative military figures gained the upper hand within the 
party and in the government. One of the first legal changes that happened during this time 
was to amend the 1959 Family Status Law. This move took place due to pressures from both 
Sunni and Shia clerics, and modified the clause that gave equal rights to inheritance (Marr 
2012). Despite the conservative trait of the political elite, urban women in the 1960s 
witnessed the same trend that had started during the last years of the monarchy, and 
especially under Qasim. During this period, educated, urban women were participating in 
the vibrant political atmosphere of the country. An example is the Iraqi Women’s League, 
which was an associate of the Iraqi Communist Party (Al-Ali 2007). The Ba’ath regime 
continued to encourage women’s participation in the public sphere, especially the education 
system. On a social level, the dissemination of modern ideologies by secular parties, such as 
the Communist party, helped women to gain more control over their lifestyles; for example, 
some women in larger cities, particularly in the capital Baghdad felt free to choose non-
traditional dress codes.  
 
Women in the capital wore more daring and fashionable clothes than women in the 
rest of the country, especially the countryside, where women continued to wear more 
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conservative dress. In the 1960s, it was not unusual for younger women in Baghdad to 
wear miniskirts as it was the fashion at the time in Western countries (Al-Ali 2007: 
98).  
 
Decades after the establishment of modern day Iraq, the state managed to consolidate its 
power. State institutions were now responsible for dealing with matters of the family, and 
appeared to be promoting gender equality, although in limited areas. The influence of 
traditional institutions was eclipsed by the growing power of the state, resulting in the 
transformation of social systems, including traditional patriarchal structures. Nevertheless, 
this was not the end of patriarchy in Iraq. The extremely centralised political Ba’ath regime 
tried hard to shift the power balance towards controlling women’s lives, from male kin to 
the state, and turning the state to the main “patriarch and patron of the country” (Al-Ali 2007: 
146). During the years of Ba’ath rule, particularly when Saddam was in power, the regime 
tried hard to weaken the patriarchal structure of the family and tribe by assuming their 
powers to the state. This strategy changed to some extent in the 1990s, when the regime was 
struggling to survive, as will be explained below. Replacing traditional patriarchy with state 
patriarchy was increasingly important, as the Iraqi regime was veering towards more 
centralisation and autocracy. Women’s organisations and initiatives were used as 
propaganda tools, propagating the regime’s rhetoric, which was increasingly centred around 
the ‘strong leader’ and his ingenious plans to modernise the nation and fight the enemies that 
wanted to harm the nation. In this way the regime used gender equality as a platform to 
indoctrinate women with a ‘modern’ rhetoric that was a combination of nationalism, 
militarism, praising the ‘saviour’ of the nation and gender equality. The state’s patriarchal 
orientation was spelled out by Saddam Hussein at the party’s 8th regional congress in 
January 1974:  
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Women will not be liberated by women’s assertions… Women can only be liberated 
by liberation of the entire society, political and economic. Since the Arab Socialist 
Party is the leader of social change in every sphere and activity, the main and vanguard 
responsibility falls on its shoulders (Regional Command, Baath Party 1974: 116-117, 
cited in Ismael and Ismael 2000: 194-195). 
 
During these years, more women were encouraged to participate in public life. This narrative 
was largely employed by the state to further its causes. This policy, which was viewed as a 
way of emancipating women, challenged the fundamental tenets of traditional patriarchy and 
resulted in more unveiling of women; an increase in the numbers of educated women, and 
the increasing presence of female workers in the job market. A manifestation of these 
developments was the fact that, “Iraqi women were among the most educated in the whole 
region” (Al-Ali, 2005: 743). Nonetheless, women in the countryside were almost completely 
deprived of the privileges that urban women, especially Baghdadi women, enjoyed. The 
majority of women from poor backgrounds, especially in rural areas, did not have access to 
education and proper healthcare. Moreover, their freedom and self-determination was 
extremely limited by the traditional patriarchal and religious structures of their communities. 
In 1979 Saddam Hussein took power (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2001). He is 
believed to have been the main figure in the Ba’ath Party years before he formally assumed 
the Presidency. Saddam was keen to promote a more secular attitude towards gender 
relations, particularly to reform the laws pertaining to the public sphere. This attitude was in 
line with replacing traditional patriarchy with state patriarchy by assuming powers to the 
state- powers that used to be in the hands of the patriarchal family. However, the regime fell 
short of dealing with male relatives’ powers to control women’s sexuality for fear of 
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alienating the population and losing support. Although secular attitudes towards gender 
relations since the days of the monarchy were always opposed by conservative sectors of 
society, particularly clerics and tribal leaders, the wider public was accepting of them, 
especially when the regime was able to deliver economic prosperity, and as long as it did 
not touch what was perceived as the private aspect of gender relations. Saddam’s cautious 
approach towards modernising gender relations is clear from the following statement he 
made at the 7th Congress of the General Federation of Iraqi Women in 1976. In response to 
women’s rights groups which were demanding radical reforms, he said: “But when the 
revolution tackles some legal matters related to women without taking a balance of attitudes 
to the question of equality and its historical perspective, it will certainly lose a large segment 
of the people” (Hussein 1981: 36-38, cited in Al-Ali 2007: 140).  
In 1980, one year after Saddam’s presidency began, the Iran-Iraq war started. The 
imperatives of the war and the prominence of internal security during this period caused the 
regime to change its rhetoric towards gender equality. The pictures of men and women 
working shoulder to shoulder to build a modern country were replaced by images of brave 
men going to war to protect their homeland, which was mainly portrayed as a female whose 
honour was in danger. The narrative of the regime started veering towards a more 
conservative patriarchal one. In a country where the regime was obsessed with controlling 
every aspect of life, this change of heart had real consequences for gender relations in the 
country. 
 
The Ba’th’s gendered recruitment policies during the war and their gendered war 
propaganda can be expected to have reinforced images of male heroism and 
superiority, notions of gender differences, ideas of virility and practices of male 
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bonding among the individuals affected by them and in Iraqi society in general (Rohde 
2006 cited in Al-Ali 2007: 154). 
 
Towards the end of the war (which ended in 1988) the regime completely distanced itself 
from reform and gender equality, especially to help boost men’s diminishing morals during 
the years of the war of attrition. At the same time, there was another trend during the years 
of the war that further increased women’s public participation. Iran’s population was much 
higher than Iraq’s and was able to more easily recruit soldiers to go to war. This impacted 
the balance of manpower during the war and led the Iraqi regime to push more and more 
men towards the war front, creating a vacuum in the job market. This void was filled by 
employing more and more women to do the jobs that men used to do, mainly in the public 
sector, but even in the private sector.  
The events of the early 1990s, however, caused Saddam’s regime to greatly shift its 
policy on gender and ‘hand back’ many patriarchal powers to the conservative sections of 
society. In August 1990 Iraq invaded its neighbour, Kuwait. As explained in the previous 
chapter, the international community led by the US, expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 
1991, and the UN Security Council placed Iraq under harsh economic sanctions. Saddam’s 
regime was struggling for survival and therefore it chose to ‘woo’ the influential 
conservative sections of society by abandoning ‘modernisation’ projects. Interestingly, one 
of the areas that the regime was happy to surrender power over was gender (Baram 1997).  
As a result of “the regime’s rehabilitation of tribal traditions” (Ismael and Ismael 2007: 257), 
the penal code was amended to satisfy the conservative sections of society. Amongst the 
laws that were introduced was exemption from punishment for perpetrators of honour 
crimes, and also the legalisation of wife beating. Although the law was abrogated two 
months later, the attempt to change the law in this manner highlights the regime’s plans to 
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satisfy the conservative sections within society at the expense of gender equality.  
The sanctions had a dire impact on the infrastructures that were already under pressure 
as a result of the eight years of war with Iran. The education system was hit particularly hard, 
with negative consequences for women. The country witnessed a sharp decline in the 
numbers of female students, as many families could not afford to send their children to 
school. Public attitude towards women’s employment also changed. As the country suffered 
enormously under sanctions, and unemployment rates soared, women were pushed into 
household environments. Marriage, rather than education and financial independence, 
seemed the only way forward for many women. As a result, “’nuclear patriarchy’…increased 
women’s dependency on one male provider, especially in the light of the fact that the state 
had withdrawn its previous support” (Husein, 2005: 196, cited in Al-Ali 2007: 199). During 
this period, the social environment changed towards more conservative and Islamic 
ideologies. Women’s dress code is a clear sign of this transformation. Hijab and Islamic 
covering started to replace the Western dress code, even in the most liberal environments 
such as universities. The regime, which had previously boasted about its ‘progressive 
policies’ towards gender and its animosity towards ‘reactionary ideologies’, resorted to 
religious rhetoric. As a symbol of this transformation, one of the most important slogans in 
Islam, Allahu Akbar (God is Great), was added to the flag of the country, in Saddam’s 
handwriting. 
 
Saddam Hussein opportunistically engaged in a national faith campaign (al-hamla al-
wataniyya al-imaniyya), responding to a changing domestic social climate–a 
population increasingly drawn towards religion and social conservatism alongside an 
attempt to increase regional and international support among the Islamic umma (Al-
Ali 2007: 200-201). 
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All in all, under the UN sanctions, Iraqi women lost many gains they had made during the 
past decades, mainly as a result of the state’s decision to give up some of the patriarchal 
powers that it had managed to take away from religious and tribal institutions. 
After years of reverting to traditional gender norms in Iraq, the post-Saddam era came 
with US policy to deliver gender equality. This included the involvement of women in the 
reconstruction efforts in Iraq, which were led by the US administration. Other US institutions 
such as Congress were also concerned with women’s status in Iraq.  
 
In May 2003, a bill “expressing the sense of Congress that the United States should 
provide assistance for women and women’s organizations in Iraq in order to strengthen 
and stabilize the emerging Iraqi democracy” was introduced” ... In November 2003, a 
bill “commending Iraqi women for their participation in Iraqi government and civil 
society, encouraging the inclusion of Iraqi women in the political and economic life of 
Iraq, and advocating the protection of Iraqi women’s human rights in the Iraqi 
Constitution” was introduced” (Armanios 2004: 14). 
 
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) declared gender equality as one of its goals in 
building a free and prosperous Iraq. During the eight years of occupation, and in its efforts 
to reconstruct Iraq, the U.S administration stressed its commitment to promote and support 
activities that would help women to take part in political, civil, and economic spheres in the 
new Iraq. To achieve this goal, it designated some of the funds allocated to the reconstruction 
of Iraq to activities pertaining to gender equality. For example, the CPA in conjunction with 
USAID funded several women’s centres, some of which were opened by CPA’s head, Paul 
Bremer, to train women in different fields, including business skills and legal advice. These 
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types of affirmative actions were a formal policy of the CPA (Al-Ali and Pratt 2009). 
However, the support for women’s ‘empowerment’ policies was implemented without 
considering the local social and political contexts. Neoliberal ideas, such as the importance 
of private entrepreneurship in democracy, underpinned these plans, without any regard for 
the reality of a war-torn country that for decades had been run by a heavily centralised state 
economy. In some cases, these centres raised suspicions amongst local people, who started 
asking questions about the purpose of these centres, which their women were attending.  
The post-Saddam era has not been a good time for improving gender equality in Iraq, 
as several developments during this period have helped consolidate the imbalanced power 
relations between the two sexes. Violence has been the biggest problem in post-Saddam Iraq, 
hindering progress on all social, political and economic levels. As mentioned above, the 
increasing participation of women in the public sphere under successive ‘secular’ regimes 
transformed gender relations in Iraq. The post-Saddam violence, however, has limited 
women’s presence in public domain, helping to reverse the achievements in gender relations. 
This is despite the increasing presence of women in other public domains such as the 
growing media sector and the political sphere, as will be explained later. For example, the 
lack of security has left women in a more vulnerable position, since they are afraid of going 
out in many areas because of the increasing number of abductions. This is a particularly 
sensitive matter, as abduction in many cases can mean rape. In a society that is oversensitive 
towards women’s sexual experiences, rape can bring shame and disrepute to the victim and 
her family. Also, the international organisations concerned with the improvement of 
women’s status had to leave the country in 2004 and 2005 because of the deteriorating 
security situation. Some of the people working for these organisations were killed, forcing 
others to move to neighbouring countries such as Jordan, and resorting to ‘remote 
management’. This has negatively affected the quality and the effectiveness of the services 
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they provide, many of which were aimed at preparing women to participate in socio-
economic activities. In addition to the politically or criminally motivated violence, reports 
indicate a rise in domestic violence, including honour-based violence (Linos et al. 2012). 
The inability and/or unwillingness of state institutions to act against this type of violence is 
a sign of the rise in traditional patriarchal norms.  
On the other hand, the proliferation of militia groups, most of them Islamic, had 
restrictive consequences for women’s participation in socio-political and economic 
activities. These groups grew in a power vacuum to oppose the Coalition Forces. They have 
been increasingly growing in power and influence, even after foreign troops left the country 
in 2011. Islamic militias have been attempting to impose their version of religion on society, 
and gender relations is an area they are very interested in. They have tried hard to impose 
traditional gender norms such as hijab and sex segregation (Al-Ali and Pratt 2009). The 
Sunni militias, such as Al-Qaeda and IS, have been the strictest about these gender norms in 
the areas they control; but also Shia militias who are part of the state, have had a huge 
influence on women’s presence in public spheres, as they propagate the gender relations that 
they see as being compatible with the religion of Islam, and the values, norms and customs 
of Iraqi society. In this regard, they are in line with the tribal forces that exploited the power 
vacuum and the adverse security situation to expand their influence in Iraqi society. They 
have enjoyed great influence since the early 1990s, but in post-2003 they have been able to 
consolidate their influence even more. In a largely tribal society such as Iraq, when the state 
institutions are unable to provide security for the citizens, it is only normal that they resort 
to traditional bonds to provide security for themselves. It is well known that people with 
larger and stronger tribes in Iraq enjoy more security than others. The growth of these 
conservative sections of society eroded many of the achievements that Iraqi women had been 
fighting for since the establishment of the state. This is not to say that gender equality was 
 129 
achieved under Saddam. The repressive nature of the regime; the militarisation of society; 
the subsequent wars and sanctions that undermined the infrastructures of the country in every 
single aspect, from education to health; the rise of the power of conservative groups that 
were keen to follow their deeply patriarchal and anti-equality agendas, and many other 
factors, resulted in a retreat to traditional patriarchal norms under Saddam. But the hopes 
that came mainly as a result of the coalition forces’ rhetoric about improving women’s status 
has definitely been shattered, and this happened soon after the war in 2003. The reality is 
that more than a decade after the toppling of Saddam Hussein by Allied Forces, women’s 
status in Iraq has declined in many areas (Green and Ward 2009). 
However, beside these negative developments, there have also been some important 
positive developments in regard to gender equality. The most obvious development is 
women’s quotas in the Iraqi parliament, the Kurdistan region parliament and in the 
provincial councils around the country. A minimum of 25% of member places in parliaments 
and provincial councils are guaranteed to be women; the figure for Kurdistan’s parliament 
is 30%. Even so, as Al-Ali and Pratt (2009) explain, many of these female members of 
parliament and provincial councils are members of Islamic parties and are not necessarily 
very keen on gender equality; in fact, in some cases they have fought to reverse the 
achievements made in this area. Yet no one cannot ignore the fact that women’s presence in 
higher levels of decision making at an unprecedented level, is a positive signal for people 
concerned with gender equality in Iraq. Some of the most active and influential members of 
parliament in Iraq are female, and the pictures of outspoken female politicians (both Islamic 
and secular) in Iraq has become a normal occurrence. In other areas of decision making, 
women are making progress too. For example, Thikra Alwash who took office in 2015 is the 
first female mayor of Baghdad.  
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4.5   Ird, Ghira and Áar 
Despite all the developments since the early years of the 20th Century, which resulted in 
fundamental changes in gender norms in Iraq, gender inequality remains an issue. The ideas 
promoted and encouraged by the country’s Islamic heritage are still persuasive, as certain 
cultural values are promoted by influential traditional authorities, such as clerics who infer 
their Islamic rules from this heritage. Traditional tribal values, which are to a great extent in 
line with this Islamic heritage, also play an important role in shaping current gender relations 
in Iraq. They informed Islamic values at the time of the advent of Islam and were 
subsequently influenced by Islamic heritage themselves. 
One of the most important of these tribal cultural values, which is key to understanding 
the current gender culture in Iraq, is ird. Although ird is not mentioned in the Quran, 
observing it is in line with the gender relations that are considered legitimate in Islam and 
promoted through the Quran, Sunnah23 and Islamic Jurisprudence. Indeed, the Islamic 
heritage encourages the spread and consolidation of the concept of ird (Dodd 1973), as will 
be seen later. Ird and the highly patriarchal set of values and customs developed around it 
are enshrined in the traditional culture of the society. In Iraq, patriarchy is centred on 
controlling women’s sexuality through observation and enforcement of codes of practice 
that have been developed around ird. This makes sexuality the main site of patriarchy in 
Iraq. 
Ird promotes a sexual double standard that obliges females to avoid a wide range of 
sexual behaviours that are allowed for men, including those that can be seen as sexuality 
inviting to a ‘strange’ man. In this manner, a simple act such as a smile or speaking loudly 
in public might be seen as a ‘dishonourable demeanour’. Ird is mainly a type of masculine 
                                               
23  Teachings and practices of  Prophet Muhammad and his disciples that are one of the main sources of Islamic 
Jurisprudence.  
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honour and females are considered equal to it, therefore it is very common in Iraq and other 
societies that value ird, to say that female members of a male’s kin are his ird. Thus, a male’s 
female kin and ird can be used interchangeably (Almaney 1981; Abu-Rabia 2011). Ird 
assigns men as women’s guardians. This is in line with Islam, as the Quran calls men the 
maintainers of women, as will be shown later. 
Men are expected to protect their ird (i.e. women) from any encroachment by ‘strange 
men’ and also to prevent women from engaging in any ‘inappropriate sexual behaviour’ to 
make sure that their women stay chaste to prevent bringing áar (dishonour) to the man and 
their family. If they fail to do so, men lose their social status and are ashamed because 
“[m]isbehavior by a woman detracts from her male figure's 'ird [honour]” (Abu-Rabia 2011: 
34).  In order to avoid the violation of ird and the prospect of bringing áar to them, men are 
supposed to act according to their ghira, which is one of the most significant concepts that 
have developed to support ird. Ghira is a virile moral courage that obliges men to protect 
some important and holy values and moral codes. For instance, a man with ghira takes care 
of and protects his family members, especially the ‘vulnerable’, such as children, the elderly 
and women, but also his homeland and religion. So someone who has ghira is courageous 
and always ready to defend his family, religious beliefs or country, amongst other things, 
through taking different action, including violence. One of the most important values that a 
person with ghira has to defend is his ird. A man with ghira might take pre-emptive actions 
in order to keep his ird intact, for example by circumscribing his female kin’s movements to 
make sure that they are not exposed to ‘indecent’ sexual behaviours. In more extreme cases 
women are deprived from any sexual pleasure so that they remain ‘restrained’, hence the 
proliferation of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM)24 (UNICEF 2011) in some areas of Iraq. 
However, a ‘decent woman’ is expected to preserve and protect the ird of the family herself 
                                               
24 This practise is more widespread in Iraqi Kurdistan and almost non-existence in the Arabic parts of Iraq. 
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by avoiding any sexual contact outside marriage; in this regard it is mainly the responsibility 
of mothers to bring up ‘modest’ and ‘chaste’ daughters.  
Ird can be violated to different degrees and men with ghira are expected to react 
accordingly. Not wearing modest clothing can violate ird, and in this case men might be 
expected to pressurise or even force their female kin to comply with ird codes and wear 
‘proper clothing’. The definition of appropriate behaviour, however, can differ from family 
to family and from community to community. For example, for some communities, not 
observing Islamic hijab might be considered a violation of ird, but in some other 
communities it might not be. But when ird is violated, according to the delineation of the 
family or community, men need to take action. The ultimate level of the violation of ird is 
penetration by a non-husband man, especially one that leads to pregnancy. This will bring 
áar to the family, and male members’ ird is affronted, therefore they are shamed and lose 
their status and respect in their society. In this case the family, and especially men, are 
supposed to take action to amend the situation and regain their reputation. This happens by 
making several different moves that vary widely, from verbal reproach to death. “Elopement, 
marriage, hushing-up of violations, compensation and banishment, or any combination 
thereof are the usual and preferred solutions for cases of honor” (Abou-Zeid 1965: 685, cited 
in Dodd 1973: 43). However, there are cases where the penalty for the violation of ird is 
much harsher. This is when a man (or a group of men who are the relatives of the woman 
who violated ird) decides to ‘wash away’ the áar, which is brought to them by one of their 
female kin so that they regain their honour and consequently social status. In this case she 
might be murdered, in an act of honour crime. “The penalties for violation of the norms 
surrounding Ird are severe and may include death. These are the penalties inflicted by men 
on women of their own family” (Dodd 1973: 45). As explained above, violence is an 
important site of patriarchy that helps men to subordinate women; in this case to make them 
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abide by the ird related values and norms that are designed to restrict women’s sexuality, 
which is another very important site of patriarchy.  
The severity of the penalty may have a strong connection with whether or not the 
public is aware of the act. Families may try to keep these violations a secret, so that their 
honour remains intact; if successful, the penalties are normally less severe because “Ird is a 
matter of reputation even more than of fact. What other people think becomes as important 
as what takes place” (Dodd 1973: 45). 
 Ird is not necessarily an individual attribute. A group, such as a tribe or religious sect, 
may have a shared ird. This cultural value is a universal notion in Iraq (and indeed many 
other countries in the region) (Khayyat 1990). “68% of young Iraqi men believe that killing 
a girl for dishonouring the family is justifiable” (Human Rights Council 2014: 3). The 
agnates and husbands are primarily responsible for preserving the ird of the family. The 
significance of this concept in gender relations in Iraq varies between different communities 
and among different families, but it is fair to say that it is present in all communities. In 
communities where tribal ties are stronger, codes around ird are observed more strictly and 
diligently. The concept’s extension is also wider in families that belong to these 
communities, so it could go beyond sisters and wives and be extended to female cousins and 
other relatives too. In communities with less tribal ties, these cultural values are less strictly 
observed, giving female members of these families a greater chance of self-determination.  
In these families, ird covers only sisters, wives and in some cases mothers, especially if the 
mother is/or looks young. Additionally, the severity of the punishment meted out on the 
females who violate codes related to ird is much less severe and can be as lenient as “being 
lectured on morals” (Khayyat 1990: 23), especially if the violation of ird that has happened 
is not in the form of sexual intercourse but less advanced relationships.  
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Although the concept ghira can be attributed to women as well, it is predominantly a 
masculine one. The masculinity connected to the concept ghira is ‘constructed in relation to 
various subordinated masculinities’ (Connell 1991: 183); therefore, a man who does not 
conform to the codes around ghira and is not ready to defend his ird, for example by showing 
indifference towards his female kin’s sexual conduct, is mocked, humiliated, shamed, and 
in more extreme cases, ostracised. A man who does not have ghira is viewed as lacking 
morality. In order to have status in society, a man needs to have ghira and be prepared to 
defend his ird. The masculinity embedded in the gender system of ird and ghira is a 
hegemonic one, and it subordinates and delegitimises other masculinities by claiming honour 
and morality to itself only and dispossessing these values from other types of masculinity. 
 
4.6   Ird, Ghira and Áar: Hegemonic Masculinity  
Hegemonic masculinity is the pattern of practice that facilitates the continuation of men’s 
dominance over women. It is distinguished from other types of masculinities in that it 
embodies “the currently most honored way of being a man” and requires “all other men to 
position themselves in relation to it” (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005: 832).  In this manner 
it discredits other types of masculinities through a variety of mechanisms spanning from 
mockery to violence. 
Hegemonic masculinity is not considered to be normal, but it presents some patterns 
of practice as a collective ideal. Actually, the exemplars of hegemonic masculine men are 
normally only a minority, and there is a distance between this collective ideal and most 
men’s actual lives, but the concept is certainly normative. However, most men benefit from 
the patriarchy sustained by patterns of action enforced by hegemonic musicality, without 
necessarily conforming to the characteristic of its exemplars. These men show a complicit 
masculinity. In fact, the power of hegemonic masculinity lies in complicity from these men 
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who do not necessarily enact the strongest version of hegemonic masculinity. On the other 
hand, in order for hegemonic masculinity to be sustained, it requires compliance from 
women too. These are usually women who are persuaded that hegemonically masculine 
patterns of practice are the norms and benefit them. Therefore, enacting hegemonic 
masculinity does not necessarily require violence, although it could be supported by it; it 
mainly consolidates men’s ascendancy over women “through culture, institutions, and 
persuasion” (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005: 832). 
The gender system of ird is a hegemonic masculine pattern of practice that 
consolidates and sustains patriarchy in Iraqi society. This system has great implications for 
women as well as men in Iraqi society. Sex segregation; emphasis on hijab and ‘modest 
clothing’ that extremely limits women’s choices in what they can wear; preventing from or 
limiting women’s access to education or paid-work in mixed-sex environments; preventing 
women looking for a sexual partner and choosing one that they see fit, are amongst these 
implications. In fact, in order to observe ird in a society “the actions of women must be 
strictly circumscribed” (Dodd 1973: 46). Through observing ird and ghira, almost all aspects 
of women’s lives can be determined by male family members or relatives and, consequently, 
the notion of self-determination diminishes. It is important to note that the collective ideal is 
to make sure women do not have ‘inappropriate sexual contact or even thoughts’ and to 
regain ird in the case of violation. To what extent men are willing or able to enforce codes 
around ird and to conform to the ‘ideal’ man with ghira determines how much control they 
have over their female kin’s lives. And this varies from person to person and community to 
community in societies that value ird. This explains why in some of these societies women 
can have a great deal of freedom of movement and can excel in many roles in society. 
Despite the fact that the developments of the last century have changed women’s status 
in Iraq and that, nowadays, many Iraqi women are participating in public activities, the 
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traditional cultural values of ird and ghira still allow men to dominate women and greatly 
shape their lives in accordance with their own benefits. It is worth noting that this male 
dominance and control is sustained without necessarily using force. This “social ascendancy 
[is] achieved in a play of social forces that extends beyond contents of brute power into the 
organization of private life and cultural processes” (Connell 1991: 184). Linking women’s 
sexual conduct to men’s pride, honour, morality, reputation and masculinity has made it very 
difficult for women to avoid this system, and it has allowed men to limit women’s activities 
in almost all aspects of their lives. Equally, the support that other sites of patriarchy such as 
culture, violence and the state give to ird, creates a very efficient system that is difficult to 
avoid. Culture, represented by religious and tribal values and norms, is particularly 
important, because it persuades women to abide by the rules of ird voluntarily.  
Accordingly, women have to depend on men’s judgment and decisions to take any 
step in life, even in the most basic and private matters. For example, men can decide when 
a woman (in many cases children) is ready for marriage and who can be the future husband, 
or if they can study or work outside their home. Even when women are allowed to study or 
work, in many cases women feel the threat of losing this privilege any minute if men come 
to the conclusion that this is against their ird (for example if a woman tries to establish a 
relationship with a man). As a result, women must be very vigilant and try to keep men 
happy by obeying them, so that they can enjoy some of their rights.25 
Equally, the system of ird makes it difficult for men who otherwise might not be 
particularly interested in dominating their own female kin members, to ignore codes 
connected to these concepts. They will be insulted and mocked and degraded. A whole 
system of swearwords has been developed around these concepts. In order to insult someone, 
                                               
25 This is not to say that women in Iraq are passive and that they never resist patriarchy, and that they are 
completely under men’s control. It is rather to emphasise that the exemplars of this type of hegemonic 
masculinity are men with ghira who are in full control of their own female kin’s lives. In fact, it is very possible 
that many men cannot or are not willing to fully live up to these exemplars.  
 137 
people use sexual words towards their female kin members. These words can hurt men in 
Iraq and in many cases can be the start of physical violence. In fact, the ultimate insult is 
when someone is labelled as lacking ghira. This might even result in tribal disputes that need 
to be resolved through fasel and sulh in a tribal court (Carroll 2011). The concepts of ird and 
ghira are powerful and hegemonic and make men, especially those from families with 
stronger tribal ties, feel huge pressures to observe codes connected to them in order to gain 
status in their society and retain their honour and dignity. Shame, reputation, dignity, honour 
and morality are used in this system as notions that help “in preventing alternative 
[masculinities] gaining cultural definition and recognition as alternative” (Connell 1991: 
186). 
On the other hand, patterns of action related to the hegemonic masculine system of ird 
are presented as positive and beneficial for women to persuade them to conform to them. In 
fact, “most accounts of hegemonic masculinity do include such “positive” actions as 
bringing home a wage, sustaining a sexual relationship, and being a father” (Connell and 
Messerschmidt 2005: 840-41). Men and women in general consider ghira to be a positive 
attribute in Iraq. As explained above, a man with ghira is very keen to look after and protect 
the ‘vulnerable’ members of his family, mainly women and children, and to provide for 
them. This ‘positive’ aspect of hegemonic masculine actions plays a role in persuading 
women that it is in their own interests to conform to the codes around this system, especially 
when draws on revered cultural values such as religious values. In fact, hegemonic 
masculinity does not necessarily mean being horrible towards women. On the contrary, 
women might feel more comfortable and familiar and safe with this type of masculinity.  
 
…it is difficult to see how the concept of hegemony would be relevant if the only 
characteristics of the dominant group were violence, aggression, and self-
 138 
centeredness. Such characteristics may mean domination but hardly would constitute 
hegemony—an idea that embeds certain notions of consent and participation by the 
subaltern groups (ibid). 
 
This pattern of practice can be more persuading when there is “a kind of fit between 
hegemonic masculinity and emphasised femininity” (Connell 1991: 185). In this system a 
‘real’ man is defined as a man who is zealous about his female kin, that has ghira and is 
prepared to defend his ird. This is considered a characteristic of a courageous man who 
protects women from the bad intentions of strange men who try to encroach on their chastity 
and reputation, and therefore is ideal for them. This masculine gesture is played against the 
emphasised feminine characteristics of being modest, soft, vulnerable, intellectually inferior 
and needing protection from a ‘real’ man to feel safe.  
 
Out of this opposition of male and female sexual roles emerges an extreme duality in 
the conception of male and female character and in the positive and negative aspects 
of feminine character as well. Men are assertive, strong, rational, capable of self-
control, especially sexual control; women are vulnerable, weak, emotional, 
uncontrolled, and unreliable, especially sexually (Dickemann 1981: 419). 
 
By accepting the argument that is based on the claim that women are inferior and in need of 
the superior men’s protection, women are complicit in the hegemonic masculine system of 
ird. It is, however, important to bear in mind that although ird does draw upon emphasised 
femininity as a persuasion mechanism to sustain patriarchy, it also draws on other very 
important notions to make it even more persuasive for women to accept the dominance of 
men and be complicit in this. As explained above, Iraqi patriarchy draws upon traditional 
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cultural values (e.g. religious, tribal) that constitute the value system of Iraqi people. These 
values are the pillars of Iraqi people’s identity, making it more difficult for women to oppose 
or resist them, because that will mean opposing the very value system that they dearly 
respect. 
 
4.7   Religion 
As explained previously, culture is an important site of patriarchy. In Iraq, tribal as well as 
religious texts work hand in hand with sexuality to promote and sustain patriarchy. This 
explains why ird and its relevant codes and practises are so pervasive and convincing for 
both men and women in Iraq, as these concepts are intertwined with religious ideologies in 
a sophisticated manner. Religion, as an important source of morality in Iraq, obliges people 
(both males and females) to conform to some aspects of ird. The role of religion in promoting 
ird is a vital one, because, as explained in Chapter Two, traditional institutions in Iraq are 
widely respected and religious leaders are highly influential. Although the term ird is not 
mentioned in the Quran, some of the values revolving around it have been encouraged and 
incited in the Quran, Sunnah and Islamic Jurisprudence. The Quranic verse 34 of the Surah 
(chapter 4) Al-Nisa (Women) reads  
 
Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has made one of 
them to excel the other, and because they spend (to support them) from their means. 
Therefore the righteous women are devoutly obedient (to Allah and to their husbands), 
and guard in the husband's absence what Allah orders them to guard (e.g. their chastity, 
their husband's property, etc.). As to those women on whose part you see illconduct 
[sic], admonish them (first), (next), refuse to share their beds, (and last) beat them 
(lightly, if it is useful), but if they return to obedience, seek not against them means 
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(of annoyance). Surely, Allah is Ever Most High, Most Great (The Qur’anic Arabic 
Corpus, verse 4:34). 
 
According to this Qur’anic verse, men are supposed to protect women (‘protectors and 
maintainers’; in other translations the same term has been translated to ‘managers of the 
affairs of women’ or ‘in charge of women’). On the other hand, women are expected to be 
obedient and chaste. If they disobey their husbands or violate their chastity, they must be 
punished, including by physical punishment. 
This Qur’anic notion, which is part of Iraqi Muslims’ moral belief system, is in 
accordance with the hegemonic masculine system of ird. Additionally, in this verse there “is 
an overt recognition of the relation between masculine control over female sexuality and 
male investment of effort in offspring” (Dickemann 1981: 420). Men ‘spend from their 
means’ and in return expect women’s obedience and sexual control. 
Islamic Jurisprudence plays an important role in the daily lives of Iraqi people. Muslim 
clerics’ religious publications and sermons are full of rules for women who are advised to 
be modest and obey their guardians (mainly, fathers and husbands and in the event of the 
absence of them, for example as a result of death, paternal grandfathers, brothers and uncles. 
See Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani’s website). For example, according to most Shia clerics, 
women need their husband’s permission to go out. Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, instructs people 
on his website about this rule: “For a woman with whom permanent marriage is contracted, 
it is haram [unlawful] to go out of the house without the permission of her husband” 
(Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, Marriage, Rules regarding permanent marriage, Rule: 2421). This 
obligatory rule is consistent with the traditional cultural values of ird and ghira. Another 
value that is promoted both by ird and Islam is the concept of modesty for women. The 
concept ird, as well as the religion of Islam, encourages and enforces female dress codes in 
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a stricter fashion than male dress code. The Qur’anic verse 31 of the Surah An Nur (Chapter 
24) set outs in detail the legitimate dress code for women: 
 
And say to the believing women that they should lower their gaze and guard their 
modesty; that they should not display their beauty and ornaments except what (must 
ordinarily) appear thereof; that they should draw their veils over their bosoms and not 
display their beauty except to their husbands, their fathers, their husband's fathers, their 
sons, their husbands' sons, their brothers or their brothers' sons, or their sisters' sons, 
or their women, or the slaves whom their right hands possess, or male servants free of 
physical needs, or small children who have no sense of the shame of sex; and that they 
should not strike their feet in order to draw attention to their hidden ornaments. And 
O ye Believers! turn ye all together towards Allah, that ye may attain Bliss (The 
Quranic Arabic Corpus, verse 24:3126). 
 
This code is also reflected in Islamic Jurisprudence: 
 
Woman should conceal her body and hair from a man who is non-Mahram27, and as 
an obligatory precaution, she should conceal herself even from a Na-baligh28 boy who 
is able to discern between good and evil, and could probably be sexually excited. But 
she can leave her face and hands upto (sic) wrists uncovered in the presence of Na-
Mahram, as long as it does not lead him to casting a sinful, evil glance or her to doing 
                                               
26 There is no consensus among Muslim clerics as to how much of women’s bodies should be covered. For 
example, some believe that this includes the woman’s face too and some rule out covering the face. However, 
almost all agree that women need to dress and behave modestly.  
27Mahram is an unmarriageable kin (such as father/mother, brother/sister, etc.) with whom sexual intercourse 
is considered incestuous. The rest of people are non-Mahram 
28 A person who has not yet reached puberty. 
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something forbidden; for in both these cases, she must cover them (Ayatollah Ali Al-
Sistani, Marriage: Looking at non-Mahram, Rule: 2442). 
 
Sex segregation is another code of practise related to ird that is encouraged by Islam as well: 
 
It is haram for a man and a woman who are not Mahram, to be together at a private 
place where there is no one else, if it is feared to lead to immorality and scandal, even 
if it is a place where another person can easily arrive. But if there is no fear of any evil, 
there is no objection (Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, Marriage, Miscellaneous rules 
concerning marriage, Rule: 2454). 
 
Women who believe in these Islamic moral values and act according to them are complicit 
in promoting and enforcing hegemonic musicality that works towards sustaining patriarchy 
in a sophisticated multi-pronged, multi-layer manner. Therefore, it is fair to say that the 
subordination of women by men through the hegemonic masculine ideas of ird is achieved 
by persuasion to a great extent rather than force. Nonetheless, this does not mean that using 
force is completely avoided.  
 
4.8   Violence and Religion 
Women, who do not obey the rules of the hegemonic masculine concept of ird, can be 
severely punished. These women might face a range of honour-based violence in verbal, 
economic and physical forms, including murder. Violence is an important site of patriarchy. 
The legitimacy of using ird-based violence comes from another basis of patriarchy, which 
is culture; this type of violence is in accordance with Islamic Jurisprudence. Although the 
interpretation of the verse from the Qur’anic Surah mentioned above varies among Muslim 
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scholars,29 Ayatollah Sistani’s rulings are clear on this matter. He instructs his followers that 
men are allowed to beat their wives if they disobey them, although they are not allowed to 
beat harshly and the beating should be used as the third step for disciplining the wife (in line 
with the above Qur’anic verse) and that it shouldn’t be done in revenge (see اﯾﺔ ﷲ ﻋﻠﻲ 
اﻟﺴﯿﺴﺘﺎﻧﻲ، اﺣﻜﺎم اﻟﻨﺸﻮز واﻟﺸﻘﺎق، ﻣﺴﺌﻠﺔ ٣٥٣  [Ayatollah Ali Sistani: Rules of recalcitrance and 
discord, rule 353]). Ayatollah Sistani is also clear that if a man does not fulfil his marital 
duties, his wife is not allowed to beat him. 
In addition to that, according to Islamic Jurisprudence, a married women’s punishment 
for adultery is death30. Although theoretically this applies to men as well, a sexual double 
standard promoted by Islam gives men more freedom to have various sexual partners. The 
Quran allows men to marry up to four wives at a time. Verse 3 of chapter 4 (Al-nisa) reads 
 
And if you fear that you shall not be able to deal justly with the orphan girls, then 
marry (other) women of your choice, two or three, or four but if you fear that you shall 
not be able to deal justly (with them), then only one or (the captives and the slaves) 
that your right hands possess. That is nearer to prevent you from doing injustice (The 
Qur’anic Arabic Corpus, verse 4:3). 
 
Although there are debates amongst Islamic scholars as to whether this is an unambiguous 
rule that allows men to marry a maximum of four wives, orthodox Islamic Jurisprudence 
tends to take this Qur’anic verse literally and sanction polygyny.  
                                               
29 There is a debate amongst Muslim scholars about the extent of the permissible violence and some have 
argued that the beating mentioned in this verse is symbolic, therefore men are not allowed to be violent towards 
their wives in any case. 
30 There is a debate amongst Islamic scholars as to whether it is possible at all to prove that someone has 
committed adultery.  
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In addition, Shia orthodox Jurisprudence allows men, including married men, to temporarily 
marry an unlimited number of women under certain circumstances for the purpose of sexual 
pleasure. These temporary marriages known as mut’ah (literally pleasure) “are contractual 
arrangements that legally unite [husband and wife] for a designated amount of time and for 
which the temporary wife is paid” (Ghodsi 1993: 645). Mut’ah is however not open for 
married women as all Shia mujtahids have ruled out mut’ah marriage for married women. 
Additionally, men can have as many temporary wives as they can afford, while women can 
only enter into one temporary marriage at a time and need to wait a certain period of time 
before remarrying (Ghodsi 1993), mainly for the purpose of paternity certainty (Iddah, The 
Oxford dictionary of Islam). Furthermore, virgin girls are not allowed to marry mut’ah 
without their guardian’s (mainly father) permission (for more information about mut’ah see: 
Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, Marriage, Marriage: Mut'ah (temporary marriage)). 
These rules promoted by Islam delineate a sexual double standard that greatly restricts 
women’s sexual conduct in a way that is aligned with ird and ghira. 
 
4.9   Legal System 
The state itself is also an important site of patriarchy in Iraq. Although for years successive 
Iraqi regimes have attempted to undermine Iraqi traditional patriarchy in order to consolidate 
state powers, various state institutions have also been supporting traditional patriarchy in 
Iraq. This is especially true for the post-Saddam era where the state is more influenced by 
the traditional forces of religion and tribe; in particular, the shows of empathy towards 
observing ird and its pertinent concepts, values and norms. The hegemonic masculine system 
of ird, through which ascendancy of men becomes possible, is not only promoted by tribal 
cultural values and religious doctrines, it is also backed by the Iraqi legal system. In fact, 
religious and tribal doctrines have, to some extent, shaped Iraqi state law. The Iraqi legal 
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system is obliged to respect Islamic principles. Also, the constitution emphasises the state’s 
responsibility towards advancing the tribes. 
According to the Iraqi penal code a man can physically punish his wife in order to 
discipline her. Again, two important sites for patriarchy- state and violence- working hand 
in hand to sustain men’s domination over women. This violence allowed under state law is 
also consistent with the country’s cultural norms, which is another site of patriarchy. 
“Paragraph 41 of the 1969 penal code considers a husband’s punishment of his wife to be a 
legitimate private right… this is consistent with prevailing interpretations of Shari‘a” 
(Ahmed 2010: 168). Moreover, the sexual double standard that greatly restricts women’s 
sexual conduct in comparison to men is also enshrined into the legal system in Iraq. For 
instance, Iraqi law stipulates that polygyny is permissible under specific circumstances, 
while there is no mention of polyandry, as women are allowed to have only one husband at 
a time.  
 
Polygamy is permitted under the law if a court finds that the husband can financially 
support more than one wife and treat them equally, but Ba’athist-era amendments 
allow men to evade even these restrictions if the new wife is a widow or if the husband 
initiates a divorce, marries, and then reconciles with his first wife (ibid). 
 
Supportive of ird and ghira is also the punishment for honour killings in Iraqi penal code. 
Article 405 of the Iraqi Penal Code No 111 of 1969 (amended) stipulates that “Any person 
who wilfully kills another is punishable by life imprisonment or imprisonment for a term of 
years” (Iraq Federal Law 1969). Article 406 considers the death penalty for murder under 
certain circumstances. However, when it comes to ird-related crimes the law is much more 
lenient. In this regards article 409 stipulates:  
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Any person who surprises his wife in the act of adultery or finds his girlfriend in bed 
with her lover and kills them immediately or one of them or assaults one of them so 
that he or she dies or is left permanently disabled is punishable by a period of detention 
not exceeding 3 years (Iraq Federal Law 1969). 
 
The state, as a site of patriarchy, is clearly supporting the system of ird. The implementation 
of this lenient punishment for ird-based killing sometimes proves difficult, mainly due to the 
complicity of the men who are in charge of enforcing the law in a society where most of the 
policemen and judges are men. The brutal murder of Do’a, a 17-year-old Yazidi girl, in 2005 
is a vivid example of the complicity of men, including policemen, in enforcing the 
punishment codes connected to ghira and ird. Do’a was publicly stoned to death in broad 
daylight because she fell in love and fled from home with a man31. In the footage taken from 
this collective punishment, tens of people including police personnel either take part in the 
act of stoning or watch it (Mahmoud 2007). Although most of the men were bystanders and 
did not actively participle in the act of stoning, as the beneficiaries of  ird, they allowed the 
murder to be committed. As explained in the previous section:  
 
the number of men rigorously practising the hegemonic pattern in its entirety may be 
quite small. Yet the majority of men gain from its hegemony, since they benefit from 
the patriarchal dividend, the advantage men in general gain from the overall 
subordination of women (Connell 2014: 79).  
                                               
31 Publicly killing, and especially stoning a woman that has violated ird, is very rare in Iraq. However, this case 
clearly highlights the complicity of men in enforcing codes related to ird. 
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As a result, family members who resort to ird-base violence, “often receive sympathy and 
tolerance from the police, if not encouragement for doing what they see as the right thing. 
Perpetrators are released without investigation or charges, and the government remains 
silent, treating the cases as private matters” (Ahmad 2010: 163). Another obstacle in the way 
of implementing the law is that these crimes largely go unreported and the death is attributed 
to accidents or militia violence (Ahmad 2010). This environment of complicity and support 
of ird makes it very difficult to implement the law that softly punishes the perpetrators of 
ird-base violence, not least because the people in charge can relate to ird and ghira and are 
benefiting from these values. 
Patriarchy is deeply embedded in Iraqi culture. It is centred around sexuality and is 
sustained through sophisticated mechanisms that are promoted and enforced by old-
established institutions, using a variety of notions and mechanisms to sustain men’s 
ascendancy over women; different sites of patriarchy work together to endure this 
domination. However, masculine domination is not self-producing and “is open to challenge 
and requires considerable effort to maintain” (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005: 844). In 
modern societies, the patriarchal family has been challenged for a variety of reasons, 
including the transformation of women’s consciousness. This is a multi-dimensional process 
that has increasingly spread around the world, transforming traditional views on gender 
relations. The current trend indicates “a substantial decline of traditional forms of patriarchal 
family” (Castells 2010: 194) around the world but especially in developed countries. How 
about Iraq? Have the cultural values that underpin the Iraqi patriarchal family and encompass 
gender culture been altered? And what role does the media play in this regard? 
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4.10   Conclusion 
Iraqi gender culture draws heavily on cultural values that originated from Ancient Arabia. 
But the developments in the last century have also left their finger print on gender culture in 
this country. The introduction of ideas about gender equality, self-determination, unveiling 
and female participation in public sphere, amongst others, have transformed the gender 
culture in Iraq. Yet, the country is still deeply patriarchal. Iraqi patriarchy is deeply enshrined 
in the traditional institutions of tribe and religion that have greatly shaped the cultural sphere 
of the country. Ird and the concepts that have been developed around it allow men to limit 
women’s sexual agency. This is a hegemonic masculine system that legitimises only one 
type of sexual attitude and discredits the rest. Men and women who do not follow the rules 
of this system lose their status in society. The rules stipulate that a man’s reputation is related 
to their female kin sexual demeanour, while a woman’s reputation is linked to their virtue. 
In this manner, women are denied sexual agency, as they are only permitted to have sexual 
relations that are considered legitimate under this system. By limiting women’s sexual 
agency and linking it to men’s reputation, women’s lives are also limited in other areas, as 
many social activities are considered to put women in a situation in which ird is prone to be 
violated. Men, however, have more choice concerning their sexual relations, hence the 
existence of a sexual double-standard in Iraqi society. This does not, however, mean that 
men are not under pressure. They feel pressurised to defend their honour, through a variety 
of actions that include murdering their own female kin. Although this is the last resort, 
persuasion and the threat of violence are used as pre-emptive methods to avoid violent 
reparative actions. As in any other hegemonic masculine system, not all men are willing to 
do so, however, the majority are compliant with the rules as they benefit from the dividends 
provided by the system. Women also are compliant with ird-related rules and this facilitates 
the continuation of ird, because they believe that that the benefit from it. This makes 
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sexuality the main site of patriarchy in Iraq. Other systems, however, support sexuality as a 
patriarchal site, for example the cultural systems of religion and tribe legitimise ird-related 
actions. Violence in this regard is also legitimised. State institutions that draw on traditional 
values also support ird in a variety of ways, including refraining from punishing men who 
commit ird-related violent acts. This complicated system works in an efficient way to sustain 
men’s dominance over women.  
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Chapter 5: Methodology 
 
5.1   Background 
This research explores the ways in which Iraqi citizens have sought to use media 
communications as part of their daily lives and, in particular, the ways in which the media 
has become embedded in practices that relate to gender relations. A key question here is to 
consider whether Iraqi citizens’ access to media helps shape the ways in which they perceive 
gender relations. This question is especially important for women, whose lives are greatly 
shaped by patriarchal structures. The idea of this research came out of my curiosity about 
what is called the ‘impact’ of media on social relations. Since the abrupt introduction of 
satellite TV and the internet post 2003, Iraqis have been concerned about its ‘impact’ on 
their society. Media reports that warn about the negative impact of the media on social 
values, family bonds, and so on, have never stopped. Even today, one can find such reports 
supported by ‘experts’ opinions. Psychologists and sociologists, solicitors and judges, 
teachers and clerics, have voiced their concerns over this ‘devastating impact’. Yet, the 
proliferation of the media in Iraq is intensifying by the day. People are rushing to buy the 
latest technology, and millions use it for a variety of reasons (Amos 2010: 11). One of the 
main areas that the question of the negative ‘influence’ of the media focuses on is gender 
relations. It is interesting that in a country where various terrorist groups have been using 
the media for more than a decade for propaganda and recruiting purposes, people in Iraq 
seem to be much more concerned about the ‘influence’ of the media on gender culture.  
I was born in Iraq, but since the age of two, I lived in the neighbouring country of Iran. 
I am well aware of the Iranian regime’s sensitivity towards the media. As a child, I remember 
how people hid their video players and VHS cassettes to avoid being caught by the 
authorities. Then satellite TV and the internet came along, only for the regime to start a 
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campaign of censorship and surveillance. The Iraqi regime was even stricter, but the 2003 
war changed everything in Iraq. I was always curious to know what will happen when you 
have an open media environment in a country in which a strictly conservative value system 
dominates. I was raised in an environment in which the elite constantly warned against the 
horrible consequences of having an open media environment with regard to people’s 
traditions and moral values. The education system, the state owned and run media, and the 
clergy through their access to a vast network of mosques, were all repeating the same claims. 
Sexuality and gender culture were also the main point of focus. The negative ‘influence’ on 
women was particularly highlighted. 
 Despite the public concern over the media’s ‘influence’ in Iraq, academic circles have 
not paid much attention to this area. To help fill this gap, I embarked on this very important, 
but hugely under-investigated area of research.  
The relationship between the media and gender is always about agency and structure, 
especially in a deeply patriarchal society, and the next section deals with this issue. 
 
5.2   Structuration and Iraqi Gender Culture 
Classic sociologists and social theorists such as Marx, Weber and Durkheim, have all tried 
to deal with the question of social structure and individual agency. This is also true about 
many modern thinkers. This issue is at the heart of social theory, as well as the philosophy 
of the social sciences. In the past, the relationship between structure and agency “was usually 
seen as a dualism between individual and society, or the actor and the social system” 
(Giddens and Pierson 1998: 75). In functionalism and structuralism, social structure is 
granted primacy over agency; from this perspective, “the constraining qualities of structure 
are strongly accentuated” (Giddens 1986: 2). In this regard, social structures are viewed as 
“primary, hard, and immutable, like the girders of a building” (Sewell Jr 1992: 2); whereas 
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the social processes that they structure are considered to be secondary. Human agency, “the 
capability to do otherwise” (Giddens and Pierson 1998: 75), is therefore eclipsed. According 
to this viewpoint, structures exist apart from human actions, yet they determine and shape 
them. Karl Marx’s famous quote can be seen as representative of this viewpoint: “Man 
makes his own history, but he does not make it out of the whole cloth; he does not make it 
out of conditions chosen by himself, but out of such as he finds close at hand. The tradition 
of all past generations weighs like an alp upon the brain of the living” (Marx 2008: 12). 
Structure is “one of the most… elusive terms in the vocabulary of current social science” 
(Sewell Jr 1992: 1). As a result, it is very difficult to provide a universal definition of social 
structure. As a matter of fact, “"[u]niversal" notions of structure have been…opposed on 
both theoretical and empirical grounds” (Kontopoulos 2003: 2). There are, however, features 
of social life that have been described as being constitutive of social structure. 
There is another view, adopted mainly by proponents of interpretative sociologies, that 
believes in the accentuation of human agency over social structures. In this sense 
“individuals are regarded as the only constituents of the social world and their actions and 
reactions, their reasons, motives and beliefs, are the sole ingredients of social explanation” 
(Thompson 1994: 56). According to this worldview, structures are not particularly 
prominent and there is not much emphasis on constraint. Social structures are nothing but 
patterns that are generated by the repeated acts of individuals, giving human agency primacy 
over social structure, so the argument goes. These individuals are competent agents and they 
have great knowledge about the social world. Their actions are purposive and reflective; 
thus, they can provide reasons for what they do.  
This dichotomy, which insists on a rigid view of social reality has, however, been 
contested by another view that believes that instead of looking at the dominance of social 
structure and human agency over each other, we need to regard them as complementary 
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terms-as a duality. 
 
What must be grasped is not how structure determines action or how a combination of 
actions make up structure, but rather how action is structured in everyday contexts and 
how the structured features of action are, by the very performance of an action, thereby 
reproduced (Thompson 1994: 56).  
 
The most prominent advocate of this understanding of the social world is Anthony Giddens 
and his structuration theory, which is best explained in his famous book, The Constitution 
of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (1986). In this research, I have adopted a 
conception of society which believes in the duality of structure.  
Giddens writes “I mean that social structures are both constituted by human agency, 
and yet at the same time are the very medium of this constitution” (1979: 121). Every act 
that results in production is simultaneously engaged in the act of reproduction. The same 
structure that makes an action possible is, in the performance of that same action, 
reproduced. Structuration theory sees social life “as a series of ongoing activities and 
practices that people carry on, which at the same time reproduce larger institutions” (Giddens 
and Pierson 1998: 76). It does not, however, follow that social structures are static and 
reproduced in the same form over and over again. In the social world, there are actions that 
are considered to be disruptive of social order, for example by breaking conventions or 
challenging established hierarchies. Even these actions are mediated by structural features, 
which are themselves reproduced by these actions. This reconstitution results in the 
appearance of a modified form of these structures.   
The close connection between production and reproduction is what Giddens calls the 
‘recursive character’ of social life. In this regard, structure is viewed as rules and resources 
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recursively implicated in social reproduction. These social structures in the form of larger 
institutions are the medium of human activities, as well as the result of them. In this sense, 
human actions and social structures are not considered as separate concepts that can 
dominate each other, but as being dual, part of the same processes. Therefore,  
 
’[s]ociety’ can be understood as a complex of recurrent practices which form 
institutions. Those practices depend upon the habits and forms of life which 
individuals adopt. Individuals don't just 'use' these in their activity but these life 
practices constitute what that activity is (Giddens and Pierson 1998: 76-77). 
 
Social structures are mainly expressed in what people repeatedly do in a regularised manner. 
They present some constraints on human behaviour, but at the same time create possibilities 
through which humans can transform the structures. The structural properties of social 
systems exist when social actions are reproduced time and again across time and space. They 
exist to the extent that there are established conventions that people follow.  
 
Structure only exists in so far as people do things knowledgeably and do them in 
certain contexts that have particular consequences. Those consequences are often ones 
that they don't themselves foresee or even know about-but it is their regular happening, 
their reproduction-which makes them structural and allows us to talk of structural 
effects (Giddens and Pierson 1998: 81). 
 
But what are these structural properties and how do they constrain human activities? These 
properties have a structural effect on people’s actions. They do not have a physical existence, 
but they can be very fixed and ‘hard’, such as the structural properties of ird. “They depend 
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upon regularities of social reproduction” (Giddens and Pierson 1998: 77). Obviously, their 
‘hardness’ varies from society to society and from community to community. Sometimes 
they are so strong that can be as powerful as physical coercion, as is the case in some Iraqi 
communities that strictly abide by concepts of ird. Ird can confine women to very limited 
spaces, similar to a physical barrier that does not allow people to pass a specific point.  
Nevertheless, life for members of other Iraqi communities might be less shaped by the 
structural properties of ird and, therefore, women in these communities have a greater say 
on their lifestyles; although it may be the case that their lives are more shaped by other 
structural qualities such as that of capitalist consumerism. Ird is one of these social structures 
that places constraints on people’s actions in life. Although ird gives men the upper hand to 
shape women’s behaviour in a variety of areas, especially sex, the hegemonic nature of it 
means that it also presents constraints on men’s attitudes and behaviours as well, directing 
them towards what is seen as a legitimate lifestyle. But this does not mean that this structure 
is static and immutable to change. Some of the policies of the successive governments since 
the final years of the Iraqi monarchy, and also the activities of many social groups, including 
women’s rights advocacy groups, have challenged many perceptions regarding gender 
relations in general, and ird in particular. For example, the imperatives of the war in the 
1980s pushed the government to employ more women, indirectly and possibly 
unintentionally, challenging the notion of sex segregation deeply embedded in ird.  
On the other hand, as will be shown in the next two chapters, media consumption by 
women as a social act also helps reproduce ird, albeit in a modified way. Media consumption 
happens within the boundaries of social structures such as ird that places constraints on this 
act. The same can be true about men reacting to women’s media consumption. Through these 
acts carried out by women and men, the structure of ird is also reproduced. However, some 
of the acts carried out by women in relation to their media consumption habits, which 
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challenge the social structure of ird, are “mediated by structural features which are 
reconstituted by the action, albeit in a modified form” (Thompson 1994: 58). 
 
5.3 The Methodological Framework: Research Methodology  
From a positivist perspective, the only way to obtain objective, verifiable facts about 
research participants and their social situations/backgrounds is to carry out a properly 
conducted investigation. Needless to say, participants may lie or be mistaken during the 
course of the research. Distortions are not limited to the informants, as researchers 
themselves are viewed as potential distorting factors. Accordingly, positivism places 
emphasis on standard questions and the drilling of participants, and the inclination to ignore 
data that has been created in response to leading questions. Equally important from the 
positivist perspective is the verifiability of research data. The researcher needs to make sure 
that the data represents the real situation so that it can be corroborated by other means. 
Conversely, interpretive research is not necessarily concerned with establishing objective 
facts, or “the explanation of human behaviour”, but rather aims at “understanding… human 
behaviour” (Bryman 201: 28, [italics in original]). Therefore, interpretivism puts a great 
emphasis on personal perceptions and interpretations of the informants regarding the 
research topic. Uncovering these perspectives is an important aspect of the research in that 
it helps the researcher to illuminate a particular issue without necessarily providing a specific 
quantification or even solution. 
My perspective is that different approaches to social research are part of a continuum. 
At one end of this continuum sits the positivist stance, which is mainly concerned with the 
extraction of ‘facts’ from the participants’ accounts. It seeks to gain discrete responses from 
them. The role of the researcher, then, is to construct the questions and direct the discussion 
in such a way that the participants provide answers to all the questions. The researcher then 
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uses these answers to construct an account of objective reality, as far as it is possible. A 
wholly interpretive approach is placed at the other end of this continuum. This approach is 
only concerned with participants’ perceptions and viewpoints on the situation. The 
researcher then focuses on the processes of the interpretation and meanings of the 
participants, instead of reaching an absolute account of an objective reality. This research is 
located between these two extremes. While rejecting the assumptions of positivism, 
explained above, attempts have been made to remain objective by providing a true account, 
as far as possible. However, it is recognised that certain claims are always prone to error. I 
endeavoured to be as objective and non-directive as possible in the course of the 
investigation, allowing the research participants to speak for themselves. It is recognised that 
a focus group method would have provided a better opportunity to pursue this objective, but 
the practical restrictions, which will be explained later on in this chapter, meant that semi-
structure interviews was the only alternative option. Interviewees were given the chance to 
express themselves as far as possible and to present their views and perceptions in relation 
to the questions. 
This research will utilise a qualitative methodology. It will compare, analyse and 
interpret the primary data that has been gathered from semi-structured interviews. In order 
to derive meaning for social phenomena, such an analysis goes beyond mere description to 
a higher level of synthesis.  
 
5.4   Organisation of Qualitative Data 
“Qualitative research is a research strategy that usually emphasizes words rather than 
quantification in the collection and analysis of data” (Bryman 2012: 380). This concern with 
words is an important feature that distinguishes it from quantitative research. However, the 
absence of numbers is not the only distinct feature of qualitative research. Qualitative 
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research strategies can be more effective in research that is concerned with matters such as 
life history or everyday behaviours. That is why qualitative interviewing has been chosen as 
the research method here, since media consumption will be explored, which is an everyday 
practice, as well as its relationship with cultural concepts around gender relations. It is 
believed that qualitative strategies will be more useful for this, as unlike quantitative 
strategies that attempt to quantify the data and reduce it to numerical representations, 
qualitative research can bring about a deeper understanding of the social world through a 
more thorough examination of social phenomena. For example, a quantitative survey is 
prone to draw spurious conclusions simply because participants’ answers to the questions 
do not necessarily reflect their behaviours in naturally occurring situations. Therefore, 
quantitative “researchers who generalize from a sample survey to a larger population ignore 
the possible disparity between the discourse of actors about some topical issue and the way 
they respond to questions in a formal context” (Fielding and Fielding 1986: 21).  
On the other hand, qualitative research can draw more reliable conclusions by enabling 
the researcher to explore the social and cultural contexts in which the participants reside and 
facilitates “the observation of behavior in everyday situation” (Silverman 2003: 32). By 
utilising qualitative strategies, the researcher attempts to understand “the social world 
through an examination of the interpretation of that world by its participants” (ibid).  This is 
why many qualitative researchers strive to view the social world through the eyes of the 
people they study. Quantitative methods, on the other hand, require “the imposition of 
predetermined formats on the social world” (Bryman 2012: 403). But as qualitative 
researchers are committed to seeing the world through the eyes of people, they cannot 
employ a structured method of data collection, because this will entail an expectation of the 
social reality that will limit the researcher in their investigation. 
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Qualitative strategies allow the researcher to integrate the data and also to carry out an 
in-depth evaluation of variables. Also, qualitative analysis facilitates the organisation of 
primary data into patterns and analytic units that allow for the comparison of participants’ 
responses, in order to help find answers to the research question(s). Qualitative research 
"should make decisions on the basis not only of a sound research strategy but also of a 
sensitivity to the changing contexts and situations in which the research takes place" (Mason 
1996: 5). This is because qualitative research tends to understand social life in terms of 
processes. Although ethnography is mainly associated with an emphasis on processes, other 
qualitative methods, such as semi-structured and unstructured interviews, can help the 
researcher to achieve an understanding of social life within a set of processes. Additionally, 
because in qualitative research the conceptual scope of an investigation is not limited, the 
researcher is able to achieve a deeper understanding of the social world. As a result, 
qualitative strategies are more suitable for investigating cultural concepts, such as gender 
relations. Qualitative research will allow an exploration of the relationship between mediated 
messages, and cultural norms, concepts and practices around gender relations in Iraq.   
 
5.5   Research Method 
To conduct this research, 40 semi-structured interviews with eight different groups of people 
were conducted.  
 
5.5.1   Sampling and Research Participants  
The sampling rationale for the interviews was purposive and was informed by two strands 
of investigation. First, my experience as an Iraqi citizen who knows the culture and the 
language and has also has been involved with journalism in regard to the socio-political and 
economic developments of Iraq; this meant I was aware that I needed to interview members 
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of a wide range of social groups. In addition, the secondary data that was collected by 
reviewing the relevant academic literature provided insights into the groups that would best 
inform the research. These two strands directed the research towards important categories: 
Firstly, both female and male citizens (age 18 and over) were chosen as the main target 
group, because the research aimed to investigate the relationship between media and gender 
relations, and that would ensure interviewing representative of the majority of the population 
and hence the majority of media consumers. Secondly, representatives from key areas of 
power and influence in Iraqi society who control wealth, knowledge, the traditional 
institutions of tribe and religion, and the political arena. The research has drawn upon figures 
that, although not representative of all working in their field, nonetheless carry significant 
weight as social actors. It is possible, therefore, to attribute significance to their views and 
ideas with regard to the relationship between media and gender relations in Iraq, while 
recognising that they are not exhaustive of Iraqi public opinion, but merely indicative. Six 
categories of representative from key areas and influence were interviewed: Tribal chiefs, 
clerics, journalists, university lecturers, elected politicians, and women’s rights activists (See 
Table 5.1).  
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Category Number Location Total 
Number 
Female  Male 
Female Citizens 6 Baghdad 9 9  
3 Erbil   
Male Citizens 5 Baghdad 7  7 
2 Erbil   
University Lecturers 3 Baghdad 5 2 3 
2 Erbil   
Clerics 2 Baghdad 4  4 
2 Erbil   
Women’s Rights 
Activists 
2 Baghdad 3 3  
1 Erbil   
Tribal Chiefs 2 Baghdad 3  3 
1 Erbil   
Politicians & 
Government Officials 
2 Baghdad 3 1 2 
1 Erbil   
Journalists 4 Baghdad 6 2 4 
2 Erbil   
Total   40  17 23 
Table 5.1 
 
Two categories shape and uphold the preponderant traditional cultural values in Iraq. As 
explained in Chapter Two, tribal chiefs are enormously influential in a deeply tribal society 
such as Iraq, to the point where they enjoy judicial powers, among other privileges. Religious 
 162 
leaders, on the other hand, are widely respected. Some of them enjoy great financial, political 
and even military influence. They uphold the sanctity of society. The four remaining 
categories also yield influence in society. Journalism has enjoyed a boom in the post-Saddam 
Iraq. Although journalism is still a dangerous profession in Iraq, journalists have been able 
to prove their presence in Iraqi affairs, exploiting tens of Iraqi media outlets. Politicians, 
although not seen as being very successful, have played a crucial role in post-2003 Iraq. 
University lecturers have access to knowledge. They have been able to gain an increasingly 
important presence in the media, informing the public on a wide variety of matters. And 
finally, women’s rights activists, although not well supported, have been able to yield 
influence in an incredibly dangerous environment through both their grassroots activities 
and also their media presence, attaining international reach. In order to obtain an objective 
picture, as far as possible, it was decided that, although challenging, it would be necessary 
to interview representatives from all these eight groups. 
I tried to include more female participants, than male ones. This is because in a 
patriarchal society such as Iraq, women have less access to influential positions and 
experience marginalisation, hence it was decided to make an effort to hear their voice to get 
a better sense of the social developments. this proved difficult for several reasons. First as I 
chose several categories which yield influence, it was difficult to find women, as mainly 
men occupy these positions. Some categories are men exclusive. For example, women 
cannot become tribal chiefs or religious leaders. Even in other categories such as journalists 
it is much easier to find men for interviewing.  
Additionally, given the prevalence of gender segregation traditions in the country, 
finding female ‘citizens’ who are happy to give interviews was a challenge to. Despite this 
as it is clear in table 5-1, I was able to talk to more female ‘citizens’ than male ‘citizens’. 
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The participants were interviewed in two cities: Baghdad, the capital of Iraq, and Erbil, 
the capital of the Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraq is made up of different ethnicities, but the two main 
ethnicities in Iraq are Arabs and Kurds. The country is clearly divided into two different 
political, ethnic and geographical regions-the Arab region, in which the central government 
in Baghdad retains overall power and authority (although since 2014 seriously challenged 
by the IS), and the Kurdish region where the Kurdish authorities in Erbil are largely in 
control. Local authorities have ruled Kurdistan since 1991, following the uprisings that 
occurred after the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and the imposition of the no-flight 
zone over some parts of Iraq, including Kurdistan. In the rest of Iraq, the Ba’ath Party 
remained in power till 2003 when the Iraqi government was toppled by the coalition forces 
led by American troops. 12 years of independence of Kurdistan from the central government 
in Baghdad has led to a variety of different political and social developments in these two 
regions, combined with the ethnic and cultural differences of the Kurdish people and the 
Arabs in Iraq. This led to choosing the targeted research groups from these two cities.  
Practical reasons where behind the decision to choose Baghdad in Arab Iraq and Erbil in the 
Kurdish region. As I had at the time family in Baghdad, it was decided to select the sample 
from Baghdad, as I could use their contacts to find participants for the research. It was not 
really possible for me to find people for interviews from other cities or rural areas, as I did 
not have any personal contacts in the country. On the other hand, access to the Kurdistan 
region of Iraq was restricted. Due to the fact that I cannot speak Kurdish, I needed a guarantor 
to be able to stay in Kurdistan for more than one week. As the only guarantor who was also 
happy to help me as an interpreter, was a resident of Erbil, I had to interview people from 
this city. These practical issues circumscribed my access to a broader population. As a result 
of these restrictions, the interviewees are all urban-based and mainly middle-class people 
who are not representative of all Iraqis. 
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I faced two problems in finding suitable candidates for interview. One was the adverse 
security situation that hindered me from moving freely in a war-torn country and one of the 
most dangerous countries in the world. The second problem was particularly related to 
talking to female participants. The honour-based norms meant that I did not have easy access 
to female participants, particularly from communities with stronger tribal bonds.  
Another issue was lack of any systematic method to appeal for participants. It was not 
possible to use the internet to ask for people who are interested in participating in my 
research, as this is not a common method for such matters. Even politicians did not have a 
clear channel through which I could reach out to them. Instead, the traditional networks of 
family, tribe and friends is very useful in Iraq. As at the time of carrying out my fieldwork I 
had family in Iraq, I could use their networks to reach out to potential participants. My 
brother helped me to find many participants, particularly among university students and 
lecturers in Baghdad. My sister who was a high school teacher at the time, helped me to 
reach out to religious leaders and tribal chiefs. Shew was able to do that through her 
colleagues. For example, one of her colleague’s husband, was able to put me in contact with 
a Sunni imam. My mother was able to reach out to neighbours. She knew a professional 
woman who lived near my parents’ house. An Iraqi colleague in London helped me to find 
a politician who was willing to talk to me.  
In Erbil, I didn’t not have any family members. But, my friends helped me make 
contact with potential interviewees. As, I knew the Iraqi society, I knew that I need to rely 
on my personal contacts for the purpose of this fieldwork. I went prepared, talked to my 
family and friends about it, even before I leave the UK to Iraq. In a tribal society such as 
Iraq, the familial and personal networks play an important role in many aspects of social life. 
In Erbil, not only I I was able to get help in terms of finding potential interviewees, 
but as I don’t speak Kurdish, I asked one of my friends to help me communicate with 
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participants. I was keen to get help from someone who not only speaks Kurdish, but also is 
familiar with the topics that I study. I was lucky to get help from my friend, Ibrahim, who is 
a sociologist from Erbil. He was present in my interviews with people who don’t speak 
Arabic and interpreted the questions to the participants and the answers to me.  
 
5.5.2  Ethics  
I was able to gain ethical approval from my previous institution (Brunel University32). As I 
was not supposed to interview any ‘vulnerable’ person, and because Brunel university did 
not deem my research as sensitive, I was able to complete the process of ethics pretty 
smoothly. The only issue for Brunel University was the security issues in Iraq; therefore, 
they asked me to write a letter saying that I am aware of the dangers of traveling to Iraq and 
conducting research in this country and that I was responsible for my own safety.  
I wrote and signed the letter and travelled to Iraq soon after completing the ethics 
process. Security was the main obstacle that I had to overcome. The city of Erbil was a 
relatively safe place, but Baghdad was a dangerous city. Also, the road that I took from Erbil 
to Baghdad was a very dangerous road. Later, the biggest part of that road fell under IS. I 
tried to be as careful as I can and by Using family and friend’s network I was able to avoid 
unnecessary movements in Baghdad. This meant that I was exposed to less danger. I also 
had to cancel the idea of interviewing people in other cities in which I didn’t have any family.  
 
5.5.3   Interview as a Research Method 
Interviews are probably the most widely used method for data collection in qualitative 
research. Flexibility is one of the most important advantages of this method (Bryman 2012). 
It was especially important to be able to use a flexible method to collect data, so that any 
                                               
32 I started this degree at Brunel University and later on transferred my studies to Keele University. 
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unexpected circumstances could be managed in an unsafe and unstable country such as Iraq, 
where, for example, at any minute a road might be blocked by the security forces. Semi-
structured interview:  
 
typically refers to a context in which the interviewer has a series of questions that are 
in the general form of an interview schedule but is able to vary the sequence of 
questions. The questions are frequently somewhat more general in their frame of 
reference from that typically found in a structured interview schedule. Also, the 
interviewer usually has some latitude to ask further questions in response to what are 
seen as significant replies (Bryman 2012: 212). 
 
The type of questions posed in this research also another reason for choosing interviews as 
the method of data collection. It enabled an exploration of people’s thoughts on media and 
whether they believe that as a result of the exposure to media, any changes in their 
understanding of their social environment and changes in behaviours towards the other sex 
have occurred. Interviews are particularly useful for exploring people’s thoughts on such 
questions, and are more appropriate for providing a depth of information (Denscombe 2007); 
especially because, it gives space to the researcher to manoeuvre their approach. 
As mentioned above, flexibility is one of the main advantages of qualitative 
interviews. For example, ethnography, as a method utilised in qualitative research, although 
it can be very useful, lacks the flexibility that interviews enjoy.  
 
[E]thnography usually involves the researcher participating, overtly or covertly, in 
people’s daily lives for an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening 
to what is said, and/or asking questions through informal and formal interviews, 
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collecting documents and artefacts – in fact, gathering whatever data are available to 
throw light on the issues that are the emerging focus of inquiry (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 2007: 3). 
 
Although carrying out ethnographic research can be a very useful way of investigating the 
social world, its downside is that it usually requires a prolonged period of participant 
observation, as is clear from the activities that are involved in ethnography. This can be very 
disruptive as researchers would have to be absent from family or work life for long periods 
of time. In relation to this research, ethnography may have been a very good method, as the 
intention was to research perceptions around, and the act of, media consumption in Iraq. As 
an everyday life activity, media consumption can be easily investigated using ethnography 
or participant observations. However, in this case in particular, ethnography was by no 
means a practical option. As the research is about media consumption and gender relations, 
it would have been necessary to observe people dealing with media content, mainly inside 
their own homes. Considering the cultural nuances around ird, and the emphasis that is put 
on sex segregation and modest clothing, it would have been practically impossible for me, 
as a man, to enter people’s private spaces to carry out ethnographic research. Also, in order 
to carry out ethnographic research, I would have had to understand the language of people 
being observed; but as I cannot speak Kurdish (and many people in Kurdistan do not speak 
the three languages that I speak), it was not practically possible to carry out ethnographic 
research in Erbil. 
Another common method in social enquiry is the focus group.  
 
The focus group method is a form of group interview in which: there are several 
participants… there is an emphasis in the questioning on a particular fairly tightly 
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defined topic; and the accent is upon interaction within the group and the joint 
construction of meaning (Bryman 2012: 502).  
 
The focus group method can offer many benefits to the researcher. For example, it allows 
him/her to “develop an understanding about why people feel the way they do” (Bryman 
2012: 502; Italics in original). Instead of asking one participant about the reasons behind 
his/her view, as happens in individual interviews, focus groups allow participants to engage 
in probing each other’s reasons for taking a specific stance. Also, focus groups allow the 
researcher to investigate the ways participants collectively make sense of a social 
phenomenon; something that cannot be achieved by employing the individual interview 
method. That is why focus groups provide a useful method for eliciting data in regard to the 
cultural norms and values of a group. As an important aspect of this research concerns the 
cultural values that shape gender relations in Iraq, focus groups could have been a very useful 
method, but unfortunately, practical issues hindered this. In particular, security issues 
prevented me from organising focus groups. Especially for me as someone who has never 
lived in Iraq, it was not possible to convince people to attend a focus group session. Even 
the people that were interviewed were chosen at short notice. I would go with one of my 
family members (for example my brother) to a place and he would ask people whom he 
knew if they were happy to talk to me.  With an enormous amount of effort, my family 
members and their contacts were able to arrange meetings with clerics, university lecturers, 
women’s rights activists, politicians, journalists and tribal chiefs. But because of their status, 
it was not possible to ask most of these groups to attend a focus group. In Erbil, the security 
issue was less of a problem, but the absence of my family members and their contacts meant 
that it was even more difficult to find participants. However, the main problem in organising 
focus groups in Erbil would have been the language. As I do not speak Kurdish, it was not 
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possible to conduct a focus group, even if other problems were eliminated. The flexibility of 
the semi-structured interview as a qualitative method means that even when the situation is 
far from ideal, as it was in my case, it is still possible to carry out the research. For example, 
in Erbil it was possible to use an interpreter when interviewing people who speak only 
Kurdish-a luxury I could not enjoy if carrying out ethnographic research or focus groups.  
 
5.5.4   Semi-structured Interview 
Amongst the different types of qualitative interviews, semi-structured interviews are the 
most popular in the social sciences. As mentioned previously, one of the advantages of semi-
structured interviews over structured interviews is the ability of the interviewer to steer the 
conversation towards the direction he or she finds important. Instead of sticking to a rigid 
interview guide, as is the case in structured interviews, the interviewer can divert his or her 
focus from one topic to another, depending on the participant’s responses. This reflexive 
process could happen during the interview or may result in a shift in focus in future 
interviews, when the interviewer adds or omits some of the questions in the original 
interview guide. As an example, in the process of carrying out the interviews in Iraq, it was 
realised that the interviewees were putting less emphasis on the conflicts that might arise 
between media users and the government as a result of their access to global media. This is 
explained by the political reality of Iraq. However, the relationship between media 
consumption and people’s perceptions of the traditional institutions of tribe and religion, and 
the values they promote and uphold, was very important for the participants. This led to 
reflecting on the questions, and putting more emphasis on the latter issue.  
On the other hand, “compared to unstructured interviews, the interviewer has a greater 
saying in focusing the conversation on issues that he or she deems important in relation to 
the research project” (Brinkmann 2013: 21). This feature of semi-structured interviews, 
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allows the interviewer to carry out the conversation within the boundaries of the issues that 
he or she sees as being most important to the research. This is particularly important when 
the time available is limited. For example, for the interviews with politicians, I was told that 
I had a limited time to interview them. It was quite possible that if I conducted an 
unstructured interview with them, the time would finish before I even touched upon many 
important questions that I needed to ask. Therefore, the interview questions were broken 
down into several parts. The first part of the interview included standard demographic 
questions. The second part focused on the interviewees’ media viewing habits. The questions 
then proceeded to enquire about participant’s views on gender relations and gender equality. 
It sought to understand participants’ conceptions of gender relations and also their thoughts 
on gender equality in their own society. The third part, which comprised the main body of 
the questions, focused on the relationship between media and gender relations in Iraq. The 
overarching theme in the interviews is concerned with the relations between media 
consumption and gender relations in Iraq, but a conscious effort was also made to allow the 
interviewees to raise issues not foreseen by the interview guide. The specific interview 
questions differed for the different groups interviewed. For example, when interviewing 
politicians, they were asked about the ways their departments deal with gender equality 
matters. And when interviewing women’s rights activists, a section of the interview was 
dedicated to their activities; a type of question that could not be asked of ‘ordinary citizens’. 
In general, the interview topic guide that addressed the following issues: 
 
• The participants’ views on gender equality 
• Their attitudes towards media in post-Saddam era 
• Their view on women’s access to media 
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• The relationship between commutation media consumption and traditional cultural 
values 
• Media consumption and women’s perceptions of themselves 
• Media consumption and men’s perceptions of women 
 
All of the interviews were audio-recorded. Audio-recording allows the researcher to preserve 
the original conversation and to have access to the exact words that were said by the 
interviewees, as opposed to note taking, which will inevitably lead to paraphrasing the 
account. This was especially useful because the in-depth analysis did not start until all the 
interviews were finished. In this way, the original account was preserved, and it was possible 
to transcribe the exact words said by the participants. This also helped me in terms of data 
security. It is easy to keep several copies of the audio files. I preserved several copies of my 
interviews. One copy of each interview on my mobile phone, one on my laptop. I also used 
cloud services to keep my filers. I then saved my audio files on two CD’s. I kept one of them 
and gave the second to my brother. All these measures were taken to make sure that I do not 
lose my files, as it was really difficult and time consuming to come back to a country like 
Iraq. Technology helped me to do this pretty smoothly as most of these measures do not take 
much time or effort.  
There is a fear that audio recording might inhibit the participants and affect the answers 
they give. But experience shows that soon after the interview begins, participants forget 
about the device, especially if a smaller, less intimidating device is used to record the 
interview (Seidman 2006). A mobile phone was used for the purpose of recording the 
conversation, and participants were asked if they agreed with this; all agreed, and it appeared 
that audio-recording posed no problems in the process of interviewing. Each interview took 
around 45 minutes to finish.  
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I chose to transcribe all the interviews myself. This proved to be very laborious and 
time consuming, but it provided me the opportunity of getting to know the material better, 
as opposed to having them transcribed by someone else. It was intentionally decided not to 
just listen to the interviews and select sections that seem important, because that would have 
“[led] to premature judgments about what is important and what is not “(Seidman 2006: 115) 
and would have led to important sections of the interview data being left out. As all the 
material was in Arabic (even the Kurdish sections were translated by my friend, during the 
time of the interview), I did not need to do any translation at this stage. 
At this stage, the interviews were ready for in-depth analysis. But before discussing 
the analysis process, the sampling and some very important methodological issues in relation 
to the qualitative interview method will be discussed.  
 
5.6   Methodological Issues Relating to Interviews  
Like other qualitative research strategies, interviews elicit informants’ perspectives on their 
own world. During the course of an interview, both the interviewer and the interviewee 
actively participate in constructing an account of the world.  The questions that the researcher 
asks are informed by his/her worldview and background knowledge and/or experience of the 
topic. On the other hand, in this process, interviewees actively create meaning. Through their 
responses, the interviewees offer details of their experience around the topic(s).  
 
Construed as active, the subject behind the respondent not only holds facts and details 
of experience, but, in the very process of offering them up for response, constructively 
adds to, takes away from, and transforms the facts and details. The respondent can 
hardly ‘spoil’ what he or she is, in effect, subjectively creating (Gubrium and Holsteim 
1997: 117) 
 173 
 
Accordingly, it can be reasonably assumed that the interviewees added, took away and 
transformed some aspects of the accounts they presented. This is mainly because the topic 
covered was related to their reputation. During the interview, no questions were asked about 
sex or sexual content broadcast and available in the media, but as all of the participants 
pointed out matters related to sexual content, this became an important theme of the 
interviews. In Iraq women’s virtue and men’s honour is linked to women’s sexual conduct 
and attitude. A ‘decent’ woman in Iraq is not supposed to be interested in media content that 
is considered to be sexually provocative, according to the norms. She is not supposed to 
approve of pre-marital relationships either. Thus, when the female interviewees disapproved 
of what is viewed as sexually provocative shows, such as dance shows, it was not possible 
to take their account at face value. Similarly, a man who shows indifference towards his 
female family members’ media consumption implicates himself in lacking ghira, as his 
female kin might watch sexually provocative content. Therefore, when one of the male 
interviewee stated that he does not allow his daughters to enter a room in which there is an 
internet-enabled computer, he might be reporting the facts, or equally he might be 
transforming the facts to avoid the disrepute that comes with lacking ghira. In their efforts 
to answer the questions, the informants started a conversation with me, as the researcher. 
They were aware that as an Iraqi I am aware of the cultural values that shape gender relations, 
particularly women’s sexual conduct and attitudes. It is very likely that female interviewees 
considered my gender when they talked about matters related to sex. This is because women 
who openly talk about sex to men might be considered to be inviting them to have a sexual 
relationship, and their decency would be questioned. Sometimes when asking a female 
interviewee to provide more details about what they mean (particularly when they touched 
upon an issue related to sex), they refrained from that and I was left with more or less one 
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sentence: “you know what I mean”. This also happened with some male informants, 
especially when they talked about how Westernised global media has encouraged women to 
engage in indecent sexual activities. But they normally ‘opened up’ after we got to know 
each other more during the interview. As a result, some of the interviews with male 
participants contain very graphic details about sexual encounters and words, while this never 
happened with the female participants. Nevertheless, when it comes to ghira, men seem to 
be more cautious about the stories they narrate. They are clearly trying to avoid being 
labelled as lacking ghira or being indifferent towards their ird. As all men, including me, 
are supposed to have ghira, and since ird and ghira are concepts that relate to men’s 
reputation and status, which is mainly evaluated by other men in the same society, the male 
informants could not afford to risk their reputation by saying something that implied a lack 
of ghira. On the other hand, it is very normal for any human being to be ambivalent about a 
specific topic or even hold conflicting views. These complicated feelings and convictions 
are very difficult to express, especially to a stranger who is asking questions. For example, 
it can be reasonably argued that many of the participants who showed their disapproval of 
broadcasting what they see as sexually provocative media content, such as dance shows or 
pornographic content, actually enjoy watching it. For these reasons, the researcher:  
 
should recognise that ambivalence is a fairly common condition of man – that men can 
and do hold conflicting sentiments at any given time. Furthermore, men hold varying 
sentiments according to the situations in which they find themselves in (Whyte 1980: 
117, cited in Silverman 2003: 112). 
 
It can be argued that participants’ accounts about media content and gender relations can 
also change depending on the setting in which the conversation takes place. Whether is it a 
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more formal setting with a strange researcher asking questions, or two old friends discussing 
the same issue; whether the researcher is a female asking a male participant, or a male 
researcher asking a female participant. The physical environment in which the interview is 
conducted can also have an influence on the account narrated by the participant. For 
example, it was necessary to interview some people in their offices, where other colleagues 
were present. Although it was preferable to carry out the interview in a room without an 
audience, this was not always possible. As some of the participants were very difficult to get 
hold of (for example if they were politicians that had worked on women’s issues), it was not 
possible to replace them and carry out the interview with someone else. Sometimes it was 
necessary to interview a female participant while a male member of her family was present, 
as due to the ird-related norm of sex segregation, I could not always be in a room alone with 
a woman. Deciding to only interview women whose male kin would allow her to be with a 
strange man alone in a room, would have led to a much more diminished representation of 
the Iraqi population, since the sex segregation norm is a prevalent one in Iraq. It can be 
reasonably argued, considering the sensitivity and importance and the gravity of the 
traditional cultural value of ird, and its pertinent concepts and values, that the presence of a 
male relative altered the interview responses received from some of the female participants. 
It seems that there are many factors that can alter the outcome of a conversation about 
the same topic. Consequently, considering conflicting feelings and views, combined with 
contextual matters and cultural nuances around sexual matters in Iraqi society, it is 
reasonable to conclude that some of the accounts, both from male and female informants, 
were transformed to adapt to the context of the interview and/or the cultural context Iraqis 
live in. In this respect, the interviewees resorted to culturally available resources in order to 
produce their account. This is explainable by the fact that “[p]articipation in a culture 
includes participation in the narratives of that culture, a general understanding of the stock 
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of meanings and their relationships with each other” (Richardson 1990: 24, cited in 
Silverman 2003: 100). It does not, however, follow that the accounts given by the 
participants are not valid and cannot help me, as a researcher, to understand the social world. 
The interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee, by itself, can help in analysing 
the social phenomena under investigation. 
 
The goal is to show how interview responses are produced in the interaction between 
interviewer and respondent, without losing sight of the meanings produced or the 
circumstances that condition the meaning-making process. The analytic objective is 
not merely to describe the situated production of talk, but to show what is being said 
relates to the experiences and lives being studied (Gubrium and Holsteim 1997: 127) 
 
It can be concluded that researchers should not consider interview responses as being true 
or false. These accounts need to be viewed as “displays of perspectives and moral forms” 
(Silverman 2003: 112; italics in original). The account that is constructed through the 
interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee is reflective of the social world that 
the participant resides in. The fact that the female participants were less willing to go into 
the details of sexual behaviour in comparison to the male participants, is reflective of the 
social and cultural norms and values that shape the society these participants live in. It should 
be noted that the importance of “the local or situated character of interview talk” (Silverman 
2003: 113) will always depends on the topic at hand and also the purpose of the research. 
For example, it is reasonable to think that the above factors would play a less important role 
in an anonymous quantitative survey that aims at finding out about patient satisfaction in a 
hospital. 
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5.7 Data Analysis 
Researchers such as Miles and Huberman (1984) and Maxwell (1996), urge that data 
collection and data analysis should go hand in hand. They believe that the moment a 
researcher starts generating data, the process of analysing the data begins. This is to allow 
the two stages to inform each other. Others such as Seidman (2006) advise researchers to 
delay the process of analysing until they have finished collecting all of the data. This is 
mainly “to avoid imposing meaning from one participant’s interviews on the next” (Seidman 
2006: 113). Completely separating the process of generating data and the process of analysis, 
however, seems to be unrealistic. “During the interview, the researcher is processing what 
the participant is saying in order to keep the interview moving forward. Afterward, the 
researcher mentally reviews each interview in anticipation of the next one” (Seidman 2006: 
113).  
In this research, after every interview, the questions and answers that were exchanged 
during the course of that interview were reflected on, and this altered, to a certain extent, the 
way the next interview was carried out. Transcribing the interviews to prepare them for in 
depth analysis, however, did not begin until all of the interviews had been conducted and I 
had left Iraq. This was mainly due to the security situation in war-torn Iraq. It was necessary 
to make sure that the data was collected as soon as possible to avoid any possible disruptions 
that might occur in such a volatile country. The interviews generated a lot of data out 40 
interviews were carried out, which amounts to a big chunk of data. All of the interviews 
were transcribed in order to begin the analysis. The first step in the process of analysing the 
data was to reduce the amount of data. This process of data reduction was an inductive one, 
so instead of treating the text using a set of hypotheses, the text was examined with an open 
attitude, looking for themes that could lead to finding answers to the research questions. 
There was, however, always an awareness that “[a]ll responses to a text are interactions 
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between the reader and the text” (Seidman 2006: 117), but an attempt was made to be as 
objective as possible and avoid any possible bias or prejudice to allow the interview text to 
speak for itself. 
Sorting qualitative data is a challenge, mainly because of the sheer volume of data that 
is produced. Computers and softwares such as NVivo can hugely help in the process of 
sorting the data. However, it was not possible to gain help from NVivo, for the simple reason 
that the data was in Arabic and NVivo has problems in processing data in Arabic. Therefore, 
it was necessary to read the data and try to detect themes that seem to be important to the 
participants and/or helpful in finding answers to the research questions. The first step in 
reducing the text is to identify what is important in the transcripts. In this process, the 
researcher needs to carry out a close reading and apply his or her judgment to identify the 
areas that seem meaningful. This will help the researcher to find a focus, by applying his or 
her accumulated knowledge. This, however, is a sensitive issue. The researcher needs to find 
a focus without prematurely committing himself/herself to a particular perspective. It is 
important to bear in mind that “in qualitative analysis we should try to suspend beliefs in 
familiar convictions and examine evidence in a new and critical way” (Dey 2005: 66). It is 
unrealistic to assume one can approach the text with an empty head. The application of our 
accumulated knowledge, experience and assumptions seems inevitable, but a researcher 
needs to be aware of this to be able to approach the text with an open mind. 
I embarked on this project with a conviction that global media, as it brings in new ideas 
about social life after years of isolation, is, to a great extent, is a liberatory force that is being 
fully embraced by Iraqi people (male and female), and one that is helping women to achieve 
equality in this patriarchal society. However, during the challenging yet exciting process of 
data analysis, I realised that this statement is over-simplistic and that cultural nuances play 
an important role in media consumption, and its potential role in shaping gender relations is 
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much more complex that what was first thought. These complexities are reflected in the 
answers that were found to the research questions. This is proof that “it is not helpful to go 
into data collection burdened with preconceived theories and ideas” (Fane 2003: 49). The 
fact that the data was treated with an open mind helped in avoiding a misplaced focus during 
the process of analysis. Finding areas to focus on, however, is not something researchers 
start with while analysing the data. The process begins at the stage where the researcher 
conceives the research project, yet throughout the conducting of the research, the focus may 
be adjusted. In the case of this research project, the initial focus was on women’s status in 
Iraq and its relationship with global media consumption. But after starting to analyse the 
interviews, it was realised that the focus needed to shift a little bit towards looking at gender 
relations. That happened because of the importance of masculinity in the process of media 
consumption by women in Iraq. There was an awareness from the beginning that in order to 
understand women’s status, it was also necessary to include men in the interviews. This is 
why the category male citizens was chosen in addition to female citizens, but in the process 
of analysing the data, it was realised that more weight needed to be given to men’s role, and 
that altered, to an extent, the focus of the analysis. Through these processes, the search for 
themes in the interview text began.  
By and large, it can be said that a theme is: 
 
• a category identified by the analyst through his/her data; 
• that relates to his/her research focus (and quite possibly the research questions); 
• that builds on codes identified in transcripts and/or/ field notes; 
• and that provides the researcher with the basis for a theoretical understanding of his or 
her data that can make a theoretical contribution to the literature related to the research 
focus (Bryman 2012: 580). 
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A coding process was performed, because although there are benefits to the coding system, 
the aim was to analyse the data by “teasing out meaning within its context, or looking for 
the overall structure in the data” (Spencer et al. 2003: 208). Thus, it was possible to identify 
six main themes: 
 
• Embracing media 
• Rejection of media  
• Control of the processes of media consumption and use by men  
• Women’s resistance to controlling the media consumption and use 
• Conflict 
• Iraqi/Eastern/Islamic identity vs Western/Westernised identity 
• Women’s acceptance of controlling the media consumption and use 
 
These themes have been used as a guide to find relevant literature and theories that would 
help develop an understanding of the relationship between media and gender relations in 
Iraq. For example, some of the participants, particularly the men, are concerned about some 
of the content broadcast through media, and through an in-depth reading of the text produced 
from the interviews, it was possible to identify some subthemes. The main resistance was 
towards sexual content, and the main concern was related to its influence on women’s sexual 
demeanour. Although any form of the word sex or sexuality was not included in the original 
interview questions, all of the interviewees expressed their concern over this particular issue. 
This emphasis was very telling. In order to make sense of why sex is so important to Iraqis, 
I started reading about sexuality in Iraq and the Middle East. I found that the system of ird 
and its relevant concepts is central. This idea was used to re-examine the text of the data to 
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try and detect some other subthemes related to ird. One of the subthemes found was style of 
dress. The way women dress is very much related to the debate on sexuality, and the system 
of ird demands that men make sure their female kin are dressed ‘modestly. Dress style and 
modesty have therefore been considered to be sub-themes. Again, the data was returned to 
in order to see to what extent these sub-themes are present in the interviews. It was possible 
to find important elements in the participants’ accounts about their concern regarding the 
‘influence’ of media on women’s dress codes. It was also found that another aspect of this 
resistance is towards content that is concerned with women’s rights. This type of mainly 
feminist content that is available through the media, which encourages women’s agency, 
was also viewed as a having negative influence on society. Therefore, women’s agency has 
been considered to be another subtheme under resisting media.  
Throughout this inductive process, which was applied throughout the analysis, it was 
possible to create thematic codes that would enable any discussions related to the research 
questions to be quickly located, and to help with providing an account of the phenomena 
that the research is concerned with.  
It is worth noting that the majority of the analysis process was done in Arabic, as I did 
not translate all the content to English. I chose to only translate parts of the interviews that I 
decided to include in my thesis. 
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Chapter 6: Media and Gender in Iraq: Struggle over Identity 
 
6.1   Introduction 
The media environment in Iraq has witnessed a radical change as a direct result of the 2003 
invasion. After years of isolation, Iraqis were able to experience the information technology 
revolution of the late 20th and 21st century. They largely welcomed this development, but the 
increasingly globalised media has also brought some problems with it. The question of 
national identity is a continuous and contested one, and since the early years of the 
establishment of Iraq, the country has struggled to establish an agreed upon identity. For 
decades, media was part of this struggle, and it has been used by different regimes to 
establish and consolidate the ‘right’ identity. In the post-Saddam era, the media is again at 
the heart of the question of identity from a variety of angles. This chapter will focus on media 
and Iraqi identity from a gender culture perspective. 
Media consumption and use is largely a social activity. It happens inside, rather than 
outside, social relations, and is done “through the same practices that define our involvement 
with the rest of everyday life” (Silverstone 2003: 170). Although the advent of technologies 
such as personal computers, laptops, tablets and mobile phones, and so on, that can be 
connected to the internet, has enabled media consumption to take place in a more ‘privatised’ 
manner, media consumption is largely negotiated through social norms and dynamics, 
including gender relations. The significance of gender in media consumption has been 
appreciated in many studies (see for instance Morley 1999; Silverstone 2003). In this chapter 
(and the next) media consumption in Iraq will be examined, and it will be shown that gender 
relations and gender specific codes of practice play a significant role in shaping media 
consumption and use, particularly by women. I will demonstrate that although there is an 
acceptance of media in post-Saddam Iraq and people welcome media technologies and 
 183 
increasingly use them, there is, at the same time, a kind of resistance or scepticism about its 
influence on society. The main worries are about media as a corrupting influence, 
threatening gender specific codes of the society. This mainly concerns men, as they are 
considered women’s guardians and are responsible for protecting the gender-specific values 
of their families. This is especially contentious because the gender related norms that are 
shown in Western/Westernised media content appear to be in favour of women’s sexual 
agency; something that is in sharp contrast to Iraqi gender culture. This chapter will 
demonstrate how satellite TV content and internet technology have enabled a section of Iraqi 
women to distance themselves from the patriarchal reality of their lives and helped them to 
circumvent their own gender-specific boundaries. This ‘influence’ is, however, hugely 
overestimated! There is also considered to be a negative influence from this media on 
society, and it is often viewed as being damaging to Iraqi identity. 
 
6.2   Media as a Corrupting Influence  
Amongst the interviewees, media was widely seen as the ‘transmitter’ of sexual immorality. 
In particular for the male interviewees, women’s exposure to satellite TV channels, as well 
as their access to the internet, is seen as a threat to cultural values around sexual conduct as 
organised by ird. They fear that the modern currents and technologies such as media will 
transform the traditional cultural values of their society. As explained in Chapter Four, ird 
is a gender specific honour that is mainly linked to a man’s female kin’s sexual demeanour. 
According to this concept, which is widespread in Iraq (Human Rights Council 2014), any 
sexual contact that women have should be strictly limited to their husbands. Any violation 
of this rule would damage the women’s reputation and that of their families. But mainly, the 
male members of the family take the brunt of this disrepute. They are ashamed and lose their 
status in society (Dodd 1973; Abu-Rabia 2011). Ird and the codes of practice and values that 
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have been developed around it work as a hegemonic masculine system that restricts women’s 
sexuality to sustain patriarchy and work with different cultural forces in a similar direction. 
Sexuality is an important site of patriarchy and is even considered the main site of male 
domination over women (see, Smuts 1995; MacKinnon 1982). Male control over female 
sexuality in Iraq is facilitated by the hegemonic masculine system of ird and its pertinent 
concepts, which are strongly supported and reinforced by other sites of patriarchy such as 
culture, represented by tribe and religion, state and violence. In this context, men are the 
main guardians of ird and are responsible for restricting their female kin’s sexual conduct to 
protect their ird, through taking a variety of pre-emptive, as well as reparative and corrective, 
measures that include employing persuasion, threats of violence and using violence. 
The interviewees stated that they are mainly worried about the prospect of women 
being seduced by media content to establish ‘inappropriate’ sexual relations. Not only porn, 
but also sexual content in movies and dramas that range from kissing to sexual intercourse, 
are deemed harmful. Also, moves and dresses that are seen as sexually provocative in music 
and dance videos are seen to be corrupting female morality. Therefore, they are worried that 
by having access to the media, women might be under negative influences that teach and/or 
encourage them to engage in ‘inappropriate’ sexual behaviour. Both male and female 
participants shared this concern, while their attitude towards approaching this problem is 
different, as will be shown later. The main concern is about the ‘invasion’ of sexual materials 
entering their private space at home. Ibrahim [high school student, M, Y, B]33 thinks that 
women learn sexual behaviour from satellite TV channels: “women’s access to satellite [TV] 
is harming the society, because they learn sexual stuff, dance and stuff and [are encouraged 
to] wear tight clothes. They learn from the West. This is not compatible with our society”. 
                                               
33 [Name, Occupation, Gender, Age (Y: Young; MA: Middle Age; O: Old), Location (B: Baghdad; E: Erbil)]. 
All names are pseudonyms. 
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He believes that dresses that are worn by actresses in some of the dramas and movies 
broadcast on Satellite TV are not compatible with the cultural values of the society, and the 
fact that women can watch these TV shows has a negative impact on his society. Yunis 
[Sunni cleric, M, M.A, B] is worried about teenage girl’s access to satellite TV channels: 
 
We currently face a problem in girls’ high schools. I know a female headmaster who 
says that they have real problems with mobile phones. Some girls record kissing scenes 
from TV shows on their mobiles. They even caught girls with porn clips on their 
phones, and these are by no means rare cases. This is very corruptive for our society. 
These things have changed our culture. We never had these problems on this scale 
before. They are threatening our culture, our traditions.  
 
One of the main issues reported by the interviewees, which is a source of concern for them, 
is imitation; this ranges from imitating dress codes to behaviours that are seen as being 
incompatible with Iraqi cultural values. Maryam [secondary school student, F, Y, B] 
explains her views on imitation: 
 
For us Iraqis, satellite TV came as a surprise [it was introduced abruptly] so the 
negative aspects mainly influenced us. Women started imitating Turkish actresses and 
so on. When they watch a Khaliji [Persian Gulf countries] drama, they wear Burqa [a 
face-veiling piece of clothing]. Then the Turkish drama came, and they started wearing 
short dresses  
 
Ibrahim [high school student, M, Y, B] voiced similar concerns about imitation: “women 
have become like women on satellite TV [shows]. They imitate [what they see on TV]”. 
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Riham [member of the Sadr district council and the head of the committee for women and 
family, F, M.A, B] agrees with the above comments:  
 
As university students we used to wear respectful clothing. We used to wear trousers 
and didn’t cover our hair, but our outfits were respectful. Nowadays, female students 
wear vulgar clothing... this is all due to satellite TV channels and the music shows and 
the Western design that has entered our culture. 
 
Zahra [shopkeeper, F, Y, B], on the other hand imitates TV characters in the way they 
appear: “when I see a girl on TV, I like to dress like her; I like to imitate her, to do my hair 
like her, and I want to have the same make-up as hers”.  
 
Imitation of ‘immodest and permissive’ dress codes or make up is one of the main concerns 
voiced by the interviewees, both male and female. Interesting here is that the participants 
have a view of media as a very strong medium, which influence people as soon as they are 
exposed to them. This makes media a scary technology and while my participants are 
fascinated by them and do not want to be prevented from having access to them, they want 
to find a way to mitigate the ‘harm’ done by these technologies. An important aspect here is 
the agreement of both female and male participants, and also of people of different ages, 
when it comes to their perception of media technology. The fact that they believe that women 
imitate what they see on the TV or on the internet, shows how this understanding of the 
relation between media and audience is strong. As will be shown later, this understanding of 
media ‘influence’ should not be taken for granted, and a more nuanced analysis is necessary. 
It is important to note that one of the codes related to ird is modesty, which is viewed 
as being greatly threatened by the media. Ird and ghira oblige men to make sure their female 
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kin dress and behave in a modest manner. The reason modesty, and especially a modest dress 
code, is so important to the participants, is the fact that it is viewed as the first line of defence 
against female sexual obscenity. Women are expected to behave and dress in a modest 
fashion themselves in the first place, and families, especially mothers, are expected to raise 
modest daughters (Khayyat 1990); however, men must monitor their female kin’s behaviour 
to make sure that they are modest, so that the reputation of the family, and especially male 
members of the family, remains intact (Dodd 1971; Abu-Rabia 2011). Many of the male 
informants emphasised that women need to be modest. Sheikh Laith, [senior tribal chief, M, 
O, B] believes that women need to be modest and that currently Iraqi women who are 
depicted on TV shows are not as modest as they should be. “Time has changed now,” says 
Sheikh Laith. He continues: “women should be present on TV, but not so permissive in the 
way they dress. They should be more modest than they are now. It shouldn’t be permissive 
to this extent when it comes to the nudity that currently we are witnessing”. Kareem 
[working in a print shop, M, Y, B] in Baghdad agrees with Sheikh Laith: “women shouldn’t 
dance with short dresses or be shown without hijab on TV. It is nice to watch the gentle sex, 
but not in this manner. If they are modest, it’s OK that women are on TV”. Modesty is an 
important trait for ‘decent’ women in Iraq. My male informants were worried that media 
‘impacts’ upon women negatively, such as when women imitate characters on TV shows 
and learn to dress and behave in an ‘immodest’ manner. Ibrahim [high school student, M, 
Y, B] expresses his concerns about the influence of TV dramas on women’s dress codes: 
 
there are women who used to wear hijab [Islamic cover/veil] from an early age; after 
they began watching satellite TV and especially Turkish dramas, they abandoned hijab 
and abaya [a long black piece of clothing worn as a cover by many women in Iraq 
especially in Arabic areas]. 
 188 
 
Hussein [PhD candidate in arts, M, Y, B] shares the same concerns: “from people’s 
behaviours we can understand whether satellite TV has had any influence or not. These days 
some female students wear flagrant dresses”.  He stresses that these dressing styles did not 
exist until recent times and are the direct result of the proliferation of the media that has 
happened since 2003. He goes further than that and states that as a result of women’s 
exposure to satellite TV programmes: “girls are turning their back on moral values” and this 
has resulted in “a state of decay in moral codes in society”. Mahdi [engineer, M, M.A, B] 
believes that certain immoral dress codes have appeared as a result of the negative influence 
of satellite TV programmes: 
 
The dress code has changed. I see mature women in their forties and fifties wearing 
jeans or doing their eyebrows in a special way. We didn’t have these things before. 
Satellite TV opened the door to the world. There are TV channels that teach women 
how to do make up, how to dress. 
 
Striking in these comments is the use of hearsay. Most of the interviewees believed that 
women’s exposure to the media post-Saddam has changed their behaviour in a way that is 
not compatible with Iraqi gender-based codes of practices. I was given numerous examples 
of how these changes are manifested in today’s Iraqi society and this is clear from the 
comments in this chapter and the next. But, almost no female participant admitted that she 
had been influenced directly by media. Nor did any of the male participants admit that any 
female relatives had changed their behaviour. This re-confirms the influence of these values 
and codes in Iraqi society. In this context, the interview needs to be seen as social 
performance (Atkinson et al. 2003). The interviewees are aware that ‘admitting’ to non-
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compliance to ird-related norms from their side or their families’ side has consequences, 
hence their use of hearsay. It also shows how in Iraq the violation of these norms is 
disconcerting and frightening. 
Although the purported collapse of ird’s first line of defence, manifested in 
behavioural change that is not in line with the modesty promoted by ird, is viewed as a 
negative influence from the media, for some other informants more direct changes in female 
sexual behaviour is the main problem. Kareem [working in a print shop, M, Y, B] is mainly 
concerned about Iraqi women imitating sexual behaviours: “whatever they’ve [women] seen 
on TV, they are imitating. They would do all the sexual things they’ve seen on TV”.  He 
continues: 
 
I used to be a shuttle driver. I could hear young girls singing songs full of sexual 
expressions and swearwords; songs that I, as a man, am ashamed of repeating. 
Whatever they see on TV they imitate. Once I heard one of my passengers who was a 
young girl telling her friend that she needs to go to her boyfriend’s house and have sex 
with him or she’ll lose him. Married women have started to cheat on their husbands. 
Their reason: ‘well my husband is not enough for me’… This is definitely because of 
satellite TV. I never saw such things during Saddam’s time when these technologies 
were banned. 
 
If women’s media consumption is considered sexually corruptive by some of the informants, 
and the fact that it encourages them to establish sexual contacts that are against Iraqi gender 
culture, is a serious concern; for others, using media to actually establish ‘illegitimate’ sexual 
contacts is the main problem. When talking about women’s access to the internet Hoshang 
[real estate agent, M, O, E] says: 
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How are they going to benefit from the internet? There might be some benefits for 
them, but they are very limited. Obviously, I am talking about women. For men it is 
very helpful. The problem is that women don’t use the internet in an appropriate way. 
They use it to find boyfriends and love stuff.  Women shouldn’t have access to the 
internet. 
 
Hoshyar [university lecturer in Sociology, M, O, E] talks about how women’s access to the 
internet has helped them to establish what he calls deviant relationships: 
 
The internet is harming our society. Unfortunately, we see deviant behaviours because 
of the internet. Girls have started unnatural relations with men whom they don’t know. 
We can actually witness deviant behaviours. I mean they establish relations outside 
marriage; in an unnatural demeanour. If we didn’t have this openness and access to the 
internet and communication technologies, these relations wouldn’t have happened. 
 
The above comments show that the participants have a similar understanding, in that sexual 
modesty is an important aspect of Iraqi culture that should be protected from the ‘invasion’ 
of foreign cultures, sneaking in through media. But also, in the fact that they perceive culture 
as a set of rules and values, codes and practices that can disappear easily or alter greatly as 
a consequence of exposure to media content. This understanding of the relation between 
media and culture is similar to that of Daniel Lerner (1958) who presented a unilinear and 
stagist model that ignores all the complexities of cultural dynamics. It proposes that by being 
exposed to Western media, people of the Middle East will essentially adopt Western values.  
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Historically women have been considered as ‘immoral’ or ‘less moral’ beings. 
Aristotle, for example, considered women inferior to men but above slave: “The slave is 
wholly lacking the deliberative element; the female has it but it lacks authority” (Aristotle 
1260a: 12-14 cited in Nichols: 31). Gilligan (1977) has argued that women are less likely to 
consider moral dilemmas with regard to individual rights and justice and are mainly 
concerned with issues regarding relationships with others. Perhaps, Freud’s explanation of 
women’s inferiority on the realm of morality is the most famous understanding of this issue 
in modern social sciences. Freud writes:  
 
“I cannot evade the notion (though I hesitate to give it expression) that for women the 
level of what is ethically normal is different from what it is in men. Their super-ego is 
never so inexorable, so impersonal, so independent of its emotional origins as we 
require it to be in men. Character-traits which critics of every epoch have brought up 
against women – that they show less sense of justice than men, that they are less ready 
to submit to the great exigencies of life, that they are more often influenced in their 
judgements by feelings of affection or hostility” (Freud 1925: 257 cited in Thwaites 
2007: 108). 
 
This understanding of women’s moral status is very similar to my participants’ 
understanding of the issue. This is true, particularly about men’s depiction of women’s moral 
judgement. As my female’s comments mentioned in this thesis show, they, to a great degree, 
agreed with the statement that, women as ‘emotional beings’ are more prone to the negative 
‘influence’ of media on their moral status. But male interviewees’ belief in this statement 
seemed stronger.  
Hegemonic masculinity places men in the position of protectors of ‘weak’ women. 
Media ‘effects’ argument here depicts women as impressionable people who can be easily 
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‘influenced’ by what they see in media, hence the need for a guardian to protect them. The 
fact that my female interviewees bought into this argument shows that women, themselves 
are convinced that they should be protected by men. The media ‘effects’ argument can be 
read as a way in which patriarchal arguments are bolstered.  Throughout the interviews, the 
gender-related norms of ird are re-asserted with the use of media ‘effects’ arguments.  
I will return to this in chapter 7, where I will discuss in more detail narrative practices 
of gender differentiation, and show how men are attributed traits that are related to reason 
and culture, when women are disconnected from mind and rationality and linked to nature. 
In that chapter I will also show how my female participants agree with this argument, by 
describing women as having “small brains”, supporting the argument that women are 
‘influenced’ by the ‘harmful’ media content and in need of protection from ‘wise’ men. As 
men are ascribed traits such as reason, there is much less concern about the ‘influence’ of 
media on their morality, as is clear from Hoshang’s comment mentioned above, when he 
says that he finds media harmful for women, but “for men it is very helpful” 
Hoshang’s concerns do not necessarily extend to men. This reflects a gendered 
sexual double standard which is embedded in Iraqi patriarchal gender culture and is 
prevalent within Iraqi society, where the sexual activities of men are under much less 
scrutiny and regulation. This double standard is clearly reflected in Ibrahim’s [high school 
student, M, Y, B] opinion on dance shows: “it is absolutely normal if men watch dance 
shows, but women shouldn’t be able to watch them”.  
An interesting pattern in the interviews is the agreement (to a great extent) between 
women and men, regarding ird-related matters, including media’s infringing on these codes. 
Another is the overlap among comments made by different generations. This is a sign of the 
pervasiveness of these norms in a society such as Iraq. Although this might seem to be an 
over-generalisation in Western societies, in a tribal society such as Iraq, with strong 
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collective characteristics, individualism is less pervasive and traditional cultural concepts, 
such as ird, are shared by people from different backgrounds. These codes and values are so 
strong, that even if someone does not believe in them, it is very difficult for them to ‘confess’ 
to it. In this case, if a woman admits that she does not believe or abide by ird-related codes, 
she is labelling herself as an immoral woman. If a man admits to such beliefs, he is branding 
himself as a man who lacks honour, again meaning that he is immoral. For the above reasons, 
a near agreement can be found among my participants when it comes to these ‘moral’ 
matters. 
The interviewees suggest that satellite TV has helped women change their habits and 
attitudes towards their dress code, and sexual relations. They also indicate that the internet 
is used by women to reclaim their sexual agency, bypassing the boundaries set by their male 
kin to establish sexual relations that are not in line with Iraqi gender culture. The media is 
presenting an alternative to the traditional attitude towards women’s sexuality, allowing 
them to distance themselves from their own local reality, where their sexuality is controlled 
by their male kin.  
As explained before, the adverse security situation in Iraq means that women spend 
more at home. Also, the male dominated public sphere in the country pushes women even 
more inside homes, meaning they spend more time watching TV or connecting the internet. 
As it is clear from statements made by my participants, a wide range of scenes and shows 
available and on TV are considered sexual and inappropriate. The ‘reality’ of Iraqi society 
determines that women are not exposed to these sorts of ideas and contents. These matters 
belong to the male-dominated public space and not the private space of homes, which is 
considered to be suitable for women. What media do is to bring this world of ‘sexual’ ideas 
to home, blurring the boundaries of public and private and enabling women to distance 
themselves from the world in which ‘sexual’ content is only for men. 
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On a different level, the ‘real’ world in Iraq, determines very strict sex segregation 
rules, according to which the contact between ‘strange’ men and woman is limited. The 
‘virtual world’ of the internet allows women to distance themselves from these sex 
segregation rules, imposed on them in the ‘reality’ of their lives. In short, media provide a 
world where women can ‘dream about’ and experience the sexual taboos of the Iraqi gender 
order.  
However, it is important to note that “whatever range of imagery they may be familiar 
with, for most viewers, their ‘horizons of action’ – that sense of the scale on which they can 
act meaningfully in the world – are still very limited” (Berker et al. 2006: 23) because these 
“global culture forms still have to be made sense of within the context of what, for many 
people, are still very local forms of life” (ibid). There are other developments in post-Saddam 
Iraq that confine women’s ‘horizon of action’ but are encouraged and/or facilitated by the 
media. One of the most important of them is attitudes towards conservatism in society. Due 
to the post-Saddam “climate of fear and violence there has been an even greater push towards 
conservative social norms” (Al-Ali 2007: 245).  This is part of the struggle over Iraq’s 
identity that includes a tendency towards Islamic dress code for women. This viewpoint is 
supported by Layla [clerk in a hospital, F, Y, B]: “We have witnessed a religious surge in 
the country after the collapse [of Saddam’s regime]. They don’t want women to have a role 
in society. You know, I mean they prefer women to stay home and be wives and mothers”. 
It seems that there are two opposing forces in post-Saddam Iraq when it comes to gender 
culture. One represented by sexualised media content that encourages women not to abide 
by ird-related codes; the other force, which partially feels threatened by the ‘modern’ forces, 
is the conservative one that has flourished after Saddam and pushes towards a stricter 
implementation of traditional values, including ird.  
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This state, in which these opposing forces pull society in different directions, is 
eloquently explained by Narmeen [social researcher at Baghdad Women Association, F, 
M.A. B]:  
 
We are witnessing a conflict in society as a whole, between religious and liberatory 
forces, well, it is not necessarily liberatory, but there is a deep change that is happening 
in society, in the way people think, and media is playing an important role… For 
example, there is a trend towards leaving hijab, but on the other hand, there is a trend 
towards wearing hijab, and I would say that the wearing hijab trend is stronger. 
 
Because of the threats that conservative sectors of society feel as a result of the uncontrolled 
media environment they tend to reassert their traditional cultural values. The religious 
groups do this through limiting women’s presence in public, coercive veiling, etc. At the 
more private level some men among my participants tend to implement gender cultural 
values in a stricter manner in regard to their own female kin. Kareem’s [working in a print 
shop, M, Y, B] remarks in this regard are telling: 
 
Satellite TV and mobile phones changed my mind about women. When I started seeing 
the internet and how girls use it, mobile phones and how they have pictured themselves 
by their mobiles, I started to doubt… This changed my mind about women. So I hated 
the idea of marriage [because he couldn’t trust any woman not to violate gender 
specific codes]. And then my family said: ‘marry this girl [his current wife], they said 
she is a 12 years old child; she’s not gone out [not seen the world], she is an orphan 
and she doesn’t know even what a mobile phone is, never touched one. She lives with 
her uncle, who is a cleric in Najaf’. When I married her, I let her watch only three 
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channels, Kowthar, Anwar and Anwar 2 [all Shia religious channels]. And I have 
blocked other channels, so that when I’m out at work, she cannot watch other channels. 
My wife is a child; I don’t want her to see these things. 
 
This is a critical era in Iraqi history, where different forces are fighting to determine the 
identity of Iraq as they see it. Gender culture is an important element of this struggle. This 
argument will be returned to later, but before that, next section explores the extent to which 
media is influential in ‘modernising’ gender culture in post-Saddam Iraq. 
 
6.3   Media in Iraq 
There has been ‘intermittent attention’ paid to the media environment in MENA, as Sreberny 
(2005) puts it, mainly because the region attracts attention around issues such as terrorism, 
political upheavals and civil wars, and oil. The Arab spring and the role of the media in its 
events and developments has encouraged researchers to look at media in the Middle East 
using a fresh approach, but still this field has not been researched extensively. If 
‘intermittent’ is the right adjective to describe the attention that the media environment 
receives in MENA, the right adjective for media research in Iraq is ‘rare’. Although the 
abrupt transformation of the media environment in 2003 was quite extraordinary, it has 
attracted very little academic commentary. 
While in the 1990s, in many parts of the world, Information and Communications 
Technologies (ICTs) were developing rapidly and were expanding in many countries, Iraq 
was almost completely isolated from these developments, mainly due to the Iraqi regime’s 
strict policies on communication technologies. During Saddam’s era, the regime had a 
complete monopoly over print and broadcast media in Iraq (with the exception of Iraqi 
Kurdistan which has been practically outside the jurisdiction of the Iraqi state since 1991). 
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Prior to the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Iraqi state owned and controlled all 
of Iraq’s TV and radio stations and newspapers (Kim 2011). The content of these media 
outlets was strictly monitored and controlled by the state to make sure that it was completely 
in line with the Ba’ath regime’s ideology and objectives (Noor Al-deen 2005). “During the 
Ba’ath rule, the media were generally shaped by the government’s policies. Social and moral 
values and norms, such as the famous ‘Faith Campaign’ in the 1990s, were all dictated to 
the public via the mass media” (Al-Rawi 2012: 17). Additionally, satellite reception was 
strictly barred in Iraq, preventing Iraqis from accessing TV channels that broadcast from 
outside the country. Internet service was almost absent during Saddam’s era as well. Access 
to the internet for the public was made possible in 2000 in a very limited scope, and people 
needed to acquire a special license from the state to be able to connect to the internet. Most 
users who were able to obtain a license were affiliated to the regime or were at least wealthy 
enough to pay the high fee of 2000 ID per month, which was almost equivalent to 20% of 
the average Iraqi's salary at the time. As a result of these conditions and the high price of 
computers for Iraqis, by 2003, the year of Saddam’s fall, only 45000 people out of 28 million 
Iraqis had access to the internet (Al-Rawi 2012). Even these very limited numbers had access 
to an internet service whose content was extremely limited, due to the heavily state 
controlled system of censorship. Ahmad [technician, M, Y, B] recalls those days:  
 
We didn’t have real options during the previous regime. Things are completely 
different now. It’s a different world when it comes to these devices. Who dared to 
think about having satellite TV receivers? They were not available in the market 
anyways. Computers were a rarity. So expensive … Mobile phones were something 
we just heard about. We didn’t have these things. 
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After the fall of Saddam’s regime, this picture changed dramatically, resulting in the 
increasing integration of Iraq into global processes. As a result of the media policies 
introduced by the CPA and pursued by subsequent central and local governments throughout 
Iraq, tens of non-state-owned media outlets mushroomed in the country. By 2009, 55 radio 
stations and 28 television stations at the national, regional, and local levels were working in 
Iraq (Kim 2011). This environment has given Iraqis a wide range of options to choose from, 
not only from among Iraqi TV and radio channels broadcast in Arabic and Kurdish, but also 
from a wide range of Arab and international broadcasters which are in the hundreds (Andary 
2007). One BBC report states: “[in] 2013, nearly all Iraqi households have access to satellite 
television” (Awad and Eaton 2013: 15), giving the Iraqis access to hundreds of satellite TV 
channels. “With the arrival of the Americans, prohibitions against satellite dishes 
disappeared; sales soon skyrocketed, leading to one of the highest penetration rates [for 
satellite broadcasting] in the world” (Amos 2010: 11).  
In other parts of the world the story has been very similar, as this has been a global 
trend: since the last decade of the 20th century, the number of people around the world who 
have been using the media through satellite broadcasting, as well as those who are connected 
to the internet, has been progressively rising. By 2015, 3.2 billion people in the world were 
connected to the internet, with 1.1 billion having access to high-speed internet (The World 
Bank 2016). Also, since the 1990s, DBS has been progressively reaching larger parts of the 
world, making communication media truly global (Thompson 2001). 
Satellite TV channels constitute the great majority of TV channels that are watched in 
Iraq, as no cable TV system operates in the country, and terrestrial TV channels are by no 
means as popular as satellite TV channels. When asked about his ideas about TV viewing in 
Iraq, Ahmad [technician, M, Y, B] who works for the ministry of environment says: 
“everybody watches satellite TV these days. There are hundreds of them. Terrestrial TV is 
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dead. Who watches terrestrial TV? They don’t broadcast interesting stuff anyways”.  In 
regard to the internet use he stated: “internet is a little different. It’s expensive. I mean many 
people have access to the net nowadays, especially younger people, university students, etc., 
but you cannot compare it to satellite TV”. People in Iraq tend to install satellite dishes in 
their houses to enjoy a vast array of free TV. Maryam [secondary school student, F, Y, B] is 
a witness to the high penetration of satellite TV: “you cannot find a house in Iraq without 
satellite receivers. After 2003 people were suddenly allowed to see the world for the first 
time, so people rushed to buy satellite [receivers]. And nowadays most houses have more 
than one satellite [receivers]”. Zakiya [teacher, F, M.A, E] indicates that watching satellite 
TV is an important part of her family’s everyday life: “we have five satellite [receivers] at 
home; three TVs [connected to satellite receivers] on the ground floor and two upstairs”. 
Nowadays satellite TV is one of the main sources of entertainment and also receiving 
information in Iraq. 
There is a myriad of satellite TV channels available for free for Iraqi people. In 
addition to that, a variety of methods are cheaply available for Iraqis to ‘illegally’ watch paid 
satellite channels too. The cost of buying and installing satellite TV receivers is relatively 
cheap for a country with a Gross National Income per capita of 6320 US dollars in 2014 
(The World Bank). In his free time, Ahmad [Technician, M, Y, B] installs satellite TV 
receivers and dishes for extra income. He estimates that the “average price for a normal 
receiver and dish that does not remotely orbit and only catches one satellite is 45000 IRD 
[around 40 US$]”. This amount would be paid once, as there is no monthly fee for using 
most of the channels broadcast in Arabic and Kurdish; also, there is no television taxation in 
Iraq. The above statistics and comments show the centrality of television viewing, and 
especially satellite TV, in Iraqi households. It is difficult to talk about homes in many parts 
of the world without considering media technologies such as television.  
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Television has become embedded in the complex cultures of our own domesticity. We 
can no more think of television as anything other than a necessary component of that 
domesticity than we can think of our domesticity without seeing both in the machine 
and the screen a reflection and an expression of that domestic life (Silverstone 2003: 
24). 
 
On the other hand, as in many other countries and regions around the world, the internet 
connection is expanding rapidly in Iraq. By November 2015, 11 million Iraqis had access to 
the internet, making it the third ranked country in the Middle East in terms of population 
with internet access (Internet World Stats, 2015). This is when adopting a broad definition 
for internet users, such as “anyone currently in capacity to use the Internet”. This is a person 
who meets the following two requirements “(1) [has]…access to an Internet Connection 
point (2) [has] the basic knowledge required to use web technology” (Internet World Stats 
2016). Other sources that adopt less broad definitions put Iraqi internet users at over 
4,8,00,000 in 2016 (Internet Live Stats 2016b). Whichever statistics are agreed upon, it is 
clear that the use of the internet is rapidly expanding in Iraq.  
Other types of entertainment are not as cheap or as available as satellite TV channels 
and the internet, for a variety of reasons. Iraq has been suffering from devastating wars and 
crippling sanctions since the early 1980s. This has left all the infrastructure in Iraq in a dire 
condition, including infrastructure in relation to entertainment, such as parks, cinemas, 
theatres, and so on. In addition, the adverse security situation in Iraq has forced many people 
to stay at home and watch TV (Alwan 2014). In particular, women have been affected most 
by this adverse security situation and their movements have been greatly limited-far more 
than men. Sadiya [housewife, F, Y, B] explaines: “you know the situation in Baghdad, 
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explosions and kidnappings etc. We have to be careful. Sometimes the best thing to do is 
just stay at home. That’s why I spend so much time watching TV”. Regardless of the security 
situation or lack of suitable spaces for entertainment, women’s access to public spaces is 
limited compared to men’s, due to Iraq’s patriarchal gender culture. That is why in a city 
such as Erbil, which is considered a relatively safe city, women are still largely confined to 
their homes. Women, as the bearers of men’s sexual honour, ird, have to comply with many 
norms such as sex segregation (Khayyat 1990). It is preferred that women have as little 
contact as possible with non-mahrams. Public space in many countries in the region, 
including Iraq:  
 
has been, and in many places remains, male space. Women are often required to enter 
it veiled, covered by the rubrics of religious decency and appropriate relations between 
the sexes, work and shop under a male ethos, and return to the female arena of the 
interior (Sreberny 2005: 64). 
 
Therefore, for many Iraqis the best place for women is the home, where they can stay 
protected from any ‘inappropriate’ approaches by men. Maryam [secondary school student, 
F, Y, B] talks about the limited number of public places where women can have fun due to 
sex segregation: “entertainment places are mostly for men. We as women cannot go alone 
to many places. We have to be with our families, otherwise they look at us in a bad way.  
There are limited places to go anyway, so we stick to the TV”. All these factors leave women 
with no option but to spend most of their time at home, especially as the vast majority of 
Iraqi women are not working in paid jobs outside their homes (United Nations Joint Analysis 
Unit Iraq 2012). Iraqi gender norms, problems with infrastructure, as well as the adverse 
security situation, limiting Iraqis’ entertainment options and rendering the home one of the 
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safest places for leisure. But this is not peculiar to Iraq; in other parts of the world too, “[t]he 
home has increasingly become the site for entertainment” (Gray 2013: 503). This is 
particularly true for women where “the domestic sphere is increasingly becoming defined as 
their only leisure space” (ibid). 
This abrupt change in the media environment means that Iraq is now connected to the 
Arab Media environment, which has witnessed huge transformations during the past twenty-
five years. The Arabic language and cultural similarities means that Iraqis now are not only 
connected to the increasing numbers of Iraqi media outlets (in Arabic and Kurdish), but also 
to hundreds of satellite TV channels broadcast in Arabic. The lack of government restrictions 
on media consumption and use also means that Iraq could be increasingly connected to the 
internet. However, the poor quality of the infrastructure that provides the internet service has 
caused Iraq to lag behind most of its neighbours, yet Iraq has had the opportunity to 
experience the internet as it has been expanding rapidly since the turn of the century. 
Successive post-Saddam governments have not had any clear policy on the media. 
Therefore, while almost all countries in the region implement some kind of censorship or 
control over specific aspects of media technologies, Iraq is a space were media can be used 
freely with no state intervention. Unlike Iran, there is no law that prevents Iraqis from 
purchasing satellite receivers. The same is true about connecting to the internet. There is no 
state censorship of the internet and unlike countries such as Iran, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, 
social networking apps such as WhatsApp and Viber can be used with no restrictions. Iraqi 
activists from all backgrounds appear on TV and use the internet to pursue their goals, 
because there is no law against it. This is not to say that media activities do not have their 
dangers in Iraq. However, it is fair to say that the media environment in Iraq is freer than 
most of the countries in the region, as very harsh criticism of the government and other state 
institutions can be easily heard on TV and the internet every single day. People use social 
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media to organise demonstrations and use them as platforms to debate sensitive social, 
cultural and political matters, creating a vibrant public space, which is hard to come by in 
other countries in the region.  
Not only are the Iraqi government in Baghdad and the regional government in Erbil 
less concerned or less able to curtail people’s usage of media technologies as public spaces, 
compared to neighbouring countries, these governments have implemented no measures to 
‘mitigate’ the media influence on their culture either. Although in September 2015 the Iraqi 
parliament passed a law that allowed blocking pornographic content, there have been no real 
steps taken to implement the law. There is absolutely no censorship of the internet in Iraq. 
Even the types of measures that deal with pornographic websites in Britain, which ask 
internet providers to block porn websites by default, and only unblock them upon an adult 
user’s request, does not exist in Iraq. Also, unlike countries in the region and even countries 
such as Britain that have criminalised watching certain pornographic content such as child 
pornography, rape or bestiality, there is no law in Iraq criminalising watching this type of 
content.  
There have, however, been restrictions on the way journalists operate in Iraq. The 
biggest problem is the security situation. Assassinations are daily occurrences in Iraq. 
Journalists have been victims of these assassinations, and this includes in Kurdistan. Since 
2003 tens of Iraqi media workers and journalists have been abducted and killed, and many 
have fled the country. Whether these crimes have been committed by the governments in 
Erbil or Baghdad, it is hard to tell, especially in an environment where the political factions 
that form the government run militias and other types of armed groups. Another problem is 
that the post-2003 media environment in Iraq is extremely partisan (Kim and Hama-Saeed 
2008). It is difficult to obtain accurate information about the ownership of media outlets, but 
it is clear that political groups, mainly Islamist parties, own many of them. “The ruling Dawa 
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party, for example, is believed to own and operate, directly or indirectly, a number of [TV] 
channels and even these are believed to have been divided along inner party splits” (Awad 
and Eaton 2013: 25). As most post-Saddam media outlets are “driven by sectarianism” 
(Cochrane 2006, cited in Al-Rawi 2012: 64) they have been an important element in the 
sectarian conflict of post-Saddam Iraq. They have been used as propaganda tools to march 
in support of the sect that the owners of the channels belong to, rendering them “an integral 
part of the conflict” (Al-Rawi 2012: 64). Although many conservative groups exploit media 
environment to further their goals, at the same time they oppose many aspects of it that are 
seen as threat to the culture of the country. Clerics and Islamic party members always warn 
about the negative influence of foreign culture on Iraqi society. They have also been 
instrumental in helping consolidate a traditional Islamist worldview within social spheres. 
For example, patriarchal sentiments have been disseminated on a large scale by these 
satellite channels, as they believe it is in line with Iraq’s traditions and values. In the struggle 
over the identity of the country and nation, media outlets have been extensively used by a 
variety of political factions. As the regime change has highly benefited the political parties 
that took over in 2003 in terms of financial gains, they can now afford to launch a variety of 
media outlets. They have the resources to be active in the virtual environment as well, 
dominating the media environment in Iraq and marginalising independent voices. On the 
other hand, the sectarian and religious pressures have greatly influenced the way journalists 
and producers work. The numerous red lines, especially around some religious figures who 
are considered to be holy and untouchable, means that journalists think twice about what 
they are going to say. Journalists have faced numerous lawsuits in an attempt to silence them, 
particularly under Prime Minister Nuri AL Maliki (2006-2014). There are doubts about the 
independence of the judicial system in Iraq, as these lawsuits have been successful in 
silencing some journalists. This has created an environment of intimidation that has hindered 
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free speech in Iraq. It is however important to note that the global nature of modern media 
has allowed journalists who find it impossible or hard to work inside Iraq, to join Iraqi TV 
channels outside the country. Countries like Jordan, Egypt and Syria have hosted many Iraqi 
satellite TV channels. As there are no restrictions on receiving satellite channels, Iraqis are 
able to watch them. Needless to say, the internet has also created an environment for media 
experts to make themselves heard from outside the country. The Jordan based Iraqi satirist, 
Ahmed Al-Basheer, started his increasingly popular comedy show, Albasheer Show, in 
2014, using YouTube as its platform. In his show he covers Iraqi social and political 
developments, mocking the ruling elites in a way never seen before in Iraq. Two years later 
two Arabic speaking channels, the Kurdistan based NRT Arabic and Germen based 
Deutsche Welle (DW) Arabic, began broadcasting his show simultaneously each Friday. It 
is also published on YouTube, as it was before. This is a unique show in the MENA, 
broadcasting from inside the region. Bassem Youssef‘s ‘The Show’, a very successful 
Egyptian comedy show, was closed down due to pressure from the government. Later on, 
Bassem youssef emigrated to the US.  
It seems that many sectors in Iraqi society, including the traditionalists and 
conservatives, have embraced the post-Saddam media environment. All of the interviewees 
agreed that having access to the media is beneficial to them and the wider society in one way 
or another. In this regard, Hameed [Sunni cleric, M, M.A, E] believes that society needs to 
embrace the internet, because it is important for “scientific purposes and various 
developments in life”. Like many other interviewees, Shahad [university lecturer at the 
college of art, F, Y, B] shows enthusiasm for satellite TV. She thinks that media is not only 
useful, but an essential element in the modern era:  
 
We used to be isolated [under Saddam]. We used to have one or two channels and 
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these channels would give us what they wanted, as a result, our level of thinking was 
limited to what the media wanted us to know. But the proliferation of satellite TV has 
developed us, developed our culture and many other aspects of life. Media is an 
essential part of modern life; it is a necessity.  
 
The high rate of TV access in Iraq, as well as the fast growth of the internet, and also the 
unanimous agreement from all the interviewees from various backgrounds, shows that Iraqis 
have truly embraced media post 2003. This welcoming, nevertheless, is not a full-fledged 
one. There seems to be a resistance towards accepting some media forms and/or content; a 
resistance motivated, mainly, by gender specific values seen as traditional and viewed as 
important elements of the Iraqi identity. 
  
6.4   Global Media, Local Context 
In order to understand the relationship between media and Iraqi cultural values pertinent to 
gender, one needs to pay attention to the local context in which this media content is 
consumed. “[M]edia recipients are not empty vessels into which media content can simply 
be poured” (Ayaß 2012: 2), as the earlier studies on media effects suggest. It is clear that 
communication and information are increasingly diffused globally; yet the local contexts in 
which the receivers are situated in play an important role in interpreting these symbolic 
materials. In order to understand the process of appropriation of the media products, it is 
important to pay attention to the specific spatio-temporal locales the consumers live in.  
 
The appropriation of media products is always a localized phenomenon, in the sense 
that it always involves specific individuals who are situated in particular social-
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historical contexts, and who draw on the resources available to them in order to make 
sense of media messages and incorporate them into their lives (Thompson 2001: 174).  
 
Individuals adapt media messages to their own practical contexts of everyday life. Through 
this process of ‘globalised diffusion and localized appropriation’ of media content the 
messages are transformed. Although media content are being circulated on an increasingly 
global scale, the process of appropriation still remains intrinsically contextual, which 
indicates the importance of the context of reception in the process of reception. On the other 
hand, the global diffusion of communication and information technology gives people the 
opportunity to distance themselves from their local reality and their day-to-day conditions, 
symbolically and imaginatively, by creating an alternative cultural space, turning locales to 
sites where globalised media content is received, interpreted and incorporated into the reality 
of people’s everyday life. This process of appropriation of globalised symbolic materials 
involves what Thompson calls “accentuation of symbolic distancing from the spatial-
temporal contexts of everyday life” (Thompson 2001: 175, italics in original). Through the 
global diffusion of media products, people are able to gain a partial understanding of 
alternative lifestyles elsewhere. Images of alternative lifestyles give the audience the 
opportunity to critically think about their own life conditions, by comparing their own lives 
with those prevailing in other parts of the world. This is especially important for Iraqi 
viewers, as some aspects of their own lifestyles are substantially different from the dominant 
pictures in the media. For example, the accepted norms and attitudes towards gender and 
sexuality compatible with Iraqi traditional cultural values are in sharp contrast to those 
portrayed in the popular media products mainly produced in the West, and particularly the 
US, but also in the region as will be shown later. This issue has become more important, 
especially when we realise that portrayals of sexuality in media products which cover a wide 
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range of content, from ‘erotic’ material to hardcore pornography, diffused globally, are on 
the increase with ever-increasing ease of access for audiences (Jackson and Barlett 2009; 
Brown 2002; Adolescents 2012) in many parts of the world, including Iraq.  
The picture of the ‘modern family’ and gender relations that regulate these families 
where women are much more independent, diverge enormously from the traditional gender 
culture in Iraq. These media products give Iraqis the chance to distance “themselves from 
their own life conditions and, at the same time… [help them] gain a critical purchase on 
official interpretations of social and political reality, both in their own country and 
elsewhere” (Thompson 2001: 176).  
This localised appropriation of media products, however, can be a source of tension, 
as will be shown in Chapter Seven, mainly because the picture that is conveyed through the 
media clashes with the traditional Iraqi lifestyle and the accepted norms supported and 
disseminated by the traditional institutions of tribe and religion. This divergence can be 
appealing, especially for less powerful sections of society, in this case women, who are 
dominated by other groups and find in globalised media a chance to distance themselves 
from their own oppressive reality. The dominant groups however, in this case men, might 
not be happy with allowing this to happen, as they see these symbolic messages in alternative 
lifestyles as threating their authority.   
However, the increasing proliferation of media technologies and globalised media can 
also be a source of strength for traditional institutions, as the process of the appropriation of 
globalised media content can interact with localised patterns and consolidate the existing 
power relations. This is clear in Iraq where the old-established traditional institutions of 
religion have been quick to exploit the new free media environment in Iraq after 2003 and 
use their money and network of audiences to launch their own satellite TV channels as well 
as websites. As explained in Chapter Two, for example, Ayatollah Sistani has a popular 
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website that is available in seven different languages. A quick look at the Iraqi satellite TV 
channels list makes it clear that religious characters as well as institutions have a very active 
presence in media in Iraq. But equally important is the variety of non-Iraqi religion-oriented 
channels broadcasting from the neighbouring countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
and so on; these channels are busy reiterating traditional cultural values that are in contrast 
to the values diffused by other channels, mainly showing Western media products or 
products produced in regional countries but seen to be disseminating Western values. One 
set of media content presents an alternative lifestyle and allows audiences to gain a critical 
view of their local lifestyle, values and norms, while another set of media products engages 
in consolidating these local values and norms. This diversity in media messages can cause 
self-conflict because individuals might experience a clash of values. “Individuals are 
constantly involved in trying to reconcile, or simply hold in an uneasy balance, messages 
which conflict with one another or with the values and beliefs embedded in the routine 
practices of their daily lives” (Thompson 2001: 177). 
There is a clear divergence between what is expected in gender relations (what it is to 
be a man and a woman) in the cultural norms and values of the local reality of Iraqis, which 
are also disseminated by media outlets owned and run by traditionalists, and the gender 
relations and expectations of sexuality disseminated through the media, either by the 
sexualised consumer oriented Western style media content, or by feminist groups’ rhetoric. 
These conflicting symbolic messages and contrasts in values disseminated by competing 
media makes the process of appropriation of symbolic messages more complicated and 
brings the question of the identity, of who Iraqis are to the fore. 
 
6.5   Media and Iraqi Identity  
It is clear that large sectors people in Iraq are worried about what they perceive as the 
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negative influence of the Western/Westernised media on their local traditional cultural 
values, particularly those related to gender relations. That is evident form my participants’ 
responses, but also from the numerous media reports and cleric’s comments on this issue. It 
is also clear that women’s media consumption is a contentious matter that provides an 
environment for serious conflict in Iraq, particularly inside families. But, it is important to 
note that the free environment that gave the opportunity for what is perceived as Western 
media products to enter Iraqi households post 2003, has also provided the right setting for 
traditionalists to hugely invest in their presence in a variety of media outlets to disseminate 
their own religious and political ideologies. In this regard, Layla [clerk in a hospital, F, Y, 
B] emphasised the ubiquity of the religious rhetoric amongst Arabic speaking satellite TV 
channels: “It is not as if you are only exposed to Western shows on satellite TV. There are 
tens of religious channels available in Iraq. Iraqi, Iranian, Egyptian, Saudi, Lebanese, you 
name it. And there are many people that actually follow them”. Zakiya [teacher, F, M.A, E] 
mainly watches Kurdish speaking religious channels. When asked about her media use, she 
proudly says:  
 
I mainly listen to Quran. I also follow religious sermons on TV. If I have time I would 
listen to the news bulletin too, but mainly Quran. I switch to religious channels and 
listen to Quran for hours. While I’m working at home, cleaning, cooking, even when 
I’m on the second floor, the TV is on and I can hear Quran. 
 
In fact, religious channels are so influential for Zakiya that they helped persuade her to 
change her behaviour: 
 
Previously, I used not to wear Hijab. I used to wear normal clothing such as blouses 
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and skirts. But after the satellite TV came, I started watching religious TV channels. I 
started to implement [what is preached in these TV channels]. I personally apply many 
things I learn from satellite TVs, such as wearing hijab and reading Quran. I 
memorised five sections of Quran. I practice many things that I’ve learnt from satellite 
TV channels. 
 
This change in behaviour towards a more traditional lifestyle influenced by media, is also 
reported by Riham [member of the Sadr district council and the head of the committee for 
women and family, F, M.A, B]: “Religious satellite TV channels, they propagate religion 
and have influenced young men in Sadr city [a poor mainly Shia district in Baghdad], 
because of this, they are increasingly prejudiced. They are stricter with their sisters, wives, 
etc”.  As explained before, since the 1990s, Iraqi society has witnessed a surge in religious, 
as well as tribal values as a result of Saddam’s regime strategy of resisting the harsh 
sanctions that were imposed on Iraq. After the fall of the regime in 2003, this trend was 
intensified mainly due to the proliferation of religious groups and institutions and the 
polarisation of the sectarian groups who are fighting to impose their own version of cultural 
identity. This has also been reflected in media spheres as these groups have exploited the 
new media environment to consolidate their power (Al-Rawi 2012). It is difficult to say 
whether the young men of Sadr city were directly ‘influenced’ by these religious media 
outlets in becoming stricter in observing values related to ird, but it is clear that the post 
2003 religious media have been instrumental in the dissemination of traditional cultural 
values and highlighting them as part of the cultural identity of the Iraqi people. Identity is 
increasingly important in many parts of the world. 
 
There has been an increased interest in cultural identity in recent years, particularly as 
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cultural identities undergo constant transformation. We live in a world where identity 
matters. It matters both as a concept, theoretically, and as a contested fact of 
contemporary political life. The word itself has acquired a huge contemporary 
resonance, inside and outside the academic world (Gilory 1997: 301). 
 
The relationship between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is key in understanding identity. In particular, 
cultural identity is important in obtaining a sense of self in relations to others. Identity 
“reflects the way people position themselves in society and on how meaning is attached to 
this position.” (Verkuyten 1999: 5). Identity is a fluid notion, and as there is a historical 
dimension to it, like everything that is historic it undergoes transformation, “[t]herefore, 
changes in society, being political, economical, demographic or cultural, all have their 
impact on identity” (ibid). Abrupt and dramatic changes, such as the regime change in Iraq, 
in particular, can intensify the struggle around identity. This is more apparent when a 
particular identity is viewed as being under threat. "Identity only becomes an issue when it 
is in crisis, when something assumed to be fixed, coherent and stable is displaced by the 
experience of doubt and uncertainty" (Mercer, 1990, p. 43). As explained previously, various 
sectors in Middle Eastern societies feel that their ‘old-established’ and ‘fixed’ identity is 
under threat from what is perceived as the West. And in this war on their cultural identity, 
the media plays a pivotal role.  This idea enjoys a shared concern between the regimes in the 
region and the public. Gender culture especially, is seen as being under threat by a media 
that is spreading Western sexual ‘immorality’.  
In order to distinguish their culture, the interviewees used three terms: Iraqi, Muslim, and 
Oriental (Eastern) and they place their identity against Western identity. Cultural identities 
reproduce common historical experiences. Also important in cultural identity is shared 
cultural codes through which a sense of being ‘one people’ is created. This sense of ‘one 
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people’ is clear in the participants’ comments. This ‘one people’ is set against ‘another 
people’, which in this case are Western. Interestingly, the world is divided into two spheres: 
the world of Islam or the East (mainly Islamic societies) of which Iraq is seen as a part, and 
the West or people who are seen as being willing to follow the West, the Westernised 
people/societies. This is particular important in the media, as the West or Westernised ideas 
are seen as dominant in media content production. This dichotomy is clear in Riham’s 
[member of the Sadr district council and the head of the committee for women and family, 
F, M.A, B] mind when it comes to the media. After showing discontent with the cultural 
changes that have taken place in Iraqi society due to the proliferation of what she believes 
are Western cultural products, Riham says: “these things are not in our nature. This is all 
because of satellite channels and music shows and the Western design that entered our 
culture. They invaded us”. She continues: “we as an Eastern society have our own traditions 
and customs, and education and upbringing”. When talking about ‘us’ (the Iraqis) she 
emphasises traditions and customs. It seems that she believes these traditions and customs 
are important components of Iraqi culture. When asked if she thinks Iraqi women should 
become like women on global TV shows, she answers:  
 
Of course not, they are different. You see on Iraqi channels, most of the female 
presenters and even the actresses, except some rare examples, are decent and respect 
themselves. Because we have, as I told you before, traditions and customs that rule us. 
Even if she is an actress, at the end of the day she’s Iraqi and there are traditions that 
she respects.  
 
For Kareem [working in a print shop, M, Y, B] Islamic values are of utmost importance as 
he mentions them several times and creates a dichotomy of Islam/Islamic vs. the West:  
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There are satellite channels such as Anwar and Kowthar, these are religious channels 
and it is possible for a woman to watch them. They are Islamic and teach women about 
religion. But women shouldn’t watch channels that show dance shows and they 
shouldn’t watch Western channels, and you know what kind of TV channels these are.  
 
Ibrahim [high school student, M, Y, B] links women’s rights to Islam, emphasising the 
importance of religion in Iraqi culture: “In Islam women get half the inheritance men get”. 
He too doesn’t like to trade this Islamic culture with a Western one: “We live in an Islamic 
society. Women shouldn’t become like Western women. This is happening now. This helps 
the spread of [sexual] corruption”. Additionally, Ibrahim believes that the internet is a source 
of conflict between women and Islamic values: “Women refer to the internet and TV rather 
than their religion… many of websites are un-Islamic”. For him tradition in the form of the 
religion of Islam is very important and what he perceives as Western culture intruding 
through media is a threat to the local culture and identity. He continues: “this is harming the 
society… because women are learning from the West and this is not compatible with our 
society”. Ibrahim repeats this opinion when asked about the internet, as he believes that 
internet use by women is harming society “they [women] learn Western attitudes. This 
corrupts our society”. 
As explained earlier, Western/Westernised culture is seen as indecent and vulgar when 
it comes to attitudes towards sex. In this regard Kareem [working in a print shop, M, Y, B] 
says: “For Europeans cheating is normal. I watched a movie the other day. There was a 
wedding, the bride opened the door and she saw her husband sleeping with her mother. This 
is unbelievable”. Islamic/Eastern/Iraqi culture, on the other hand, is seen as decent regarding 
sexual demeanour and needs to be protected from the indecent Western culture. Kareem 
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continues “Iraqi women shouldn’t try to imitate Western women, nor should Iraqi society 
become like the Western societies in regard to women”. He believes that Western women 
are not decent, and he is not happy to see Iraqi women becoming like them. In fact, Kareem’s 
main objection to the proliferation of media is that Iraqi women will turn Western, and by 
that he means adopting Western attitudes towards sex. Another comment that emphasises a 
clear distinction between Iraqi and Western culture was made by Sara [engineer works in a 
factory, as well as working for the Baghdad city council as a consultant, F, M.A, B]. For her, 
Islam is the source of this distinction. Due to the nature of her profession, she has travelled 
a lot, including to European countries. She praises Western women because of what she calls 
“their independence”. When asked if she wanted to see this happen in Iraq she said: “Well 
our religion is different. We have religious boundaries and we cannot bypass them”. On the 
other hand, Maysoon [journalist, F, Y, B] also thinks that traditions are influential players in 
Iraqi society. But she talks about them (specifically religion) in a negative tone. When asked 
if she believes that there is discrimination against women in Iraq, she says:  
 
A lot, especially after the Islamic and religious tides. Religious currents greatly restrict 
women’s role. I mean they propagate the idea that women’s role is only to get married 
and have babies and be a housewife and take care of her husband. [So] the other side 
of women is non-existent. There’s no social, political, artistic or cultural interest for 
women [in their opinion] …a woman can be successful both at home and in society, 
why not? 
 
Maysoon is very clear about the fact that women should participate fully in society and 
should not be limited to domestic roles. However, she has also concerns about the ‘influence' 
of media on sexual demeanour of people and thinks that some satellite TV programmes offer 
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content that are ‘not for us’ [Iraqis]: “Some people imitate stuff [from satellite TV] that is 
not for us, such as imitating Turkish dramas. Some of these dramas show things that are 
morally deviant; they show some immoral behaviours”. Once again, Western culture is seen 
as sexually deviant, whereas Iraqi culture is moral. Although Maysoon is critical of religion 
as a source of traditional values in Iraq, her observations about sexual demeanour are in line 
with Iraqi gender culture, which is greatly shaped by religion. Turkish culture is seen as very 
much Westernised and therefore not sexually moral to a great extent. In this regard Mahdi’s 
[engineer, M, M.A, B] remarks are interesting: “Turkey is a Muslim country in name only. 
It is not a real Muslim country like our country. In essence, Turkey is a Western society. 
This is clear from their soap operas”. Any media content that portrays sexual attitudes or 
behaviour that is perceived as being permissive, or not in line with the Iraqi gender culture, 
is considered Western, even if it is produced in a Muslim majority country. Mahdi also 
placed great emphasis on the Islamic identity of Iraqi people: “We are Muslims and live in 
a Muslim country and we have an inveterate Islamic history and heritage”. When asked in 
which area men have more rights than women (a point he previously made) he places 
societies into two categories: 
 
…take for example dress code. Men can wear whatever they want, women cannot. But 
we can say there are two types of societies, conservative [societies] in which women 
don’t have the right to wear as they wish. There are also liberal societies, as they call 
them; for them this is normal; women can wear jeans and t-shirts.  
 
It is clear that modesty in behaviour and dress for women, and other values and norms that 
are in line with and promoted Iraqi gender culture, constitute an important part of identity 
for Iraqi people, including women. Media that broadcast materials that are not in line with 
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traditional cultural values, although popular, sometimes face resistance amongst women 
themselves. According to Riham [member of the Sadr district council and the head of the 
committee for women and family, F, M.A, B] this is a source of internal conflict for many 
women in Iraq: “It causes an internal conflict for women. She desires to do these things, but 
she has traditions and customs and religion and values that prevent her doing these things 
that she sees on TV, that encourage her to do them. So, some sort of internal conflict is 
created”. 
Consequently, it is necessary to bear in mind that curbing women’s access to media 
content that are seen as being against local gender culture, is not simply a matter of the act 
of an oppressor group that is imposed upon the oppressed group by force and that faces 
outright rejection by the latter. As mentioned in Chapter Four, for hegemonic masculinity to 
successfully help sustain patriarchy, there must be a degree of complicity by women 
themselves. As will be shown in the next chapter, men rely on value systems that are shared 
by women to pursue their goal of protecting ird from the threat of the media. In addition to 
domestication, threats of violence and inflicting actual violence, men resort to a subtler 
strategy based on persuasion. This strategy exploits women’s Iraqi identity informed by 
traditional values in order to peacefully convince them to self-sensor content that are not 
compatible with the Iraqi gender culture. 
 
6.6   Conclusion  
This chapter has shown how the media environment has transformed after the collapse of 
the Iraqi regime in 2003. Nowadays, the media is used by millions of Iraqis. Those in power, 
mainly conservative groups, have realised that in a modern world they need to invest in 
media in order to further their cause. There are, however, aspects of this free media 
environment that concerns Iraqis. This is mainly related to what is seen as sexualised media 
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content. This type of content is seen as damaging the traditional values of Iraqi society, and 
as corrupting people’s morality. Women in particular are seen as vulnerable and prone to 
being damaged by sexualised media content and the possibilities that the internet provides 
to behave in a way that is against Iraqi gender culture. They are seen as imitating what they 
see in the media. Although there is evidence that shows the opening up of the media 
environment has given women in Iraq the opportunity to distance themselves from their local 
reality and the restrictions on their lives, they consume and use media in a heavily patriarchal 
environment that is keen to curtail their sexual agency to protect what is seen as salient 
traditional values.  
The most harmful media content is considered to be ‘Western’. Essentially any media 
products that are seen as against Iraqi gender culture are considered Westernised, and this 
includes non-Western media products. Iraqi cultural values around gender are in sharp 
contrast to the pictures and ideas that are disseminated in Western/Westernised media 
content. For the interviewees, this clash is related to Iraqi identity. Iraqis are seen as being 
different to Westerners when it comes to gender relations, and Iraqi identity is viewed as 
being under threat from alien cultural values.  
Before I embarked on carrying out this research, I had a much more simpler 
understanding of the relations between media and gender culture. Throughout this research, 
during the literature review phase and especially the data gathering phase, I started to see a 
different, more complicated picture. Despite the fact that I was already familiar with the 
culture and aware of the sensitivities around gender and media in Iraq, I underestimated the 
sophistication and the resilience of cultural norms.  
How, gender relations are interwoven with many other cultural dynamics that makes 
it almost impossible to draw a clear line between them. How, gender is part of the wider 
culture; the tribalism, religion, morality, honour, reputation, the power-relations, and so on 
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and so forth and that media is made sense of in this multi-dimensional, multi-layered and 
multi-pronged environment.   
As I will show in the next chapter, for the reason mentioned above, and many others, 
women in Iraq are part of this equation therefore, are not necessarily keen to change many 
aspects of their cultural norms, rendering the simple unilateral ‘media effects’ explanations 
even less convincing. 
The next chapter will show how the local reality of Iraqi women’s lives limits their 
ability to use media as a way of breaking away from the restrictions that limit their 
movements. It will also be shown how Iraqis are reacting to this threat to their identity posed 
by Western/Westernised media. We will see that in the absence of any state policies, Iraqi 
men reassert their identity by enacting their ird within a media related environment, but also 
how women reject what they see as Western values.  
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Chapter 7: Media and the Gendered Politics of Domestic Life 
 
7.1   Introduction 
The previous chapter demonstrated that although Iraqi people are happy to adopt media 
technologies, they have great concerns about the influence of some of the content available 
through media on their traditional gender culture, which they consider to be an important 
element of their identity. They are also worried that the media facilitates activities for women 
that are against this traditional gender culture. This chapter will investigate how these 
concerns, shape media use and consumption. As media consumption and use mainly take 
place at home, the focus will be on the politics of domestic life and media in Iraq. Media’s 
ability to ‘blur’ the boundaries between the public sphere and the private sphere of homes is 
problematic. It will be shown how patriarchal gender relations give men the tools to try and 
limit their female kin’s access to the media to prevent the interference of images and ideas 
that are seen as being only suitable for men from entering the private and ‘pure’ space of 
Iraqi homes; in order to avoid the ‘negative influence’ of the media on women’s sexual 
attitudes and demeanour. The main action taken is to attempt to domesticate the media and 
adapt it to the local gender culture, however, it will be shown that these measures are not 
necessarily successful, and this leads to conflict within families. Violence is used to protect 
ird in cases of media use and consumption that is considered to be in violation of ird, but 
persuasion is also a strategy used to dissuade women from ‘harmful’ media consumption 
and use. This persuasion strategy relies on what are seen as Iraq’s traditional values, which 
are vital elements in Iraqi identity.  
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7.2   Mitigating the Negative Influence of the Media 
The interviewees clearly agreed that while in this day and age it is not possible to discard 
the media, there should be measures put in place to mitigate what they see as the negative 
influence of media on their gender culture. When Kareem [working in a print shop, M, Y, 
B] raises his grave concerns about the influence of media on women’s sexual demeanour, I 
ask him: ‘are you in favour of censorship, like in the times of Saddam?’. He replied “No! 
Not like Saddam’s times. You cannot ban these technologies altogether. We benefit from 
them in many aspects. But we need to control them in a way that removes the negative 
impact”. Hoshyar [university lecturer in sociology, M, O, E] is in favour of a state censorship 
system to mitigate the negative impact on gender culture. He is not in favour of a total ban, 
such as the system that was implemented under Saddam, but certainly is in favour of a state 
censorship system. “Surely the government should do something about it. I’m also in favour 
of familial surveillance, but an Iranian style system run by the government is what it should 
be”. Riham [member of the Sadr district council and the head of the committee for women 
and family, F, M.A, B] is in agreement with Hoshyar: “we don’t have a proper government. 
It’s chaos; otherwise they should have put in place measures to filter these vulgar shows”.  
The absence of government intervention does not, however, mean that Iraqis stay 
passive about an issue they think is so important to their identity as a people. They are taking 
action in order to adapt the media to their local culture. These measures will be explained 
later on, after first focusing on the patriarchal gender culture and media consumption in Iraq.  
 
7.3   Iraqi Gender Culture and Media 
As explained in Chapter Four, Iraq is a deeply patriarchal society. Evidence presented by the 
interviewees confirms this statement in numerous ways. Patriarchy is manifest in popular 
discourses, not latent. Ird, as an effective hegemonic masculine system is key to sustaining 
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Iraqi patriarchy, rendering sexuality the main site of patriarchy. Gender relations and 
concepts such as ird and ghira have largely developed around the traditional patriarchal 
family, which plays a crucial role in the political, social and economic organisations of the 
country. The traditional patriarchal Iraqi family can be arranged in a variety of forms, based 
on class, economic status, tribal ties, geographical location, religion, and so on. These factors 
often determine the power relations within the household, proving the fluidity and flexibility 
of patriarchal structures. It is widely accepted that men are the head of the family and that 
they can exercise exclusive powers. In this patriarchal system, in some communities and 
families, men can decide on almost every aspect of their female kin’s life without necessarily 
considering their own views, resulting in a greatly diminished self-determination. Sadiya 
[housewife, F, Y, B] talks clearly about her limited self-determination: 
 
No one considers women whatsoever. For example, if she gets upset because of 
something, no one cares. I wanted to pursue my studies after secondary school; first 
my family prevented me and now it’s impossible that my husband will allow me to go 
to college or university. 
 
Raja [housewife, F, Y, B] is in agreement with Sadiya:  
 
Men always oppress women. I think that women are oppressed in many ways. Their 
views are not heard at home… thank God we don’t have these problems at home; my 
husband and I have a very good relationship, but he doesn’t let me go out alone at all. 
The other day, I was cooking at home; I realised that we didn’t have onions, so I called 
him to ask if I could go to the local shop to buy some. He said no, impossible. The 
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shop is a five-minute walk from our home, but he insisted I couldn’t go. I told him 
how can I cook then? He told me to get some onions from the neighbours. 
 
Not only did the female interviewees state that in Iraq men dominate women; the male 
interviewees also believe that women are oppressed in Iraq. Hussein [PhD candidate in arts, 
M, Y, B] was clear about this oppression: 
 
In some communities in Iraq women are sometimes viewed as immature. Men look 
down on women and don’t give them their rights to choose their profession, their 
husband. I mean fathers and brothers force husbands upon women. To be honest 
women are oppressed in some communities.  
 
A story narrated by Salih [Shia cleric, M, M.A, B] clearly shows how women’s lives in Iraq 
can be dominated and controlled by their male kin. Salih works in the office of an Ayatollah 
in Baghdad. He says that people come to their office to get help and advice about their 
problems. One day a man came to talk about his sister’s problem:  
 
His sister married one of her relatives and after she had an altercation with her husband, 
returned to her father’s home. The husband said that her family should bring her back 
and apologise to him. Her father on the other hand, said that the husband should come 
and take her and apologise. This problem continued for 15 years. The husband is not 
willing to divorce her and during this time he remarried and now has children. And the 
father is not willing to refer his daughter’s case to a religious office or the state court. 
Her brother was worried that the father might realise that he had come to our office to 
try and solve the problem. He thought that the father would be mad at him, saying how 
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dare he do this without the husband’s apology. The woman’s life is ruined and she is 
powerless.  
 
This case clearly shows how men can be powerful in a patriarchal family. Two patriarchs, 
the father and the husband, have the power to determine their family members’ fates, 
especially the female ones. This is possible due to the structure of the Iraqi patriarchal family. 
 
Patriarchy privileges males and elders (including elder women in the Arab-Islamic 
world) and justifies this privilege in kinship terms. Females are generally taught to 
respect and defer to their fathers, brothers, grandparents, uncles, and, at times, male 
cousins. Young people are taught to respect and defer to their older kin (Joseph and 
Slyomovics 2001: 2). 
 
7.3.1   Gendered Media Consumption in Iraq 
One of the matters that the male participants tend to determine for their female kin is how 
and to what extent they can have access to the media; this is also clear from the female 
participants’ experiences as they described how their male kin limit and monitor their access 
to the media. As explained before, media consumption and use can encourage women to 
choose to have an alternative attitude towards their sexuality. It can also facilitate women 
bypassing the boundaries set and implemented by men. As a result, the male interviewees 
reported that in their domestic environment they take action to mitigate the ‘harm’ by 
curbing women’s access to the media, as will be shown below. Structures of power and 
authority are particularly important in explaining media consumption in domestic 
environments. Media consumption and viewing decisions are processes that are negotiated 
at home on a daily basis, with gender relations at the heart of them. “The relationship 
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between the viewer and television, the reader and text, is often a relationship which has to 
be negotiated, struggled for, won or lost, in the dynamic and often chaotic processes of 
family life” (Gray 2013: 503). It is important to remember that studying domestic 
environments is not possible in exclusion of the wider social milieu. One always needs to 
consider the socio-political and economic developments that have led to the formation of the 
home in modern times, as well as the wider social norms that, to a certain extent, shape the 
domestic environment. This is an acknowledgment that “[the] home, what it is, what it 
means, and how it is experienced, does not just happen, or get structurally determined, but 
is the product of negotiations by people who operate within certain constraints” (Mason 
1989: 104, cited in Silverstone 2003: 29). 
In the modern world, homes are widely identified with privacy. Prior to the 19th 
century, in Europe, houses were occupied by a variety of groups, and “the home had not 
necessarily been the exclusive terrain of a single family but often contained a mixture of 
biologically related persons, friends, associates and work partners. Work, recreation and the 
care of sick people all overlapped and co-existed within the same space” (Morley 2003: 22). 
The bourgeoisie that rose in the early nineteenth century, however, “was able to create and 
display a private world, separate from the world of affairs; a world in which personal 
pleasures and social preoccupations could be sustained and protected, shielded from the 
attentions of the public” (Silverstone 2003: 24). For the first time, the space for work was 
separated from living spaces. The domestic environment became a private space and the 
notion of control became an essential part of it. 
In Iraq, a mixture of these types of homes can be observed, depending on geography, 
culture and class, but for urban middle class families in Iraq, the idea of the home as a private 
space, a place to resort to away from the ‘noise’ of the world, is the dominant idea. This is a 
place where economic activities are largely excluded and leisure is an important element of 
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it. The distinction between public and private is key to this type of home. The privatised 
nature of these homes allows the ird-based sex segregation between non-mahrams, hence 
women are not obliged to wear hijab at home, unless a non-mahram is present. The privacy 
of Iraqi homes that suitably accommodates ird-related codes is perceived to be under threat 
from the ‘intrusion’ of the media. Through the media, the public sphere, which is mainly a 
male one, enters the private sphere of the home, and this may challenge the feelings of 
security and belonging that are usually associated with home. As the interviewees indicated, 
the media is “a crucial link to a shared or shareable world of community and nation” 
(Silverstone 2003: 29) and that is one of the reasons for Iraqis embracing the media. But, at 
the same time, ‘unacceptable’ images transmitted through the media are seen as threatening 
the local traditional cultural values. This calls for action, as homes are considered to be 
private environments that are supposed to be immune from the problems of the outside. 
Many sexual matters are believed to be masculine and belong to the public space dominated 
by men. Anything related to sex can enter this category. Jokes, swearwords, sexual desires, 
sexual ‘secrets’, knowledge about sex and so on and so forth. Women are expected to be 
oblivious to these matters. They belong to the masculine world. One of the goals of keeping 
the public space dominated by males is to hide these matters from the private space that is 
shared by women. But “communications technologies inevitably transgress the boundaries 
of the household” (Morley 2003: 101), of the private space, bringing in materials that 
supposedly belong to men and making them available to women too. In the West, this 
transgression in the form of unwanted images is mainly considered to be threatening to 
children. Parents in the West are worried about the internet and “deregulated satellite 
television broadcasting bringing pornographic or violent programming within their 
children’s grasp. Deregulation is …a question of fear of the family’s boundaries being 
transgressed directly by unwanted “foreign” elements (Morley 2003: 101). In Iraq, however, 
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the main concern is women’s sexual corruption as a result of the intrusion of sexual content 
into the boundaries of private domestic environments. This seems to be due to the notion of 
the binary of what ‘woman’ is vs what ‘man’ is, and the fact that women are widely 
considered to be immature and gullible, as it is clear from common practices under ird that 
allow men to monito women’s movements in the fear that they fall into ‘indecency’. They 
are seen as emotional and unable to make the right decisions, and as a result prone to the 
sexual vices. This emphasised femininity fits the masculine attribute of reason. Men are 
reasonable beings and that is why they are responsible for overseeing their female kin’s 
behaviours, particularly those related to ird. This is the case even inside the domestic 
environment-a space that has historically been considered a feminine site. That is why men 
need to oversee the largely domestic activities of media consumption and use. Women are 
unable to protect themselves; they need men to protect them or they will fall victims of social 
ills, so the argument goes. 
 
7.4   Defining ‘Woman’ vs 'Man' 
As explained in Chapter Four, the notion of emphasised femininity is an important element 
in hegemonic masculine systems (Connell 1991). In these systems that help sustain 
patriarchy, the feminine is portrayed as feeble and emotional; the female is a being that needs 
to be protected by the strong, courageous and rational masculine. Amongst these masculine 
attributes, reason has a prominent position. Some of the interviewees gave what they call 
rationality a high standing and contrasted it with emotions that are considered less important, 
and sometimes seen in a negative light. On the other hand, rationality is associated with men, 
whereas emotions are linked to women. To Sheikh Laith [senior tribal chief, M, O, B], the 
superior standing of men in the realm of reasoning is clear: “Men are stronger both physically 
and mentally. We don’t want to disrespect women, but it is impossible for women to be as 
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strong as men in terms of rational abilities”. This quality is exploited to give men the right 
to decide for the family, including the adult women. Sadiya [housewife, F, Y, B] believes 
that men are “entitled to more rights” because “they are better managers and bosses”. 
Successful management is usually linked to masculine rationality (Ross-Smith and 
Kornberger 2004). This dichotomy, however, is not special to Iraq. In other parts of the 
world, the female emotional versus masculine rational dichotomy has facilitated women’s 
subordination, as “the concept of reason, in its everyday sense, carries with it a claim of 
patriarchal power” (Najal-Docekal 1999: 50).  
Historically, emotions have been considered as subversive to knowledge within 
Western philosophical traditions. They have been depicted as irrational impulses that 
overwhelm the body; while reason has been viewed as “the indispensable faculty for 
acquiring knowledge” (Jaggar 1989: 151). Traditionally, in Western culture, like nowadays 
in Iraq, reason has been categorised in a gendered manner, where it has been ascribed to 
men, while emotions have been associated with women. This means that women’s faculty 
of reason has been under question and that in general women have been granted an inferior 
position to men, since “the relationship between reason and emotion is represented as one of 
subordination” (Najal-Docekal 1999: 50). In search for the root of this dichotomy, Lloyd 
(1989) maintains that the Greek philosophers associated women and femininity with nature. 
Men came to be related with the opposite of nature, that is, reason and the mind. From here 
comes the association of rationality with masculinity (Ross-Smith and Kornberger 2004). 
As Ortner puts it, women’s association with nature “begins of course with the body and the 
natural procreative functions specific to women alone” (1972: 73). Three main reasons have 
contributed towards the spread of this dichotomy. First of all, women’s bodies are more 
involved with the ‘species’ life’. There are organs in women’s bodies that have no function 
in boosting their health; on the contrary, they are mainly sources of discomfort and pain. 
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Their main purpose is reproduction, which means that the “woman’s body seems to doom 
her to mere reproduction of life” (Ortner 1972: 75). However, this reproduction is repetitive 
and results in creating the same life in more individuals, while men, lacking the ability to 
create naturally, assert creativity in an external manner, ‘artificially’, through technology or 
symbols. In so doing, men create “relatively lasting, eternal, transcendent objects, while the 
woman creates only perishables–human beings” (ibid). Due to women’s greater bodily 
involvement with the natural functions related to procreation, they are viewed as being more 
a part of nature in comparison to men. On the other hand, women also participate in human 
social dialogue and culture. This quality renders them “something intermediate between 
culture and nature, lower on the scale of transcendence than man” (Ortner 1972: 76). 
Additionally, the physiological functions of women’s bodies, mainly functions related to 
child bearing and rearing, have tended to limit their social movements and have restricted 
them to social milieus that are viewed as being closer to nature, and consequently this has 
placed women in social roles seen as lower than the cultural functions of men. Finally, 
woman’s psyche is seen as being close to nature as well. Women’s traditional roles, which 
are imposed on them because of their physiological status, shape their psychic structure. As 
a consequence, like their physiological structure and social roles, their psyche is considered 
to be closer to nature (Ortner 1972). As a result, men have become associated with culture 
and women with nature. Nature is devalued in many cultures, giving women a pan-cultural 
second-class status. This is another manifestation of culture as a site for patriarchy.  
Ascribing traits to men that are related to reason and culture, and giving women a 
lower rank by disconnecting them from mind and rationality and linking them to nature, has 
helped the hegemonic masculine system of ird to continue to function. As explained above, 
hegemonic masculinity is linked to an emphasised femininity, which stresses that women 
are emotional, instable, fragile, feeble and intellectually incompetent (Connell 1991). In Iraq 
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there is a fit between the hegemonic masculine system of ird and the concept of emphasised 
femininity. Hussein [PhD candidate in arts, M, Y, B] talks about women as subtle 
individuals: “woman is a beautiful and delicate being. Protecting her is beautiful too; she 
shouldn’t be turned to something vulgar”. These feminine characteristics make women in 
need of men’s protection; a protection that is provided by masculine, courageous, strong, 
competent and rational men who have ghira and are ready to defend their ird. On the basis 
of the dichotomy of emotional weak women vs. rational strong men, women are denied 
equality with men. When asked about women’s rights, Maysoon [journalist, F, Y, B] 
highlights emphasised femininity: “The main issue isn’t about rights or equality. I don’t 
believe in equality anyway. A woman is a woman; she needs to feel her femininity, because 
she is a female and there are things that men need to feel and the same is true for women”. 
The next comment shows that Maysoon is talking about women’s weakness vs. men’s 
strength: “Frankly I’m biased towards men. It’s not related to rights. It is related to the 
psychological formation of women. I mean men are able to do things that women cannot and 
this is part of their femininity. If she were able to do them, she would lose her femininity”. 
Maysoon intimates that women’s femininity entitles them to fewer rights, and that their 
femininity necessitates that they stay weaker than men. To Maysoon, women’s supposed 
incapability at doing some of the tasks that men are able to do, is part of women’s nature 
and is beneficial to them, as it gives them a feminine trait. This emphasised femininity 
persuades women that their weakness is part of their structure and men need to assume 
masculine roles, and that these supposedly superior roles give men more rights. One of these 
masculine roles is protecting ird, including by monitoring and restricting females’ media 
consumption. Kareem [working in a print shop, M, Y, B] clearly assumes the hegemonic 
masculine role of protecting his ird on the basis of the feminine trait of intellectual 
incompetence: “we [men] don’t let women watch these things. Women’s brains are small. 
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These [harmful shows] will corrupt them”. Zahra [shopkeeper, F, Y, B], refers to women’s 
intellectual capabilities by using a similar expression used by Kareem: “women’s brains are 
tiny. They can easily be lured on the internet by men who wants to use them only for sex”. 
Another aspect of emphasised femininity is the female’s physical inferiority to men. 
This physical weakness also gives men more rights. In this regard, Riham [member of the 
Sadr district council and the head of the committee for women and family, F, M.A, B] says: 
“Women are weak beings, so they cannot achieve all the rights. Because of their structure 
and body, women don’t have equal rights with men. Because they are not able to lift heavy 
things, for example, or work in construction”. Emphasised femininity manifested in female’s 
inferior physical, as well as mental capabilities, persuades women that they need competent 
men to protect them. Women’s reputations linked to sexual honour is among the most 
important attributes that need protection by men outside the domestic environment, but 
equally inside it, especially due to what is perceived as the media’s intrusion into the private 
space of the home.  
Historically, in popular culture, ‘man’ and ‘woman’ are defined in a binary. Man’s 
body and mind is attributed superior traits, giving him the ‘right’ to dominate women. The 
narrative of ‘lack’–women always lack something that men have, not the other way round, 
helps justify this ‘right’. In this argument the ability to grow children in the womb, or to feed 
children at the breast (to name two embodied examples of difference), are not normally 
brought forward as arguments for women’s physical and psychological strength. This was 
the case amongst the participants (both male and female). This is a manifestation of the 
blurred lines of biology and culture. It is clear that the participants provided a cultural 
narrative of what they see as clear, immutable and inevitable biological traits as the attributes 
that make ‘man’ and woman’. In this cultural view, the ‘superior’ biological traits that men 
possess make them eligible to decide for women.   
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As explained earlier, the interviewees viewed media as presenting opportunities and 
encouraging behaviours that are not acceptable according to the traditional cultural values 
of the society. The widespread consumption of media is proof that Iraqi men have accepted 
that it is not really feasible to fight the proliferation of media in the modern world. Therefore, 
they resort to a variety of mechanisms to shape media consumption, particularly by women, 
in a way that is compatible with the traditional cultural values of their society. They do so to 
neutralise this threat, or at least to mitigate the consequences and minimise the damage. 
There are always facilitating and constraining practices in the micro social environments of 
the family that alter media consumption at home.  Since home does not exist in isolation of 
the wider society, one needs to consider the wider cultural concepts and practices of the 
society that shape media consumption. The wider cultural values of Iraqi society have a clear 
impact on the domestic environment. Although the domestic sphere is largely considered a 
female domain, to the male interviewees, ird related responsibilities determine that men, 
equipped with mental as well as physical superiority, have the ultimate control over what 
goes on in this domain. This notion is clearly summarised by Sheikh Laith [senior tribal 
chief, M, O, B]: “At the end of the day, a man needs to know what’s going on in his house. 
He knows what’s best for his family; he is the man of the family; he is the god of the family” 
[a common expression that refers mainly to the male head of households]. 
As explained previously, it is mainly men that are responsible for making sure ird and 
its pertinent codes are observed. Women are not trusted with their sexual desires. On the one 
hand, the sexual double standards prevalent in Iraq deny adult women sexual agency, 
particularly when these relationships happen outside marriage. The easiest and less costly 
way of protecting ird is to make sure that it is not violated in the first place. If ird is violated 
in any form, the reputation of the family, and especially the males, is severely damaged, and 
in order to regain ird some very difficult action has to be taken by men, including murder in 
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some cases (Dodd 1973). Veiling, sex segregation, and FGM are amongst these preventive 
measures that are practiced in one way or another in Iraq (UNICEF 2011; Khayyat 1990). 
Domestication of the media is another measure in this category. 
As shown above, media is blurring the boundaries between the public and private. “A 
whole range of technological innovations have made the boundaries between the household 
and the outside world far more porous in both directions” (Morley 2003: 97). Media brings 
material that is considered as belonging to the mainly masculine public sphere into the 
private space of the home, where women are also exposed to it. In this regard, Isma’el 
[research assistant at University, M, Y, E] says: “there are sexual jokes and stuff that are not 
suitable for women. Stuff that you here on the street, but for women to hear them, I think 
it’s obscene”. As the media is seen as a threat to the Iraqi gender culture, men need to make 
sure that women are ‘immunised’ against its negative impact. In order to achieve this goal, 
some pre-emptive action needs to be taken. To this end, men in Iraq try to ‘domesticate’ the 
media so that it is adapted to the gender-specific cultural norms and values of their society.  
Domestication literally refers to taming a wild animal; however, metaphorically it 
refers to the situation whereby technology users try to bring it under control (Silverstone 
2003) and ‘housetrain’ it, so that it is “integrated into the structures, daily routines and values 
of users and their environments” (Berker et al. 2006: 2) The process of domestication may 
start in the factory, where issues such as producing user-friendly products are taken into 
consideration. In this section, however, the focus is on the consumption phase, when men in 
Iraq try to control communication media by ‘housetraining’ and domesticating it at home to 
restrict their female kin’s access to some media content which they deem harmful. The 
capacity of men, as a social group appropriating media into the culture and the structure of 
everyday life in Iraq, will be discussed, with some light shed on the mechanisms used by 
men to domesticate media technology. 
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7.5   Domestication of Media in Iraq  
The male interviewees reported that they resort to a range of strategies in order to adapt 
media to Iraqi gender culture. This was corroborated by some of the female participants’ 
personal experiences. Some of the interviewees maintained that women’s access to the 
‘corrupting’ content available on TV shows and the internet should be restricted, if not 
completely banned. This is one of the strategies advocated and applied by men in Iraq to 
‘tame’ the media. This process of domestication is in line with what is seen as men’s duty to 
protect their honour and that of their families, and it is proof that local circumstances can 
greatly shape media consumption and limit what is known as ‘media impact’. This 
domestication is carried out through several mechanisms, as will be illustrated below. 
 
7.5.1   Censorship 
Censorship is one of the mechanisms employed by men in Iraq to mitigate the ‘negative 
impact’ of media on their female kin. Kareem [working in a print shop, M, Y, B] believes in 
censorship as a mechanism for getting rid of Western media content that he deems harmful 
to women: 
 
I believe if a man wants to allow a woman to watch satellite TV channels, he must 
block many channels. There are religious channels such as Al-Anwar or Kawthar; 
women can watch these channels. These are Islamic channels and teach women about 
religion. But women must not be allowed to watch channels that broadcast dance 
shows or Western TV. You know what kind of shows are on these channels. 
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Isma’el [research assistant at University, M, Y, E] will implement censorship after marriage: 
“When I get married, I will set codes for some channels, so that my wife wouldn’t have 
access to bad channels. When it comes to the matter of dance shows and sex programmes, 
I’m conservative”. 
 
7.5.2   Monitoring 
Censorship is not the only strategy some of the male interviewees have figured out to take 
control of the media. Monitoring women’s access to the media is considered a way of making 
sure that women do not consume ‘harmful’ media materials. Ibrahim [high school student, 
M, Y, B] believes that “when women browse the internet, a man must sit next to them [to 
monitor what kind of activities they are doing when connected to the Internet]. Sheikh Haidar 
[junior tribal chief, M, M.A, B] believes that men are responsible for monitoring their female 
kin’s media consumption: “there is a man in each home. He is the person who controls these 
matters. He must monitor his daughters, his sisters, etc. and see which channels are on”. 
When asked about his opinion on women’s unrestricted access to media, he is surprised that 
such a thing exists: “A woman sits in a room by herself watching foreign dramas? I don’t 
agree with this. Why? Isn’t there any man standing over this girl who is alone in the room? 
Every house has a ruler, a patron. The problem with these households lies in their patron”. 
 
7.5.3   Banning 
Some men go even further than that; they completely deny their female kin any access to 
certain forms of media. Kareem [working in a print shop, M, Y, B] believes that “men 
shouldn’t allow women to have access to the Internet”. Sadiya’s [housewife, F, Y, B] 
husband has actually denied her access to the internet, despite her continuous requests: “I 
have been asking my husband to connect me to the internet and he has always refused. He 
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says that he will buy me a laptop, but won’t connect it to the internet. Even with the laptop, 
I wouldn’t be allowed to use it more than a specific amount of time”. 
On the other hand, as the concerns about the negative influence of the media on sexual 
moralities in society is reflective of a prevalent sexual double standard in Iraq, so is the 
gender-based domestication of media that allows men to have much more freedom to explore 
their sexuality in the way they see fit. As a result, men have more options to use media 
technology in their everyday lives. Sheikh Laith [senior tribal chief, M, O, B] has denied his 
daughters access to the internet while allowing his sons the liberty of accessing the media: 
“We have a computer that is connected to the internet. I have two sons, they use the internet 
regularly, but my daughters never even enter the room where the computer is located”. He 
does not show any concern about the possibility of his son’s exposure to sexual content or 
the fact that they might use it to contact non-mahram women, while denying his daughters 
any type of access to the internet, in the fear that they might engage in some sexual activities 
that violate ird. 
 
7.6   Female Resistance to Domestication of the Media  
As shown above, men implement a variety of methods to try to domesticate media in a way 
that restricts their female kin’s access to media content that is seen as encouraging them to 
violate ird. However, the privatised and ubiquitous nature of media technologies make this 
mission a difficult, if not impossible, one. The interviewees made it clear that in many cases 
these strategies simply do not work, and at the end of the day, many women resist these 
restrictions and find a way of accessing the media content that their male kin do not want 
them to watch. Kareem [working in a print shop, M, Y, B], though very keen on 
domesticating the media, is under no illusion that in many cases it has not been successful: 
“I know a girl, a young student. She told me: in front of my dad I watch religious channels, 
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but when dad goes out, I watch music and dance shows and I have learnt all types of dance”. 
Layla [clerk in a hospital, F, Y, B] talks about how her friend connects to the internet without 
her husband’s permission: “I have a friend whose husband doesn’t agree to give her the 
password to the Wi-Fi at home. Instead, when he is at work she connects her laptop to their 
neighbour’s Wi-Fi, which doesn’t have a password”.  Shahad [university lecturer at the 
college of art, F, Y, B] clearly believes that the domestication of media in Iraq does not 
work: 
 
How can you control media access nowadays? Imagine everybody can buy an internet 
card and connect their mobile phone to the net. Yes, it is a little expensive for us Iraqis, 
but nonetheless, possible. And through that you can watch TV; you can see pictures, 
you can talk to other people. I don’t think it’s possible anymore to restrict access to 
the media. I mean, unless you ban it altogether, like during Saddam, and that is highly 
unlikely.  
 
As is clear from the above remarks, the participants reported that there is resistance from 
many women in Iraq, regarding the restrictions that have been put in place by their male 
family members. This is indicative of the fact that the domestication mechanisms, are not 
necessarily successful in restricting women’s access to the media; many factors, including 
the increasing “fragmentation of domestic viewing” (Morley 2003: 90), allows many women 
to circumvent them, as media technologies are becoming more and more ‘privatised’ and 
mobile. This fact, however, creates conflict inside Iraqi families. This is especially true when 
considering the increasing tendency to obtain more than one TV set and satellite receiver, 
and also the nature of the internet, which allows ‘privatised’ usage to the point that one can 
be connected to the internet even inside her/his bedroom using a tablet or a smartphone. 
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7.7   Media Consumption and Domestic Conflict 
Media is seen as a major source of conflict inside Iraqi families. As will be shown below, 
there are three clear reasons why women’s media consumption is a source of conflict within 
families. The main one is consumption of and/or exposure to the sexual content and also 
using media to engage in ‘inappropriate’ sexual contact, both viewed as being against the 
gender culture. It has been explained in detail how this is a sensitive issue that concerns 
many Iraqis, mainly men. The other reason is because media consumption and use is seen as 
a distraction from women’s domestic duties. Also, women’s exposure to media content that 
encourages women’s agency is problematic.  
In a patriarchal society, men try to sustain their dominance in a variety of forms. It is 
clear that in Iraq they believe that this domination is under serious threat from female media 
consumption and use. As a result, they try to curb women’s access to the media, as was 
explained in the previous chapter. However, it is clear that a significant number of women 
in Iraq are resisting this strategy, hence the (at least) partial failure of domestication. When 
women continue media consumption and use it in a way that is seen as being inappropriate 
by men, conflicts arise. This is clear from the numerous media reports, some of which ascribe 
the increase in the numbers of divorces in Iraq to the media, and in particular foreign dramas 
and social media (Mahdi 2015). Others report that the internet encourages marital infidelity 
in Iraq (Al-Nahar). But this is not limited to the media; a report published by the Federal 
Judicial Authority in Iraq states that social media is behind the increase in the numbers of 
divorce cases in Iraq (Al-Fatlawi 2015). These reports are supported by anecdotal evidence 
such as the interviews carried out for the purpose of this research. Almost all of the 
interviewees mentioned media consumption as a source of conflict in Iraqi families. Tribal 
chiefs and clerics have a role in mediating between people in Iraq. As mentioned in Chapter 
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Two, tribal customary courts are one of the main references people rely on to resolve their 
disputes. These leaders, who bear the traditional authority, emphasise that many cases of 
conflict have occurred as a result of media consumption by women, and have been referred 
to them. In this regard Sheikh Laith [senior tribal chief, M, O, B] stated:  
 
As a Sheikh I offer mediation for various conflicts on a daily basis. There are a lot of 
conflicts that happen because of the foreign dramas. Men don’t want their wives to 
watch them; people in these dramas can be role models for their daughters and they 
[men] don’t accept it. Or women see things in these shows such as dresses and stuff 
and the husband cannot afford them so problems start. 
 
Omar [Sunni cleric, M, M.A, B] also talked about people referring to him for similar 
problems: 
 
You know people of the neighbourhood trust us in the mosque. They refer to us to 
solve their problems. So, we see and hear many things. And satellite TV and the 
internet are causing a lot of problems inside families, mainly because of women using 
them in a way that our society cannot accept.  
 
This theme is even reported by government officials. Abdelrahman [Head of the department 
for monitoring violence against women, M, Y, E], also mentioned media consumption and 
use by females as a major source of conflict inside families: “We witness a lot of problems 
here in Erbil that are created by satellite TV and the internet. Women imitate what they see 
on the TV or contact men through the internet, and this is a seed for conflict and violence”. 
 240 
He continues: “Many men in Kurdistan don’t like their wives to watch these shows. 
You see Turkish soap operas, they show marital infidelity and women learn from this. Men 
don’t want this to happen and this is definitely a source of conflict that we witness in our 
department”. Nouri [Journalist, M, O, B] also sees women’s media consumption as a reason 
for conflict in families: 
 
We see so many conflicts over foreign dramas. There are men who don’t want their 
wives to watch these shows. Our society doesn’t accept this, because this will lead to 
deviation. Therefore, men prevent their wives from watching, and when women don’t 
listen to their husbands and continue watching these shows, naturally, problems occur. 
 
The other reason media consumption is a cause of conflict inside families is that it interrupts 
what is seen as female’s domestic duties. Aqila [school teacher, F, M.A, B] believes that 
watching TV can be problematic for this reason: “Many men, when they come home and see 
their wives watching TV and not preparing food for them, will get angry. He comes home, 
and says: where is dinner? She replies: just let me watch this, let me finish it; and they start 
to quarrel over that”. Riham [member of the Sadr district council and the head of the 
committee for women and family, F, M.A, B] has experienced this first hand: 
 
I was on my laptop at home, browsing the net, sending emails and stuff related to my 
work. So my husband saw me on the computer, and I was busy so forgot about him. 
He said: aren’t you going to prepare tea for me? I told him: ok, ok, just a minute and 
returned to my work. This happened several times and finally he burst out with anger. 
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In a society where the sexual division of labour is limited, domestic duties are mainly the 
responsibility of women. “The family is conventionally considered to be central to women’s 
lives and to the determination of gender inequality” (Walby 1997: 61). The importance of 
the household as a private patriarchal site of production is declining in many modern 
societies around the world. However, in a society that is still greatly shaped by tradition, and 
which experiences limited sexual division of labour, the household is a prominent patriarchal 
site where women, even women who work in paid jobs outside the household, are considered 
solely responsible for domestic duties. Zakiya [teacher, F, M.A, E] had a very telling story 
in this regard: 
 
My husband doesn’t like the bread that is sold in bakeries. He wants me to bake him 
fresh home-baked bread. The other day I baked a lot of bread for hours and had a nasty 
backache because of that. I entered the kitchen to rest. All the chairs were taken by my 
husband and children; I said: would one of you move so that I can sit and rest for a 
while? I have a backache. They all said: no, we are hungry. First prepare the food, and 
then take a rest. 
 
On the other hand, satellite TV programmes encourage women’s agency; an agency that is 
greatly denied according to the system of ird. TV programmes that focus on women’s issues 
are particularly important in this regard. Although, as Sakr explains, some of these shows 
are not more than “‘chatfest’ among a group of… women of different ages” (2007: 105), 
some others cover important issues that concern women in the Arab world. Narmeen [social 
researcher working in the Baghdad Women Association, F, M.A, B] talked about the role of 
these types of programmes: 
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There are TV programmes that have increased women’s awareness of their rights. On 
MBC and on Alhurra TV, these programmes, which are specifically for women, give 
power to women to ask for their rights. For example, when we first launched this centre 
no one was speaking; for example, when there were cases of rape etc., everyone was 
silent. Now they come forward. These TV programmes give them strength. 
 
Riham [member of the Sadr district council and the head of the committee for women and 
family, F, M.A, B], also sees these programmes to be very influential in raising awareness 
and encouraging women to increase their autonomy: 
 
Some channels encourage women to enter new fields, to do new things. For example, 
encouraging them not to be satisfied with being a school teacher. Some of my friends 
are teachers, and as a member of the council since 2004, I was able to engage them. I 
asked to create committees that engage with communities. My friends were isolated. 
They would only go to school and think about teaching. I helped them register on some 
workshops; they quite liked it. Now they ask me when the time for nominations is. 
They watch TV. They see what other women have achieved. There are many activities 
presented on these channels. For example, the weekly magazine produced by the 
provincial council. They see these activities and it encourages them to enter different 
fields. They no longer confine themselves only to their jobs. 
 
In addition to programmes that cover women’s issues, dramas are also seen as encouraging 
women’s agency and autonomy. Sadiya [housewife, F, Y, B] said: “Of course, when [Iraqi] 
women see how women in dramas are independent and strong they admire them; they want 
to gain this strength and learn from them”. When I asked her if she wants to have a similar 
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life, she answered: “Sure, I like my life to be like them, in all aspects. The freedom they 
enjoy; the autonomy they have. In terms of studies, dress code, everything. Their lives are 
better than Iraqi women’s from all perspectives”. As explained before, the media allows 
viewers to compare their own local conditions with those common in other parts of the 
world. Through this process, they can distance themselves from their own conditions that 
they find unsatisfying (Thompson, 2001). This explains what the interviewees describe as 
‘imitation. It is clear that many Iraqi women like Sadiya, have a desire to change their local 
conditions into the conditions diffused through the media, therefore they try to imitate what 
they see in an act of distancing themselves from their local reality. However, their ‘horizon 
of action’ is limited, since the local conditions are not going to disappear and allow women 
to disregard the traditional patriarchal structures altogether. The patriarchal systems make 
sure that the power relations are in favour of men, making it difficult for women to change 
this balance. This was completely acknowledged by Sadiya when she completed her last 
comment by saying: “But this is not going to happen in Iraq. Our traditions do not allow us 
to be like them. Men wouldn’t allow girls to become like that. I know girls who tried to be 
like that, tried to imitate what they see on the TV, but it brought them problems with their 
fathers and husbands”. Sheikh Laith [senior tribal chief, M, O, B] believes that as a result of 
women’s access to the media they are no longer obedient: “After [the introduction of] these 
technologies, some daughters rebelled against their fathers, some wives rebelled against their 
husbands. This is against our Islamic and tribal values and forces men to react. This is 
creating tensions amongst people”. Thus, it is believed that women can gain autonomy as a 
result of their access to the media. Men think they are losing control of their women, who 
are believed to be disobedient, and consequently react in a way that causes tension between 
men and women. 
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So far, three reasons why women’s access to media cause conflicts in domestic environments 
have been explained. However, women’s access to media is not the only source of media-
related conflict between men and women in Iraq. Men’s media consumption and use can 
cause problems too. It was reported by several informants that men compare their wives with 
the actresses they see on TV and as a result see the women on TV as more sexually desirable. 
Ibrahim [high school student, M, Y, B] has never had an encounter with a Western woman. 
He admits that he has only seen them on TV. Although Ibrahim strongly believes that 
Western media content is harmful for society and particularly corrupting for women, he 
revealed his favouritism towards Western women: “I don’t like women here anymore. I like 
women in the West”. When I reminded him that he said Iraqi women shouldn’t follow the 
same path as Western women, he answered: “that’s correct. But now I’m talking about men. 
Nowadays men prefer Western women”. The media allows men to compare their own local 
conditions with other parts of the world too. These processes of media appropriation allow 
men to distance themselves from Iraqi women, and to desire ‘sexier’ women that are 
perceived to be mainly Western or Westernised. Riham [member of the Sadr district council 
and the head of the committee for women and family, F, M.A, B] firmly believes that men’s 
favouritism towards the women they see on TV is a reason behind many conflicts at home:  
 
The man switches different channels and sees the difference between the two [women 
appear on TV and his own wife]. Of course this will cause tensions at home. Many 
women have been to our office and talked about this problem. This actually happened 
to my sister. Her husband was watching TV in which these beautiful women with nice 
dresses appear, so his wife passed in front of him, and he immediately started saying: 
look at the difference between you and this [actress], leave me, you disturbed my 
thoughts [dreams]. And this will become the seed for further problems. 
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This shows that while media might provide women in Iraq with a limited ‘horizon of action’ 
through which they challenge ird-based norms and are able to regain some sexual agency 
and self-determination, its sexualised content can at the same time impose a different type 
of patriarchy in which the sexualisation of women is another basis for imbalanced power 
relations.  
Needless to say, women do not possess a sophisticated system such as ird, to try and 
alter their male kin’s access to media; another testament to the sexual double standard that 
is prevalent in Iraq. Men, however, can take different actions based on ird. For example, 
when domestication fails, it may result in violent action being taken by men against their 
female kin. 
 
7.7.1   Female Media Use and Domestic Violence  
Although hegemonic masculinity mainly consolidates men’s domination over women 
“through culture, institutions, and persuasion” (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005: 832), it 
does not completely rule out brute force in order to sustain patriarchy. In Chapter Four, it 
was explained that violence is an important site of patriarchy that helps the other site of 
patriarchy in Iraq, that is, sexuality, to function in a more efficient manner. Ird relies on a 
variety of strategies (including persuasion) to sustain patriarchy; this however does not mean 
that Iraqi men never use violence to impose ird codes such as restricting their female kin’s 
access to media. In fact, their ghira dictates that when they feel that their sexual honour of 
ird is under threat or violated, they can take action by employing violence, either to prevent 
the violation or ird, or to regain it after it was violated (Dodd 1973; Abu-Rabia 2011). There 
is always an environment of threat hanging over women’s heads in Iraq, reminding them 
that if they deviate from ird’s codes of practice, they may be severely punished. Zahra’s 
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[shopkeeper, F, Y, B] take on this is an important indicator of this continuous threat: 
 
Turkish dramas are a catastrophe. They show women as free, independent beings that 
can have boyfriends etc. This encourages our women to follow them and try to be like 
them. This is crazy, our society is different; you know how many women are killed 
because of such behaviours in Iraq? 
  
For Zahra, ird-based violence is a continuous threat and a deterrent against transgression of 
ird. The constant fear of honour-based violence in societies that value ird has been widely 
reported. King (2008: 322), who has carried out ethnographic research in Iraqi Kurdistan, 
makes the following observation: “Within the context of this restrictive way of life for girls 
and women lurked the spectre of honor killings. Most of my female interlocutors who were 
of childbearing age (but not those younger or older) seemed to live in constant fear of them”. 
Not only threats of violence, but also the use of actual violence is prevalent in Iraq, when it 
comes to enforcing ird codes. Although obtaining reliable statistics about honour-based 
violence in Iraq is difficult, numerous reports warn of a dire situation and Human Rights 
Organisations have called for action to protect women against it (see Green and Ward, 2009; 
Human rights Watch 2011; Bayoumy and Kami 2012). There are numerous stories of ird-
related violence that happened due to women’s media consumption in the interviews. Omar 
[Sunni cleric, M, M.A, B] narrated a story about a man who caught his daughter having 
cyber-sex:  
 
There’s a family in our neighbourhood. The daughter would go in her room and stay 
there for hours. After a while the father was suspicious, so he asked the mother what 
she is doing staying awake in her room till late. She told him that the daughter is 
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studying. After a while he was more suspicious, so he entered her room without her 
noticing and saw her daughter chatting with a half-naked man. He denied her food for 
days until she fainted and they had to call a nurse to come to their place to save her. 
 
When ird is violated to a degree, violence is used to teach a lesson that prevents the future 
ultimate violation of ird, that is, penetration and pregnancy by a non-husband man. Kareem 
[working in a print shop, M, Y, B] narrated an ird-related murder: “A row happened between 
a couple. The woman who was offended by the way her husband talked to her angrily said 
‘you talk to me as if I sleep with Mohannad34. The husband shot his own wife dead.” When 
I asked Kareem if he believed that the husband had the right to kill his wife, he replied, “Of 
course he had. She fancied a man on TV who lives hundreds of miles away from her. What 
would have happened if a handsome man lived around the corner?” As mentioned in Chapter 
Four, 68% of young Iraqi men justify killing women for violating ird, by sleeping with non-
husband men (Human Rights Council, 2014). Another ird-related act of violence that was 
reported by Omar [Sunni cleric, M, M.A, B] shows clearly the extent to which ird is a public 
matter, and that if the violation of ird is known to the public, the punishment inflicted on the 
female is more severe: 
 
A girl took the school shuttle with her friends. She got off in front of the school’s gate, 
but didn’t go in, so they registered her absent. Her classmates said that they saw her 
on the shuttle and that she was with them. The head teacher contacted her family. Her 
father is an army General. So he provided her with everything, the internet connection, 
and the best mobile phones available. They thought the girl had been abducted [high 
ranking army personnel and their families are targeted by the insurgency in Iraq]. So, 
                                               
34 A Turkish actor. 
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he called the police. When the school time was over, she came back to the school to 
take the shuttle back home. Everybody was there, the parents, school staff, and the 
police. He beat her up severely in front of them in a way that she was hospitalised. It 
turned out that she found a boyfriend through Facebook and she went to see him. The 
father didn’t let her go to school anymore. 
 
Again, the media is implicated in an act of violation of ird. The ird related codes oblige men 
to take violent action against their own female kin in the event of violation of ird. They have 
to do so to regain their honour and reputation in society (Dodd, 1973). Not all men are 
prepared to take the ultimate action by killing the person who violated ird. Similar to other 
hegemonic masculine systems, where only a minority of exemplars live up to what is 
expected from the ‘ideal’ man, ird based killings are perpetrated by a minority of hegemonic 
masculine exemplars, and most men are not prepared to do that. In the above case, the father 
did not kill his daughter but beat her severely. This can be explained from different aspects. 
First of all, there are different levels of the violation of ird that deserve different levels of 
punishment. This might differ from family to family and community to community. For 
example, not wearing hijab might be viewed as the violation of ird in some communities, 
but in others it does not constitute a violation of ird. This shows that like any other social 
structure, Iraqi patriarchy and the system of ird are flexible and prone to change. However, 
as mentioned before, there is a common concept, which is that women need to dress 
modestly. Being in touch online in an intimate manner with a non-husband man can be 
another level of the violation of ird, and ideally, the female perpetrator needs to be punished, 
but it is not the ultimate violation. The ultimate violation of ird, which according to the 
collective ideal of the hegemonic masculine system of ird deserves the death punishment, is 
being penetrated and/or impregnated by a non-husband man. All other levels of violation of 
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ird should be stopped by persuasion, threat of violence or using violence short of murder or 
a combination of these three strategies, because they are viewed as leading to penetration 
and impregnation by a non-husband man.  In the above case of the high school girl, there 
was no proof that penetration and/or impregnation had happened, although there was a 
possibility that it happened, as the girl was with the non-mahram man; this can generate 
rumours and severely damage the reputation of the family and especially the male members 
of that family, hence the severe beating. However, women might be killed in an ird related 
killing based on suspicion. “In a social milieu in which honor killings are practiced, to create 
or nurture suspicion about a girl or woman’s sexual transgression is to possibly endanger her 
life” (King 2008: 320). And in this case there is certainly room for suspicion. So, why did 
the father not kill his daughter based only on suspicion? This could be explained by the fact 
that he is not ready to act as a masculine exemplar and to conform to the collective ideals of 
the hegemonic masculine system of ird. As explained previously, most men are not ready to 
take action such as murder, although less severe violent actions such as battering are more 
common in cases of violation or ird. The fact that so many people became aware of this 
violation of ird, may have contributed to the severity of the battering, as ird is a matter of 
public awareness and reputation in the eyes of other people. On the other hand, men who 
benefit from the dividend of a patriarchal system, enforced and sustained by the system of 
ird, are complicit and allow the violence to happen. This explains why men, including the 
policemen who witnessed the man beating his daughter, did not stop him. In the case 
mentioned by Kareem [working in a print shop, M, Y, B] however, the husband was ready 
to take action, as expected from a masculine exemplar, and act on the suspicion that under 
the ‘right’ circumstances his wife would sleep with a ‘strange’ man.   
Violence is normally the last resort for men to prevent violation of ird or regain it. 
Persuasion and threat of violence are normally used before the execution of violence itself. 
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Ird is not simply an oppressive system employed by men to subordinate women; a system 
that women are forced to live under against their will just because they are powerless. Codes 
that have been developed around ird and also values that promote and support ird constitute 
an important part of the value system and identity of the nation; an identity that is shared by 
women. That is why ird is such an effective system. The values that ird draw upon are 
perceived to be under threat from another value system, namely the Western one that is 
intruding through the media. As demonstrated in Chapter Six, ird is important for what is 
perceived as Iraqi identity, as it derives support from deeply respected cultural values. The 
next section will show how men exploit this to persuade women to abide by ird-related 
codes. 
 
7.8   Persuasion 
Domestication, conflicts and violence are not the sole story around media consumption in 
Iraq. Iraqi men sometimes resort to another more lenient strategy to ‘mitigate’ the ‘negative 
influence’ of media on their female kin. In addition to domesticating media technologies to 
adapt them to cultural values, they may try to persuade women to refrain from watching 
material that is seen as against those values and particularly harmful to ird; mainly drawing 
upon traditional cultural values which constitute key elements in Iraqi women’s (as well as 
men’s) identity. Culture, as an important site of patriarchy, promotes values that help sustain 
men’s domination over women (Walby 1997). In Iraq, culture is deeply informed by the 
traditional institutions of tribe and religion. Men exploit these values to persuade women to 
abide by values promoted by concepts related to another site of patriarchy-sexuality. This 
process of persuasion normally takes place in a gentle manner and relies mainly on 
emphasised femininity. Talking about women’s access to media, Omar [Sunni cleric, M, 
M.A, B] stated that men need to be gentle with women in convincing them to restrict their 
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access to inappropriate media content: “men shouldn’t be dominant at home. With good 
words and treatment [they can convince women to avoid harmful materials]”. In line with 
Omar’s remarks, Hoshang [real estate agent, M, O, E], talking about the same issue said: 
“The god of the family should direct them [female kin] with good words”. As explained 
earlier, men are seen as wise and rational; traits that qualify them to advise and guide their 
family members, including female adults who are seen as impressionable, incompetent and 
gullible.  
 
7.8.1   Female’s Ird as a Moral Value for Persuasion  
Women in Iraq might be persuaded to conform to codes of ird in different ways. First of all, 
women’s sexual demeanour is linked to their own reputation. Although ird is mainly a 
masculine quality, it can be attributed to women too. But unlike men’s sexual honour, which 
is linked to someone else’s sexual conduct, that is, their female kin, women’s ird is linked 
to their own sexual conduct and is mainly linked to their virtue rather than honour. In order 
to preserve their own ird, women are expected and persuaded to limit their sexual contact to 
those allowed under ird. Talking about women’s presence in the media, Salih [Shia cleric, 
M, M.A, B] touched upon this feminine aspect of ird: “Let women work in art, in media, in 
any field, provided that they preserve their sharaf” (another term that sometimes is used 
interchangeably with ird). Aqila [school teacher, F, M.A, B] is also concerned about 
women’s ird nowadays in Iraq:  
 
People are forced to marry their daughters off these days at an early age. I’m going to 
do it myself to be honest with you. Although I’m a teacher and cultured, as soon as my 
daughter reaches 15, I’m going to marry her off. I won’t leave her [single] in this 
society. My daughter is clever at school and stuff, but I’m afraid for her. Our society 
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has become brutal. There are so many religious programmes on TV, but at the same 
time many boys and girls are doing the opposite [of what is preached in these religious 
shows]. Young people take drugs, ecstasy and alcohol; it’s become very difficult for a 
girl to preserve her ird.  
 
Aqila is worried about failing to bring her daughter up in a way that she, herself, restricts 
her sexual contact and preserves her ird. Therefore, she plans to marry her off at an early 
age, before she establishes a relationship that is considered illegitimate according to ird. If a 
woman fails to preserve her ird, she will lose her reputation and will be given a bad name. 
Raja [housewife, F, Y, B] believes that some of her friends have damaged their reputations 
because they have behaved in a way that is incompatible with societies’ gender culture: 
 
I have friends who always watch Western music shows. They’ve become like the 
Westerners. They wear jeans outside the home; they share their pictures on Facebook. 
They speak foreign languages, dance like foreigners, they’ve become like them. We 
cannot become like Westerners. We live in an Islamic and Eastern society. You see 
when a woman behaves like that in our society, people look at her in a negative way, 
for example they won’t have suitors, because they are seen as indecent people.  
 
The women she refers to have not adhered to the codes of modesty that are linked to ird, 
therefore they have damaged their reputations in the eyes of some people, and they might 
face consequences for their actions. Women such as Aqila [school teacher, F, M.A, B] and 
Raja [housewife, F, Y, B] are persuaded that it is in the female’s benefit to comply with the 
moral values of ird and, therefore, they emphasise that women must refrain from watching 
media content that is not compatible with ird. In this regard, Raja says: “women should not 
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watch shows that are not good for them. If we don’t do this, as mothers we will be showing 
the wrong way to our daughters. They will grow up believing that it is ok to behave like 
these women on these shows. We will damage their moral values.” 
Codes of ird and values that support it are important part of the traditional cultural 
values of the society, including female members of society. Therefore, many women are 
convinced that transgression of ird is wrong. Women’s sexual agency, and even promiscuous 
behaviours, undermines ird, as this system is based on controlling and limiting women’s 
sexual attitudes. In addition, as ird-based sexuality is a moral matter, which is promoted by 
the Iraqi value system, women are not keen to undermine it. One of the strengths of 
hegemonic masculinity is that it takes its effectiveness from complicit men, and equally 
complicit women, who believe that hegemonic masculinity is a positive notion-a norm that 
is beneficial to women (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). Indeed, ‘cultural processes’ are 
key to the functioning of hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 1991). These cultural processes 
convince women to abide by rules set by ird. With this in mind, men exploit traditional 
cultural values to implement the persuasion strategy. When talking about convincing women 
not to consume inappropriate media content, Omar [Sunni cleric, M, M.A, B] said: “Women 
are emotional; you can convince them by using a Quranic verse or an Islamic story about the 
prophet”. Omar exploits both emphasised femininity and cultural values to protect ird. Wise 
moral men can use the Islamic value system to persuade women to avoid the media content 
that is seen as encouraging sexual immorality. In many cases, they are successful because 
they draw upon cultural values widely respected by women.   
 
7.9   Conclusion 
In a media environment where any kind of material is available, the Iraqi state agencies do 
not play any role in filtering this content, allowing those that are both compatible and 
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incompatible with local culture to be available. In this environment, Iraqis take the 
responsibility for adapting media to their culture. Gender culture is at the heart of this 
initiative, and men are the prime players. They are expected to protect ird from any ‘danger’, 
and that includes undesirable media content or services available through media 
technologies. As any media consumption and use happens inside the social milieu and is 
influenced by it, the ‘horizon of action’ for women to deviate from the influential and strict 
social rules is limited. In the case of women’s media consumption and use in Iraq, the 
existing power relations that attribute to men traits that entitle them to control women’s lives, 
means that men can curb women’s access to media, so that they cannot deviate from the 
gender-related cultural norms. In this regard, they resort to domestication of the media, using 
strategies such as banning, monitoring and censorship. This strategy is not necessarily 
successful, and some women resist the domestication of the media. The increasing privatised 
nature of media consumption and use is key in their success at bypassing the boundaries set 
by their male family members. They have been able to use the media to claim their sexual 
agency by watching shows, which although men watch, they do not allow women to watch; 
in addition to using the media to establish sexual contacts. This causes conflict in Iraqi 
families. Men’s honour is violated and they react to that, sometimes in a violent way. But 
women’s access to sexual content is not the only problem, nor is their use of the media to 
find sexual contacts. Women’s domestic duties are negatively influenced by media 
consumption and use. Many popular TV shows distract women from their duties at home 
and men do not like this. Additionally, some TV shows encourage women to be independent, 
to reclaim their agency and to know their rights-rights that are not necessarily in line with 
ird. The media is a window to a ‘horizon of action’ for women, enabling them to see other 
‘more liberal’ societies and the way women in those societies are strong and independent. 
Although the local reality limits Iraqi women’s ability to move towards materialising their 
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goals, it is a source of conflict. Furthermore, men’s media consumption is also a problematic 
issue, as they are exposed to a mirage of sexualised images of women. They also distance 
themselves from their own reality in which their wives may be less attractive that the women 
portrayed in the media, and dream about having sexier partners. It seems, then, that women 
are here subject to a different kind of pressure-they are expected to work as housewives 
while being as attractive as actresses.  
When the domestication of the media fails, and women use it in a way that is viewed 
as inappropriate, men may resort to physical violence. This can be either as a warning and 
the prevention of further transgression of ird, or as a way to regain it. Not all women need 
to be put off using media in an ‘inappropriate’ way. Iraqi patriarchy and the system of ird 
draw upon value systems that are shared by all Iraqis, and that includes religious values, as 
explained in Chapter Four. This Iraqi identity, shared by both men and women, is viewed as 
being under attack from Western sexualised media content; as a result, values that promote 
ird are seen as being under attack. Therefore, women are persuaded that they need to 
preserve their identity, that is, respect the values that shape ird. In this manner, women are 
complicit in their own domination facilitated by the system of ird. This explains the 
resilience of ird and also the limited role the media plays in transforming Iraqi patriarchy.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
8.1   Media and the Struggle over Identity 
Since its establishment at the hands of the British Empire in 1921, Iraq has witnessed a 
continuous struggle over its identity as a nation. For the most part, modern ideologies have 
clashed with traditional ones to form this identity. Gender has always been a central theme 
in this struggle. During the monarchy period (1921-1958), while the British were busy 
building modern institutions such as the army and parliament, they also felt compelled to 
give significant weight to traditional institutions, particularly the tribe. This policy, to a great 
extent, kept change away from gender culture, particularly in rural areas where the great 
majority of Iraqis lived, as traditional institutions supported a deeply patriarchal gender 
culture. Several ‘progressive’ republics, which were suspicious of traditional institutions and 
through modernisation programmes attempted to marginalise them, followed. Traditional 
gender culture was challenged, and for decades, women’s participation in public spheres was 
encouraged, resulting in the increasing presence of women in education and lower positions 
in state institutions. The last decade of the previous century witnessed an embrace of the 
traditional institutions by the state, resulting in a regression in the achievements of the 
previous decades, and a resurgence of traditional gender culture. But it was in the post-
Saddam era that the traditionalists found a space to fully participate in redefining Iraqi 
identity, and gender culture was strongly present on their agenda. The American-led invasion 
of 2003 opened the door for a struggle over the cultural identity of Iraq. After decades of the 
rule of a dictatorship, which through its ‘cultural policies’ tried to define the identity of the 
nation in a way that suited its agenda, space opened up for a variety of groups (international, 
regional and local) to participate in the ‘redefinition’ of this identity. Americans were keen 
to build a pro-American liberal democracy. The Iranians wanted Iraq to be a satellite of their 
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theocracy and an important player in an Islamic Shia bloc led by Iran. Internally, Islamists 
of different strands have had opposing ideas. Some Shia Islamists want an Iranian style 
system; others are happy just with a system that respects their Islamic values. The same can 
be said about some Sunni Islamists. Other Sunni Islamists, however, have a radically 
different idea about the identity of the nation. They do not see Iraq as a nation-state; rather, 
Iraq in their view is part of an Islamic empire-a caliphate. The major Kurdish groups diverge 
from most of the above. They want to see the breakdown of Iraq, as the birth of an 
independent Kurdistan is their desire. On the other hand, secular groups in Iraq, including 
some women’s rights groups, want a secular identity for the country, where religion does 
not play a crucial role in the legal system and other state institutions. Other influential social 
groups, such as tribal figures, are striving to consolidate tribal culture in the country. In this 
chaotic situation, not only is the identity of the country in the political arena contested, but 
cultural identity is also a matter of struggle. This is exacerbated by the fact that there is a 
feeling amongst some sectors of society, from politicians to clerics and even ‘ordinary 
people’, that the local culture is under threat, a viewpoint shared by various sections in other 
Middle Eastern societies. This is a perspective that believes in a conspiracy organised by the 
West to transform and Westernise Muslim culture.  According to this viewpoint, in this battle 
over identity, the media is the main weapon. Gender relations in particular are seen as the 
target of this media conspiracy. Mediated ‘modern’ ideologies that encourage sexual liberty 
and female agency are viewed as targeting Iraqi/Muslim family values; values that are seen 
as rooted in the traditional values of Iraqi society, and that are mainly shaped by the 
institutions of tribe and religion. To answer the question of media and gender in Iraq, it was 
essential to discuss the question of tradition and modernity in this country. This is especially 
important because the influential institutions of tribe and religion take the responsibility for 
promoting and preserving what they believe to be the traditions of society. Also, millions of 
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Iraqis respect and follow the leaders of these institutions on this basis. Hence, it has been 
important to ask the following question: How has tradition and modernity shaped Iraqi 
society? This research has demonstrated how traditional institutions influence Iraqi society. 
The religious institutions are extremely powerful, as it is obligatory for Muslims to follow 
religious leaders. This has enabled religious leaders to collect religious taxes, and this in turn 
has enabled them to build extensive institutions. Religious leaders are influential to the point 
that they can influence the processes of electing the Prime Minister, and they were able to 
recruit soldiers to fight the forces that attempted to topple the post-Saddam order. On the 
other hand, the tribal leaders are also able to exert huge power through customary courts that 
touch almost every aspect of social life in Iraq. Their role, as customary judges, is respected 
in a variety of conflicts stretching from family matters to blood feuds. In many cases they 
rival the state courts, even in heavily urban areas such as Baghdad. These traditional leaders’ 
worldviews towards gender relations are particularly heeded to, and they promote a very 
clear gender culture in which the sexual demeanours of women are strictly controlled by 
their male kin. These powerful traditional institutions, however, are not the only powerful 
institutions in Iraq; modern state institutions are also important and play a key role in shaping 
social life in Iraq. This has created a hybrid status in which religious and tribal institutions 
work alongside, and sometimes rival various state institutions.  
The next question is aimed at understanding the factors that shape gender relations in 
Iraq: What factors have shaped gender culture in Iraq since the overthrow of Saddam? This 
research has revealed that a variety of factors have shaped the deeply patriarchal gender 
culture in Iraq. Several sites in Iraq work hand in hand to sustain men’s dominance over 
women. Sexuality is the most important site of patriarchy in Iraq. Almost every aspect of a 
female’s life can be controlled by their male kin through enacting ird-based values that are 
aimed at limiting women’s sexual agency. This is a hegemonically masculine system that 
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promotes a version of gender relations in which a man’s reputation and honour is linked to 
his female kin’s sexual demeanour. According to this system, men are supposed to make 
sure their female kin have only ‘appropriate’ sexual relations, that is, sexual relations only 
with their husband. Accordingly, men have to take pre-emptive measures to prevent the 
violation of ird. This can be done through a variety of measures that limit and monitor 
women’s contact with non-mahram men. If the female kin establish any relations that are 
not compatible with ird-based norms and values, the honour of her male kin is violated, and 
men are supposed to take action, mainly through violence, sometimes even including 
murder. Any other type of masculinity that is not considered to limit and monitor a man’s 
female kin’s sexual behaviour and attitude is discredited and deemed immoral. Not all men 
are willing to resort to violence, and especially murder, to regain their honour. Only men 
who are willing to live up to the exemplars of ird commit this level of violence, but other 
men who are willing to be complicit in this power structure are also the beneficiaries of this 
patriarchal structure. Women also play a role due to being complicit, as they see ird as a 
value. This is especially true because ird draws its support from traditional values such as 
religious values, which are widely respected by Iraqis.  
The cultural codes that are set around sexuality are particularly important in 
maintaining patriarchy. Therefore, culture is also an important site of patriarchy. What are 
considered to be the traditional values of society play a vital role in this structure, making 
traditional institutions and authorities important elements in Iraq’s patriarchal gender 
culture. As explained above, although ird as a hegemonic masculine system relies mainly on 
persuasion and the complicity of men and women, it draws upon violence when it is deemed 
necessary, making violence another site of Iraqi patriarchy. In addition, state institutions 
support the norms and values around ird in a variety of ways. For example, the law in Iraq 
is lenient towards men who commit ird-based violence. People who are responsible for law 
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and order, such as the police and judges, are sympathetic to men who try to defend their ird. 
Therefore, the state is also a patriarchal site in Iraq.  
However, the state has also attempted to ‘modernise’ gender culture in Iraq during 
different periods in the history of modern Iraq. Since the early days of the 20th century, and 
particularly in the second half of that century, ideas about gender equality and women’s 
emancipation started to be heard in Iraq. Successive regimes in Iraq started to promote and 
implement policies that aimed at bringing gender equality, helping more women to become 
educated and participate in the public sphere. These polices challenged some important 
principles of traditional gender culture such as veiling and sex segregation. Although the 
political insatiability, war and harsh sanctions, as well as the increasing presence of Islamic 
groups in socio-political life, have striped women of some of these achievements, the role 
of modern ideas in Iraq’s gender culture cannot be ignored. Therefore, gender culture in Iraq 
is a reflection of the bigger picture of Iraq’s social life, where what is viewed by Iraqis as 
tradition exists, mainly in an uncomfortable and contentious manner, alongside modern 
ideologies about gender relations. 
One of the vehicles that have introduced modern ideas around gender is the media. 
The 2003 invasion linked Iraq to the processes of globalisation of communications and, now, 
modern media is being embraced extensively in Iraq, with increasing numbers of people 
using it. But at the same time, the media is also seen as a threat to Iraqi cultural identity. The 
question of media consumption and use within Iraq’s patriarchal culture is one of the key 
questions in this research: How is media used and/or consumed in gendered domestic 
environments in Iraq? This research has demonstrated that media consumption and use is 
influenced by the existing gender relations. As the Iraqi gender culture gives men the right 
to determine what is suitable for women, men have the right to restrict women’s access to 
media as they see fit. Media has the capability of bringing ‘sexual’ material (seen as 
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belonging to the male dominated public sphere) into the private space of homes. The ‘sexual’ 
content and narratives that are presented by the media are seen as not being compatible with 
Iraqi cultural culture. They also view content that is available through the media as being 
Western, and compatible with the values of an alien culture. Whether they believe this is a 
Western conspiracy to subjugate Muslim people, or that they are simply cultural products of 
a radically different culture, the interviewees (both men and women) agreed that they are 
harmful to the cultural identity of Iraqi people. To their mind, the threat to their culture is 
also coming from technologies, such as the internet, which facilitate behaviours that are not 
in line with their culture. In fact, the introduction of the media post-2003 has provided 
opportunities for Iraqi women to challenge patriarchy. Since 2003, Iraqi women have been 
exposed to an increasing quantity of media content that is perceived as sexual, giving Iraqi 
women a different idea about their sexuality, other than the ird based one. Also, the internet 
is giving women the opportunity to gain sexual agency, as the internet allows women to 
bypass the boundaries of their male kin to find sexual partners. Additionally, the feminist 
ideologies that promote female agency and self-determination provide an alternative 
narrative for women in Iraq. These three aspects allow women to, at least partially, break 
away from ird based patriarchy. All these developments and activities, however, do not 
happen to the exclusion of other social structures. Although the media provides a window 
for people to compare their local lives with those in other societies and allows them, to some 
extent, to distance themselves from their own lives, as this thesis clearly shows, the realities 
of local life do not allow for ‘full-scale’ deviation from the structures of gender culture in 
their own society as a result of their exposure to radically different ideas about gender. 
 
8.2   Mitigating Media’s ‘Harmful Effects’ 
All in all, although the media is seen as being beneficial in a variety of ways, it is also viewed 
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as a force that needs to be harnessed, so that its negative effects can be mitigated. This 
intervention is supposed to make the media compatible with Iraqi gender culture. For years 
in Iraq and other countries in the region, state agencies have implemented plans to control 
the media. One of the main reasons for this approach is the states’ fear of the media creating 
a public space that challenges the status quo. Furthermore, some of the regimes in the region, 
Iran the most obvious example, have been preoccupied with what they believe to be the 
cultural onslaught of the West, facilitated by the media. This ‘cultural invasion’’s main 
objective is also perceived as being a political one. In post-Saddam Iraq, state agencies do 
not have any plans in this regard. There is no government censorship anywhere in Iraq when 
it comes to having access to media content; all types of media technology are also allowed 
to be acquired by citizens. In this thesis, it has been shown that in this environment, there 
are people who take the initiative themselves to protect themselves and their families from 
what they see as the harmful effects of the media. The interviewees’ concern was mainly 
their ird-related values and codes when it comes to women’s media access. As Iraqi men are 
the main protectors of ird, the interviewees widely agreed that in the case of mitigating the 
harmful effects of the media, men take the main responsibility, and they implement a variety 
of strategies to achieve this objective. These strategies are mainly implemented in the 
domestic environment. Media domestication is an important one in this regard. This 
domestication takes place at the level of media consumption and use. Amongst the ird-
related domestication strategies is censorship. Through this strategy, men limit women’s 
access to some media, for example, through setting up codes on the satellite channels 
receiver to make it impossible for their female kin to have access to those channels. Another 
way of domesticating the media to make it compatible with Iraqi gender culture is 
monitoring. Using this strategy, men monitor their female kin’s media consumption and use, 
for example, by not allowing them to watch satellite TV alone or by sitting next to them 
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while they are connected to the internet. Banning access to some forms of media altogether 
can also be used to limit the ‘harmful influence’ of the media. Some of the interviewees 
believe that there is no need for women to have access to the internet. Some of the female 
participants reported that their male kin do not allow them to access the internet. These are 
pre-emptive measures taken by men to protect ird.  
As this research has shown, another strategy used to protect Iraqi cultural values from 
the damaging Western media is persuasion. Hegemonic masculine systems rely on 
persuasion to continue. They do not necessarily use brute force to sustain patriarchy, as this 
would make the relationship between men and women untenable. Instead, hegemonic 
masculinity draws upon other resources such as culture to persuade women that this 
relationship is in their benefit. The hegemonic masculine system of ird also relies on very 
important cultural values and norms promoted by the religion of Islam, and also tribe, to 
persuade women of the benefits of the ascendency of men over them and their rights to 
monitor and control their sexuality and other aspects of their lives. The participants reported 
that when men try to mitigate the harmful effects of the media, they draw upon these values 
to persuade women to self-limit their access to media, in the hope that they will stay immune 
from what they believe to be the evils of the media.  
These strategies are, however, not always successful, and as a result, women’s access 
to media is sometimes viewed as violating ird. As the media’s nature is becoming 
increasingly ‘privatised’, it is becoming increasingly difficult for men to monitor their 
female’s kin media access, as they can find ways to avoid the restrictions on their media use 
and consumption. This research has demonstrated that the media is a source of conflict in 
some Iraqi families, and this result was widely acknowledged by the interviewees, as well 
as also other sectors of Iraqi society. The participants repeatedly talked about a radical 
transformation of gender culture and an increase in conflicts inside families as a result of 
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access to the media, which has manifested itself in rising divorce rates. This is also 
emphasised by numerous media reports in Iraq; for example, one Asharq Al-Awsat news 
report entitled ‘Social media behind the rise in divorce cases in Iraq’ reads: “There is an 
increase in the numbers of reported problems regarding couples as a result of the 
technological openness and the proliferation of social media” (Al-Obaidi 2015). One of the 
manifestations of these conflicts is resorting to violence. When the pre-emptive measures of 
domestication and persuasion fail, and ird is either violated or feared to be violated, violence 
is used to either prevent a further transgression of ird or to regain ird. The threat of violence 
works as an important deterrent to prevent women engaging in any behaviour that violates 
ird, and actual violence is also used in the case of transgression of ird. As mentioned 
previously, hegemonic masculinity relies mainly on persuasion, but if necessary, violence is 
used to make sure patriarchy is sustained. Violence is an important site of patriarchy and is 
also supported by culture and the state. Tribal and religious norms allow for the punishment 
of women who are in violation of ird. This violence can take the form of physical violence 
such as battering, and even murder. In these cases, the state agencies such as the legal system 
are often complicit. 
As mentioned above, persuasion is an effective strategy for hegemonic masculinity 
such as ird to sustain patriarchy. In the case of Iraq, the fact that ird draws its legitimacy 
from what are seen as the traditional values of society, this makes the question of identity an 
important one; hence this research has addressed the following question: What role does 
cultural identity play in this process? Traditional values are weaved within Iraqi identity. 
This identity, which the interviewees believed to be under threat from the media, is to be 
protected from media content that is against these traditional values. The participants in this 
research had a clear sense of their identity. Eastern, Iraqi and Islamic are three important 
components of this identity, which are pit against Western identity. Media content that is 
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seen to be sexuality provocative and permissive, and those which advocate female agency, 
are dubbed Western, even if the content is produced in majority Muslim countries such as 
Turkey. The importance of traditional values and Iraqi identity is so much valued by the 
participants that even the women who praised Western women’s agency, do not want Iraqi 
women to enjoy the same powers. The female participants’ comments show that they 
strongly believe that the values that promote ird are an important part of their identity. They 
showed a strong tendency towards protecting this identity against what they believe to be 
the aggression of Western culture. This is why although the media is presenting alternative 
less restrictive attitudes towards sex to women, which can lead to their freedom from ird-
based restrictions, many women would not actually want this lifestyle, simply because it is 
in contrast with their identity. Protecting Iraqi identity and the cultural values that shape it 
is done through individual actors, as the Iraqi state agencies do not have a programme or 
initiative to take on this responsibility. This is a very important dimension in the process of 
media consumption and use in Iraq, as it strengthens men’s responsibility to protect their ird, 
especially because, as this research has demonstrated, they feel their identity is increasingly 
under threat from the media.  
In this environment, it is important to examine whether the media is indeed helping 
women to challenge patriarchy. Thus, this research has addressed the following question: 
Has the media helped women achieve gender equality?  
 
8.3   Media as an Emancipatory Force? 
The rush of Western/Westernised content and ideas available through satellite TV and also 
services that are available via the internet, in an environment where the state is completely 
absent, has led to the reassertion and strengthening of the practice of ird. During Saddam, 
the media environment in the world, including the Arab World was revolutionised, but Iraq 
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was completely isolated from this world, as a result of the extremely strict policy of state 
censorship (Al-Rawi 2012). The limited media content that was available on state owned 
and run channels was largely compatible with Iraqi gender culture. The 2003 invasion 
allowed an uncontrolled rush of a variety of media content and technologies in the complete 
absence of state agencies, transforming Iraq from the most restricted society in the region in 
terms of media, to the most uncontrolled and open society. In this environment, where gender 
culture is viewed as being under threat from Western culture, resorting to ird and enacting 
it in a stricter manner seems to be the solution in the minds of the majority of the 
interviewees. This is in line with reports that emphasise an increase in honour-based violence 
in Iraq.  One media report states, “what is exceptional about [honour-based] crime in Iraq is 
that it has become more deeply rooted than ever, although the opposite should have 
happened, given social and cultural developments and media openness” (Bassem 2013). 
There are no reliable statistics that compare honour-based violence cases before and after 
2003. Even gathering information about the most severe and obvious enactment of honour, 
that is, murder, has proved difficult. To attempt to gather information about other aspects of 
the practice of ird that are subtler and much less likely to be reported is simply impossible. 
But as the evidence in this thesis suggests, threats to ird, mainly perceived as coming from 
the media, are encouraging men to reassert their honour. The media is providing an 
alternative narrative to the prevalent gender culture in Iraq. This surely encourages women 
to deviate from what are perceived as traditional cultural values. However, as these 
alternative ideologies undermine the traditions of the country that are so revered and 
respected, and especially ird which is a hegemonic masculine system that helps sustain 
men’s dominance, many men are trying to tighten their grip on women to keep control of 
them.  The post Saddam era has certainly not been a very good one for the women of Iraq. 
The progress that was made over decades to bring about a more equal society has regressed 
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for a variety of reasons. This has been widely acknowledged by a range of academic research 
carried out in this field (Al-Ali and Pratt 2008; Ismael and Ismael 2007), but the role of the 
media in relation to gender culture had not been explored. This research has shown that when 
it comes to gender relations, the post-Saddam media environment plays a contradictory role. 
On the one hand, it has provided women with an alternative gender culture and helped them 
to find ways of bypassing the boundaries of Iraqi patriarchy; on the other hand, it has 
provided an environment where men feel they have to try and restrict women even more. 
 
8.4   Project Limitations and Future Research Possibilities 
This research project has explored the relationship between media consumption and use in 
post Saddam Iraq, mainly through conducting semi-structured interviews. While this has 
enabled key aspects of media consumption processes in a gendered environment to be 
examined, there are, of course, limitations to this research. First, interviewing as a method 
cannot capture various aspects of media use and consumption and its relationship with 
gender relations at home. As most media consumption and use takes place in domestic 
environments (this is even more accurate for Iraq, as mobile data is not as widespread as in 
developed countries), it would have been beneficial to carry out content analysis on TV 
programs that are watched by selected families and to do some co-watching, to develop an 
understanding of how views of ‘appropriate media content’ are applied to specific texts; 
what makes some TV content not compatible with gender culture whilst others are 
‘appropriate’ for general viewing, and to explore how different methods of domestication of 
media are implemented at home.  Another interesting area that could have been explored, 
had there been the opportunity to conduct the research through observing media related 
behaviour, is to see how the media consumption setting is arranged. This would have been 
very informative, as gender relations have an important role in shaping this setting. But 
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having said that, due to the ird-related codes described, it would have been almost impossible 
for a male researcher to do so, unless the household was marham. Moreover, limiting the 
research to mahram only households would be extremely limiting for the scope of the 
research. A female researcher, however, could enjoy more freedom in carrying out this type 
of research, without interrupting the gender related codes in Iraqi families. Another 
important benefit of observing media related behaviours in domestic environments is that it 
would open up horizons for future research regarding media and gender culture in Iraq.  
This research project has explored how ideas and pictures mediated through satellite 
TV and the internet are received in Iraq. A logical follow on from this would be to explore 
the extent to which the increasing number of Iraqi diaspora shape gender relations in post-
Saddam Iraq. This period has witnessed a phenomenal increase in the number of Iraqis who 
have left the country as a result of the political and security crises. New developments and 
innovations in media technology have enabled Iraqis (and indeed many other nations) to stay 
in contact with their family members abroad like never before. Various applications allow 
file sharing as well as voice and video calls. Also, people can now broadcast live through 
various applications such as Facebook and Twitter. As people in diaspora adopt the cultural 
norms and values that are prevalent in the host country, they communicate them to their 
home countries via the media. This is an area that has not attracted much academic 
commentary and would be an interesting path to further the current research.  
Another interesting research path would be to explore the relationship between the 
sexual content in the media and women’s emancipation. As sexuality is the main site of Iraqi 
patriarchy, through which men assert their domination over women, an alternative attitude 
towards sex that gives women sexual agency would undermine Iraqi patriarchy. The 
question here is whether sexual content in the media is actually helping women to break 
away from the restraints of patriarchal structures. Media content has been accused of 
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perpetuating female sexual objectification (for example see Aubrey, 2006). Media content 
is becoming increasingly sexualised and focusing on the body and appearances, but there is 
a gender difference in the way bodies are shown. The way that women’s bodies are depicted 
tends to sexually objectify them more so than men (Crawford and Unger 2004). In this sense, 
women are reduced to instruments for pleasing men; they are no longer persons, but tools at 
the disposal of men. This certainly creates a power base that is in favour of men. The 
interesting question for future research on media and gender in Iraq could involve a question 
about this subtle matter. Women’s bodies and sexuality is a territory controlled by men. Ird-
based patriarchy takes control of women’s bodies by restricting women’s sexual choices. On 
the other hand, the over-sexualised media content reduces women to mere sexual objects. 
These structures, both lead to power relations that are in favour of men. These two types of 
approaches to women’s’ sexuality at first glance seem to be extremely far from each other, 
hence the objections of important sectors of Iraqi society to Western/Westernised media 
content. But in fact, they both dominate women by taking control of their sexuality. Ird 
creates a power relation that places women in an inferior position through restricting their 
sexuality. Iraqi women’s exposure to media content that portrays a more liberal alternative 
to sexuality allows women to partially distance themselves from that oppressive situation. 
Future research could ask the following question: is more exposure to increasingly 
sexualised media content going to help Iraqi women to achieve gender equality, or will it 
bring them under a different type of patriarchy in which women are treated as sex objects? 
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Appendix: Interview Schedule 
 
Category 1: Women: 
• Demographic Questions: 
1. Age? 
2. Place of Residency? 
3. Education? 
4. Occupation? 
5. Marital Status? 
 
• Main Questions:  
Equality & Iraqi society: 
1. To what extent do you think that women possess natural rights in the same way 
as men do?  Discuss. 
2. Do you feel or experience any discrimination against yourself or women in 
general in society?  Elaborate. 
 
Satellite TV Channels 
1. Do you have access to Satellite TV channels? 
2. Do you watch Satellite TV channels? If yes, for how long? How often? 
3. For what purposes do you normally watch Satellite TV channels? Education? 
Entertainment? etc.   
4. Which programmes do you normally watch? Do you have a favourite type of 
Satellite TV programmes?  
 
      Iraqi Women & Satellite TV Channels 
1. What do you think about the way women are depicted in these programmes? 
a) Do you like to be like them? 
b) Do you want Iraq to be like their countries? 
 294 
2. What is your impression about the fact that Iraqi women are exposed to Satellite 
TV channels? Why? 
3. To what extent do you believe women must or mustn’t watch Satellite TV 
programmes?  Elaborate?  
4. To what extent do you think that women’s exposure to Satellite TV programmes 
is helping or harming the society? In what sense? 
a) Do different ideas that women are exposed to through Satellite TV 
programmes have a positive or negative influence on the society? 
b) Is it a source of conflict between women and men, on different levels? 
Within family for example? 
c) Or between women and religion and Iraqi traditions? 
d)  Or between women and the state? 
e) Or between women and the political parties? 
5. If you believe that inequality exists within society, do you think the introduction 
of Satellite TV channels is helping women towards achieving equality with men? 
If yes, how? 
6. To what extent do you find watching Satellite TV channels make you think 
differently about yourself as a woman? What issues have they alerted you to? 
a) In comparison to your life before the conflict when access to Satellite TV 
was non-existent, is your exposure to Satellite TV channels leading you 
to think differently about what it means to be a woman? If yes, how? 
b) In what ways, if any, is watching Satellite TV channels  changing your 
idea about what it means to be a woman? Elaborate. 
7. To what extent do you believe that Satellite TV channels have helped you to raise 
your awareness about your rights as a woman? Elaborate. 
8. To what extent do you find watching Satellite TV channels make men think 
differently about women? What issues have they alerted them to? 
a) In comparison to the life before the conflict when access to Satellite TV 
was non-existent, is men’s exposure to Satellite TV channels leading 
them to think differently about women? If yes, how? 
b) In what ways, if any, is watching Satellite TV channels changing men’s 
idea about women? Elaborate. 
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9. To what extent do you believe that Satellite TV channels have helped men to 
raise their awareness about women’s rights? Elaborate. 
       
 The Internet 
1. Do you have access to the Internet? 
2. Do you use the Internet? If yes, for how long? How often? 
3. For what purposes do you normally use the Internet? Education? Entertainment?  
Socialising? etc.   
4. Which type of activity do you normally have when using the Internet? Do you 
have a favourite type of websites or activities?  
a) Do you brows any web pages which deal with women’s rights? If yes, 
why? 
      Iraqi Women & the Internet 
1. What is your impression about the fact that Iraqi women are exposed to the 
Internet contents? Why? 
2. To what extent do you believe women must or mustn’t use the Internet?  
Elaborate? 
3. To what extent do you think that women’s exposure to the Internet is helping or 
harming the society? In what sense? 
a) Do different ideas that women are exposed to through the Internet have a 
positive or negative influence on the society? 
b) Is it a source of conflict between women and men, on different levels? 
Within family for example? 
c) Or between women and religion and Iraqi traditions? 
d) Or between women and the state? 
e) Or between women and the political parties? 
4. If you believe that inequality exists within society, do you think the introduction 
of the Internet is helping women towards achieving equality with men? If yes, 
how? 
5. To what extent do you find using the Internet make you think differently about 
yourself as a woman and your rights? What issues has it alerted you to? 
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a) In comparison to your life before the conflict when access to the Internet 
was non-existent, is the Internet usage leading you to think differently 
about what it means to be a woman? If yes, how? 
b)  In what ways, if any, is the internet usage  changing your idea about what 
it means to be a woman? Elaborate. 
6. To what extent do you believe that the Internet has helped you to raise your 
awareness about your rights? Elaborate. 
7. To what extent do you find the Internet makes men think differently about 
women? What issues have they alerted them to? 
a) In comparison to the life before the conflict when access to the Internet 
was non-existent, is men’s internet usage leading them to think differently 
about women? If yes, how? 
b)  In what ways, if any, is internet usage  changing men’s idea about 
women? Elaborate. 
8. To what extent do you believe that the Internet has helped men to raise their 
awareness about women’s rights? Elaborate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 297 
Category 2: Men: 
• Demographic Questions: 
1. Age? 
2. Place of Residency? 
3. Education? 
4. Occupation? 
5. Marital Status? 
 
• Main Questions:  
Equality & Iraqi society: 
1. To what extent do you think that women possess natural rights in the same way 
as men do?  Discuss. 
2. Do you believe any discrimination against women exists in society?  Elaborate. 
 
Satellite TV Channels 
1. Do you have access to Satellite TV channels? 
2. Do you watch Satellite TV channels? If yes, for how long? How often?  
3. For what purposes do you normally watch Satellite TV channels? Education? 
Entertainment? etc.   
4. Which programmes do you normally watch? Do you have a favourite type of 
Satellite TV programmes? 
 
      Iraqi Men & Satellite TV Channels 
1. What do you think about the way women are depicted in these programmes? 
a) Do you like Iraqi women to be like them? 
b) Do you want Iraq to be like their countries? 
 
2. What is your impression about the fact that Iraqi women are exposed to Satellite 
TV channels? Why? 
3. To what extent do you believe women must or mustn’t watch Satellite TV 
programmes?  Elaborate?  
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4. To what extent do you think that women’s exposure to Satellite TV programmes 
is helping or harming the society? In what sense? 
a) Do different ideas that women are exposed to through Satellite TV 
programmes have a positive or negative influence on the society? 
b) Is it a source of conflict between women and men, on different levels? 
Within family for example? 
c) Or between women and religion and Iraqi traditions? 
d)  Or between women and the state? 
e) Or between women and the political parties? 
5. If you believe that inequality exists within society, do you think the introduction 
of Satellite TV channels is helping women towards achieving equality with men? 
If yes, how? 
6. To what extent do you find watching Satellite TV channels make you think 
differently about women? What issues have they alerted you to? 
a) In comparison to your life before the conflict when access to Satellite TV 
was non-existent, is your exposure to Satellite TV channels leading you 
to think differently about women? If yes, how? 
b) In what ways, if any, is watching Satellite TV channels changing your 
idea about women? Elaborate. 
7. To what extent do you believe that Satellite TV channels have helped you to raise 
your awareness about women’s rights? Elaborate. 
8. To what extent do you find watching Satellite TV channels make women think 
differently about women? What issues have they alerted you to? 
a) In comparison to the life before the conflict when access to Satellite TV 
was non-existent, is women’s exposure to Satellite TV channels leading 
them to think differently about what it means to be a woman? If yes, how? 
 
b) In what ways, if any, is watching Satellite TV channels changing your 
idea about women? Elaborate. 
 
9.  To what extent do you believe that Satellite TV channels have helped women to 
raise their awareness about their rights? Elaborate. 
c)  
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       The Internet 
1. Do you have access to the Internet? 
2. Do you use the Internet? If yes, for how long? How often? 
3. For what purposes do you normally use the Internet? Education? Entertainment?  
Socialising? etc.   
4. Which type of activity do you normally have when using the Internet? Do you 
have a favourite type of websites or activities?  
      Iraqi Men & the Internet 
1. What is your impression about the fact that Iraqi women are exposed to the 
Internet contents? Why? 
2. To what extent do you believe women must or mustn’t use the Internet?  
Elaborate? 
3. To what extent do you think that women’s exposure to the Internet is helping or 
harming the society? In what sense? 
a) Do different ideas that women are exposed to through the Internet have a 
positive or negative influence on society? 
b) Is it a source of conflict between women and men, on different levels? 
Within family for example? 
c) Or between women and religion and Iraqi traditions? 
d) Or between women and the state? 
e) Or between women and the political parties? 
4. If you believe that inequality exists within society, do you think the introduction 
of the Internet is helping women towards achieving equality with men? If yes, 
how? 
5. To what extent do you find using the Internet make you think differently about 
women? What issues has it alerted you to? 
a) In comparison to your life before the conflict when access to the Internet 
was non-existent, is the Internet usage leading you to think differently 
about women? If yes, how? 
b) In what ways, if any, is the internet usage changing your idea about 
women? Elaborate 
6. To what extent do you believe that the Internet has helped you to raise your 
awareness about women’s rights? Elaborate. 
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7. To what extent do you find using the Internet make women think differently 
about what it means to be a woman? What issues has it alerted you to? 
c) In comparison to the life before the conflict when access to the Internet 
was non-existent, is the Internet usage leading women to think differently 
about what it means to be a woman? If yes, how? 
d) In what ways, if any, is the internet usage changing your idea about 
women? Elaborate 
8. To what extent do you believe that the Internet has helped women to raise their 
awareness about their rights? Elaborate. 
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Category 3: Politicians & Government officials: 
• Preliminary Questions: 
1. How old are you? 
2. What party do you belong to? 
 
• Main Questions:  
Equality & Iraqi society: 
1. To what extent do you think that women possess natural rights in the same way 
as men do?  Discuss. 
2. Do you believe any discrimination against women exists in society?  Elaborate. 
3. Do you have any activities in regard to women’s rights? If yes, explain. If not, 
why? 
4. According to article 14 of the new Iraqi constitution, Iraqi citizens are equal 
before law without discrimination based on gender; do you think this article has 
been implemented properly? If yes, in what sense? If not, what are the obstacles? 
5. What were/are your plans to help implement the article 14 of the Iraqi new 
constitution? Explain. 
Satellite TV Channels 
1. Do you watch Satellite TV channels?  
2. What do you think about the way women are depicted in Satellite TV 
programmes? 
a) Do you think that Iraqi women should look at women in these 
programmes as role models? 
b) Do you believe that Iraq should take these countries’ path in regard to 
women’ status? 
3. What is your impression about the fact that Iraqi women are exposed to Satellite 
TV channels? Why? 
4. To what extent do you believe women must or mustn’t watch Satellite TV 
programmes?  Elaborate? 
5. To what extent do you think that women’s exposure to Satellite TV programmes 
is helping or harming the society? In what sense? 
a) Do different ideas that women are exposed to through Satellite TV 
programmes have a positive or negative influence on the society? 
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b) Is it a source of conflict between women and men, on different levels? 
Within family for example? 
c) Or between women and religion and Iraqi traditions? 
d)  Or between women and the state? 
e) Or between women and the political parties? 
6. If you believe that inequality exists within society, do you think the introduction 
of Satellite TV channels is helping women towards achieving equality with men? 
If yes, how? 
7. To what extent do you find watching Satellite TV channels make women think 
differently about themselves as a woman? What issues have they alerted them 
to? 
a) In comparison to the life before the conflict when access to Satellite TV 
was non-existent, is women’s exposure to Satellite TV channels leading 
them to think differently about what it means to be a woman? If yes, how? 
b) In what ways, if any, is watching Satellite TV channels changing 
women’s idea about what it means to be a woman? Elaborate. 
8. To what extent do you believe that Satellite TV channels have helped women to 
raise their awareness about women’s rights? Elaborate. 
9. To what extent do you find watching Satellite TV channels make men think 
differently about women? What issues have they alerted them to? 
a) In comparison to the life before the conflict when access to Satellite TV 
was non-existent, is men’s exposure to Satellite TV channels leading 
them to think differently about women? If yes, how? 
b) In what ways, if any, is watching Satellite TV channels changing men’s 
idea about women? Elaborate. 
10. To what extent do you believe that Satellite TV channels have helped men to 
raise their awareness about women’s rights? Elaborate. 
11. To what extent has watching Satellite TV channels changed your idea about 
women? Elaborate.  
12. Do you exploit Satellite TV channels to support women’s equality? If yes, how? 
If not? Why? 
The Internet 
1. Do you use the Internet?  
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2. What is your impression about the fact that Iraqi women are exposed to the 
Internet contents? Why? 
3. To what extent do you believe women must or mustn’t use the Internet?  
Elaborate? 
4. To what extent do you think that women’s exposure to the Internet is helping or 
harming the society? In what sense? 
a) Do different ideas that women are exposed to through the Internet have a 
positive or negative influence on society? 
b) Is it a source of conflict between women and men, on different levels? 
Within family for example? 
c) Or between women and religion and Iraqi traditions? 
d) Or between women and the state? 
e) Or between women and the political parties? 
5. If you believe that inequality exists within society, do you think the introduction 
of the Internet is helping women towards achieving equality with men? If yes, 
how? 
6. To what extent do you find using the Internet make women think differently 
about themselves as women? What issues has it alerted them to? 
a) In comparison to the life before the conflict when access to the Internet 
was non-existent, is the Internet usage leading women to think differently 
about what it means to be a woman? If yes, how? 
b) In what ways, if any, is the internet usage changing women’s idea about 
what it means to be a woman? Elaborate. 
7. To what extent do you believe that the Internet has helped women to raise their 
awareness about women’s rights? Elaborate. 
8. To what extent do you find using the Internet make men think differently about 
women? What issues have they alerted them to? 
a) In comparison to the life before the conflict when access to the Internet 
was non-existent, is the Internet usage leading men to think differently 
about women? If yes, how? 
b) In what ways, if any, is internet usage changing men’s idea about women? 
Elaborate. 
9. To what extent do you believe that the Internet have helped men to raise their 
awareness about women’s rights? Elaborate. 
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10. To what extent has the Internet usage changed your idea about women? 
11. Do you have any initiatives or are part of a plan, using the Internet to help achieve 
equality for women?  If yes, how? If not, why? 
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Category 4: Clerics: 
• Preliminary Questions: 
1. General Information? 
 
• Main Questions:  
Equality & Iraqi society: 
1. To what extent do you think that women possess natural rights in the same way 
as men do?  Discuss. 
2. Do you believe any discrimination against women exists in society?  Elaborate. 
Satellite TV Channels 
1. Do you watch Satellite TV channels?  
2. What do you think about the way women are depicted in Satellite TV 
programmes? 
a) Do you think that Iraqi women should look at women in these 
programmes as role models? 
b) Do you believe that Iraq should take these countries’ path in regard to 
women’s status? 
3. What is your impression about the fact that Iraqi women are exposed to Satellite 
TV channels? Why? 
4. To what extent do you believe women must or mustn’t watch Satellite TV 
programmes?  Elaborate? 
5. To what extent do you think that women’s exposure to Satellite TV programmes 
is helping or harming the society? In what sense? 
a) Do different ideas that women are exposed to through Satellite TV 
programmes have a positive or negative influence on the society? 
b) Is it a source of conflict between women and men, on different levels? 
Within family for example? 
c) Or between women and religion and Iraqi traditions? 
d)  Or between women and the state? 
e) Or between women and the political parties? 
6. If you believe that inequality exists within society, do you think the introduction 
of Satellite TV channels is helping women towards achieving equality with men? 
If yes, how? 
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7. To what extent do you find watching Satellite TV channels make women think 
differently about themselves as a woman? What issues have they alerted them 
to? 
a) In comparison to the life before the conflict when access to Satellite TV 
was non-existent, is women’s exposure to Satellite TV channels leading 
them to think differently about what it means to be a woman? If yes, how? 
b) In what ways, if any, is watching Satellite TV channels changing 
women’s idea about what it means to be a woman? Elaborate. 
8. To what extent do you believe that Satellite TV channels have helped women to 
raise their awareness about women’s rights? Elaborate. 
9. To what extent do you find watching Satellite TV channels make men think 
differently about women? What issues have they alerted them to? 
a) In comparison to the life before the conflict when access to Satellite TV 
was non-existent, is men’s exposure to Satellite TV channels leading 
them to think differently about women? If yes, how? 
b) In what ways, if any, is watching Satellite TV channels changing men’s 
idea about women? Elaborate. 
10. To what extent has watching Satellite TV channels changed your idea about 
women? Elaborate.  
11. To what extent do you believe that Satellite TV channels have helped men to 
raise their awareness about women’s rights? Elaborate. 
The Internet 
1. Do you use the Internet?  
2. What is your impression about the fact that Iraqi women are exposed to the 
Internet contents? Why? 
3. To what extent do you believe women must or mustn’t use the Internet?  
Elaborate? 
4. To what extent do you think that women’s exposure to the Internet is helping or 
harming the society? In what sense? 
a) Do different ideas that women are exposed to through the Internet have a 
positive or negative influence on society? 
b) Is it a source of conflict between women and men, on different levels? 
Within family for example? 
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c) Or between women and religion and Iraqi traditions? 
d) Or between women and the state? 
e) Or between women and the political parties? 
5. If you believe that inequality exists within society, do you think the introduction 
of the Internet is helping women towards achieving equality with men? If yes, 
how? 
6. To what extent do you find using the Internet make women think differently 
about themselves as women? What issues has it alerted them to? 
a) In comparison to the life before the conflict when access to the Internet 
was non-existent, is the Internet usage leading women to think differently 
about what it means to be a woman? If yes, how? 
b) In what ways, if any, is the internet usage changing women’s idea about 
what it means to be a woman? Elaborate. 
7. To what extent do you believe that the Internet has helped women to raise their 
awareness about women’s rights? Elaborate. 
8. To what extent do you find using the Internet make men think differently about 
women? What issues have they alerted them to? 
a) In comparison to the life before the conflict when access to the Internet 
was non-existent, is the Internet usage leading men to think differently 
about women? If yes, how? 
b) In what ways, if any, is internet usage changing men’s idea about women? 
Elaborate. 
9. To what extent do you believe that the Internet have helped men to raise their 
awareness about women’s rights? Elaborate. 
10. To what extent has the Internet usage changed your idea about women? 
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Category 5: University Lecturers: 
• Preliminary Questions: 
1. How old are you? 
2. What is your speciality? 
 
• Main Questions:  
Equality & Iraqi society: 
1. To what extent do you think that women possess natural rights in the same way 
as men do?  Discuss. 
2. Do you believe any discrimination against women exists in society?  Elaborate. 
3. Do you have any activities in regard to women’s rights? If yes, explain. 
Satellite TV Channels 
1. Do you watch Satellite TV channels?  
2. What do you think about the way women are depicted in Satellite TV 
programmes? 
a) Do you think that Iraqi women should look at women in these 
programmes as role models? 
b) Do you believe that Iraq should take these countries’ path in regard to 
women’s status? 
3. What is your impression about the fact that Iraqi women are exposed to Satellite 
TV channels? Why? 
4. To what extent do you believe women must or mustn’t watch Satellite TV 
programmes?  Elaborate? 
5. To what extent do you think that women’s exposure to Satellite TV programmes 
is helping or harming the society? In what sense? 
a) Do different ideas that women are exposed to through Satellite TV 
programmes have a positive or negative influence on the society? 
b) Is it a source of conflict between women and men, on different levels? 
Within family for example? 
c) Or between women and religion and Iraqi traditions? 
d)  Or between women and the state? 
e) Or between women and the political parties? 
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6. If you believe that inequality exists within society, do you think the introduction 
of Satellite TV channels is helping women towards achieving equality with men? 
If yes, how? 
7. To what extent do you find watching Satellite TV channels make women think 
differently about themselves as a woman? What issues have they alerted them 
to? 
a) In comparison to the life before the conflict when access to Satellite TV 
was non-existent, is women’s exposure to Satellite TV channels leading 
them to think differently about what it means to be a woman? If yes, how? 
b) In what ways, if any, is watching Satellite TV channels changing 
women’s idea about what it means to be a woman? Elaborate. 
8. To what extent do you believe that Satellite TV channels have helped women to 
raise their awareness about women’s rights? Elaborate. 
9. To what extent do you find watching Satellite TV channels make men think 
differently about women? What issues have they alerted them to? 
a) In comparison to the life before the conflict when access to Satellite TV 
was non-existent, is men’s exposure to Satellite TV channels leading 
them to think differently about women? If yes, how? 
b) In what ways, if any, is watching Satellite TV channels changing men’s 
idea about women? Elaborate. 
10. To what extent do you believe that Satellite TV channels have helped men to 
raise their awareness about women’s rights? Elaborate. 
11. To what extent has watching Satellite TV channels changed your idea about 
women? Elaborate.  
The Internet 
1. Do you use the Internet?  
2. What is your impression about the fact that Iraqi women are exposed to the 
Internet contents? Why? 
3. To what extent do you believe women must or mustn’t use the Internet?  
Elaborate? 
4. To what extent do you think that women’s exposure to the Internet is helping or 
harming the society? In what sense? 
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a) Do different ideas that women are exposed to through the Internet have a 
positive or negative influence on society? 
b) Is it a source of conflict between women and men, on different levels? 
Within family for example? 
c) Or between women and religion and Iraqi traditions? 
d) Or between women and the state? 
e) Or between women and the political parties? 
5. If you believe that inequality exists within society, do you think the introduction 
of the Internet is helping women towards achieving equality with men? If yes, 
how? 
6. To what extent do you find using the Internet make women think differently 
about themselves as women? What issues has it alerted them to? 
a) In comparison to the life before the conflict when access to the Internet 
was non-existent, is the Internet usage leading women to think differently 
about what it means to be a woman? If yes, how? 
b) In what ways, if any, is the internet usage changing women’s idea about 
what it means to be a woman? Elaborate. 
7. To what extent do you believe that the Internet has helped women to raise their 
awareness about women’s rights? Elaborate. 
8. To what extent do you find using the Internet make men think differently about 
women? What issues have they alerted them to? 
a) In comparison to the life before the conflict when access to the Internet 
was non-existent, is the Internet usage leading men to think differently 
about women? If yes, how? 
b) In what ways, if any, is internet usage changing men’s idea about women? 
Elaborate. 
9. To what extent do you believe that the Internet have helped men to raise their 
awareness about women’s rights? Elaborate. 
10. To what extent has the Internet usage changed your idea about women? 
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Category 6: Tribe Chiefs:  
• Preliminary Questions: 
1. How old are you? 
• Main Questions:  
Equality & Iraqi society: 
1. To what extent do you think that women possess natural rights in the same way 
as men do?  Discuss. 
2. Do you believe any discrimination against women exists in society?  Elaborate. 
Satellite TV Channels 
1. Do you watch Satellite TV channels?  
2. What do you think about the way women are depicted in Satellite TV 
programmes? 
a) Do you think that Iraqi women should look at women in these 
programmes as role models? 
b) Do you believe that Iraq should take these countries’ path in regard to 
women’s status? 
3. What is your impression about the fact that Iraqi women are exposed to Satellite 
TV channels? Why? 
4. To what extent do you believe women must or mustn’t watch Satellite TV 
programmes?  Elaborate? 
5. To what extent do you think that women’s exposure to Satellite TV programmes 
is helping or harming the society? In what sense? 
a) Do different ideas that women are exposed to through Satellite TV 
programmes have a positive or negative influence on the society? 
b) Is it a source of conflict between women and men, on different levels? 
Within family for example? 
c) Or between women and religion and Iraqi traditions? 
d)  Or between women and the state? 
e) Or between women and the political parties? 
6. If you believe that inequality exists within society, do you think the introduction 
of Satellite TV channels is helping women towards achieving equality with men? 
If yes, how? 
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7. To what extent do you find watching Satellite TV channels make women think 
differently about themselves as a woman? What issues have they alerted them 
to? 
a) In comparison to the life before the conflict when access to Satellite TV 
was non-existent, is women’s exposure to Satellite TV channels leading 
them to think differently about what it means to be a woman? If yes, how? 
b) In what ways, if any, is watching Satellite TV channels changing 
women’s idea about what it means to be a woman? Elaborate. 
8. To what extent do you believe that Satellite TV channels have helped women to 
raise their awareness about women’s rights? Elaborate. 
9. To what extent do you find watching Satellite TV channels make men think 
differently about women? What issues have they alerted them to? 
a) In comparison to the life before the conflict when access to Satellite TV 
was non-existent, is men’s exposure to Satellite TV channels leading 
them to think differently about women? If yes, how? 
b) In what ways, if any, is watching Satellite TV channels changing men’s 
idea about women? Elaborate. 
10. To what extent do you believe that Satellite TV channels have helped men to 
raise their awareness about women’s rights? Elaborate. 
11. To what extent has watching Satellite TV channels changed your idea about 
women? Elaborate.  
The Internet 
1. Do you use the Internet?  
2. What is your impression about the fact that Iraqi women are exposed to the 
Internet contents? Why? 
3. To what extent do you believe women must or mustn’t use the Internet?  
Elaborate? 
4. To what extent do you think that women’s exposure to the Internet is helping or 
harming the society? In what sense? 
a) Do different ideas that women are exposed to through the Internet have a 
positive or negative influence on society? 
b) Is it a source of conflict between women and men, on different levels? 
Within family for example? 
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c) Or between women and religion and Iraqi traditions? 
d) Or between women and the state? 
e) Or between women and the political parties? 
5. If you believe that inequality exists within society, do you think the introduction 
of the Internet is helping women towards achieving equality with men? If yes, 
how? 
6. To what extent do you find using the Internet make women think differently 
about themselves as women? What issues has it alerted them to? 
a) In comparison to the life before the conflict when access to the Internet 
was non-existent, is the Internet usage leading women to think differently 
about what it means to be a woman? If yes, how? 
b) In what ways, if any, is the internet usage changing women’s idea about 
what it means to be a woman? Elaborate. 
7. To what extent do you believe that the Internet has helped women to raise their 
awareness about women’s rights? Elaborate. 
8. To what extent do you find using the Internet make men think differently about 
women? What issues have they alerted them to? 
a) In comparison to the life before the conflict when access to the Internet 
was non-existent, is the Internet usage leading men to think differently 
about women? If yes, how? 
b) In what ways, if any, is internet usage changing men’s idea about women? 
Elaborate. 
9. To what extent do you believe that the Internet have helped men to raise their 
awareness about women’s rights? Elaborate. 
10. To what extent has the Internet usage changed your idea about women? 
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Category 7: Journalists:  
• Preliminary Questions: 
1. How old are you? 
2. Which media institution do you work for? 
 
• Main Questions:  
Equality & Iraqi society: 
1. To what extent do you think that women possess natural rights in the same way 
as men do?  Discuss. 
2. Do you believe any discrimination against women exists in society?  Elaborate. 
3. Do you have any activities in regard to women’s rights? If yes, explain. 
Satellite TV Channels 
1. Do you watch Satellite TV channels?  
2. What do you think about the way women are depicted in Satellite TV 
programmes? 
a) Do you think that Iraqi women should look at women in these 
programmes as role models? 
b) Do you believe that Iraq should take these countries’ path in regard to 
women’s status? 
3. What is your impression about the fact that Iraqi women are exposed to Satellite 
TV channels? Why? 
4. To what extent do you believe women must or mustn’t watch Satellite TV 
programmes?  Elaborate? 
5. To what extent do you think that women’s exposure to Satellite TV programmes 
is helping or harming the society? In what sense? 
a) Do different ideas that women are exposed to through Satellite TV 
programmes have a positive or negative influence on the society? 
b) Is it a source of conflict between women and men, on different levels? 
Within family for example? 
c) Or between women and religion and Iraqi traditions? 
d)  Or between women and the state? 
e) Or between women and the political parties? 
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6. If you believe that inequality exists within society, do you think the introduction 
of Satellite TV channels is helping women towards achieving equality with men? 
If yes, how? 
7. To what extent do you find watching Satellite TV channels make women think 
differently about themselves as a woman? What issues have they alerted them 
to? 
a) In comparison to the life before the conflict when access to Satellite TV 
was non-existent, is women’s exposure to Satellite TV channels leading 
them to think differently about what it means to be a woman? If yes, how? 
b) In what ways, if any, is watching Satellite TV channels changing 
women’s idea about what it means to be a woman? Elaborate. 
8. To what extent do you believe that Satellite TV channels have helped women to 
raise their awareness about women’s rights? Elaborate. 
9. To what extent do you find watching Satellite TV channels make men think 
differently about women? What issues have they alerted them to? 
a) In comparison to the life before the conflict when access to Satellite TV 
was non-existent, is men’s exposure to Satellite TV channels leading 
them to think differently about women? If yes, how? 
b) In what ways, if any, is watching Satellite TV channels changing men’s 
idea about women? Elaborate. 
10. To what extent do you believe that Satellite TV channels have helped men to 
raise their awareness about women’s rights? Elaborate. 
11. To what extent has watching Satellite TV channels changed your idea about 
women? Elaborate.  
12. Do you exploit Satellite TV channels to support women’s equality?  Do you have 
any initiatives using Satellite TV channels to help achieve equality for women?  
If yes, how? If not, why? 
    The Internet 
1. Do you use the Internet?  
2. What is your impression about the fact that Iraqi women are exposed to the 
Internet contents? Why? 
3. To what extent do you believe women must or mustn’t use the Internet?  
Elaborate? 
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4. To what extent do you think that women’s exposure to the Internet is helping or 
harming the society? In what sense? 
a) Do different ideas that women are exposed to through the Internet have a 
positive or negative influence on society? 
b) Is it a source of conflict between women and men, on different levels? 
Within family for example? 
c) Or between women and religion and Iraqi traditions? 
d) Or between women and the state? 
e) Or between women and the political parties? 
5. If you believe that inequality exists within society, do you think the introduction 
of the Internet is helping women towards achieving equality with men? If yes, 
how? 
6. To what extent do you find using the Internet make women think differently 
about themselves as women? What issues has it alerted them to? 
a) In comparison to the life before the conflict when access to the Internet 
was non-existent, is the Internet usage leading women to think differently 
about what it means to be a woman? If yes, how? 
b) In what ways, if any, is the internet usage changing women’s idea about 
what it means to be a woman? Elaborate. 
7. To what extent do you believe that the Internet has helped women to raise their 
awareness about women’s rights? Elaborate. 
8. To what extent do you find using the Internet make men think differently about 
women? What issues have they alerted them to? 
a) In comparison to the life before the conflict when access to the Internet 
was non-existent, is the Internet usage leading men to think differently 
about women? If yes, how? 
b) In what ways, if any, is internet usage changing men’s idea about women? 
Elaborate. 
9. To what extent do you believe that the Internet have helped men to raise their 
awareness about women’s rights? Elaborate. 
10. To what extent has the Internet usage changed your idea about women? 
11. Do you exploit the Internet to support women’s equality? Do you have any 
initiatives using the Internet to help achieve equality for women?  If yes, how? If 
not, why? 
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Category 8: Women’s Rights activists. 
• Preliminary Questions: 
1. How old are you? 
2. What organisation do you belong to? 
 
• Main Questions:  
  Equality & Iraqi society 
1. According to article 14 of the new Iraqi constitution, Iraqi citizens are equal 
before law without discrimination based on gender; do you think this article has 
been implemented properly? If yes, in what sense? If not, what are the obstacles?  
2. What were/are your plans to help implement the article 14 of the new Iraqi 
constitution? Explain. 
  Satellite TV Channels 
1. Do you watch Satellite TV channels?  
2. What do you think about the way women are depicted in Satellite TV 
programmes? 
a) Do you think that Iraqi women should look at women in these 
programmes as role models? 
b) Do you believe that Iraq should take these countries’ path in regard to 
women’s status? 
3. What is your impression about the fact that Iraqi women are exposed to Satellite 
TV channels? Why? 
4. To what extent do you believe women must or mustn’t watch Satellite TV 
programmes?  Elaborate? 
5. To what extent do you think that women’s exposure to Satellite TV programmes 
is helping or harming the society? In what sense? 
a) Do different ideas that women are exposed to through Satellite TV 
programmes have a positive or negative influence on the society? 
b) Is it a source of conflict between women and men, on different levels? 
Within family for example? 
c) Or between women and religion and Iraqi traditions? 
d)  Or between women and the state? 
e) Or between women and the political parties? 
 318 
6. To what extent do you think the introduction of Satellite TV channels is helping 
women towards achieving equality with men? Explain. 
7. To what extent do you find watching Satellite TV channels makes women think 
differently about themselves as a woman? What issues have they alerted them 
to? 
a) In comparison to the life before the conflict when access to Satellite TV 
was non-existent, is women’s exposure to Satellite TV channels leading 
them to think differently about what it means to be a woman? If yes, how? 
b) In what ways, if any, is watching Satellite TV channels changing 
women’s idea about what it means to be a woman? Elaborate. 
8. To what extent do you believe that Satellite TV channels have helped women to 
raise their awareness about women’s rights? Elaborate. 
9. To what extent do you find watching Satellite TV channels make men think 
differently about women? What issues have they alerted them to? 
a) In comparison to the life before the conflict when access to Satellite TV 
was non-existent, is men’s exposure to Satellite TV channels leading 
them to think differently about women? If yes, how? 
b) In what ways, if any, is watching Satellite TV channels changing men’s 
idea about women? Elaborate. 
10. To what extent do you believe that Satellite TV channels have helped men to 
raise their awareness about women’s rights? Elaborate. 
11. To what extent has watching satellite TV changed your idea about women? 
12. Do you exploit Satellite TV channels to achieve your goals?  Do you have any 
initiatives using Satellite TV channels to help achieve equality for women?  If 
yes, how? If not, why? 
  The Internet 
1. Do you use the Internet?  
2. Do you exploit the Internet to achieve your goals?  Do you have any initiatives 
using the Internet to help achieve equality for women?  If yes, how? If not, why? 
3. What is your impression about the fact that Iraqi women are exposed to the 
Internet contents? Why? 
4. To what extent do you believe women must or mustn’t use the Internet?  
Elaborate? 
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5. To what extent do you think that women’s exposure to the Internet is helping or 
harming the society? In what sense? 
a) Do different ideas that women are exposed to through the Internet have a 
positive or negative influence on society? 
b) Is it a source of conflict between women and men, on different levels? 
Within family for example? 
c) Or between women and religion and Iraqi traditions? 
d) Or between women and the state? 
e) Or between women and the political parties? 
8. To what extent do you think the introduction of the Internet is helping women 
towards achieving equality with men? Explain. 
9. To what extent do you find using the Internet makes women think differently 
about themselves as women? What issues has it alerted them to? 
a) In comparison to the life before the conflict when access to the Internet 
was non-existent, is the Internet usage leading women to think differently 
about what it means to be a woman? If yes, how? 
b) In what ways, if any, is the internet usage changing women’s idea about 
what it means to be a woman? Elaborate. 
10. To what extent do you believe that the Internet has helped women to raise their 
awareness about women’s rights? Elaborate. 
11. To what extent do you find using the Internet makes men think differently about 
women? What issues have they alerted them to? 
a) In comparison to the life before the conflict when access to the Internet 
was non-existent, is the Internet usage leading men to think differently 
about women? If yes, how? 
b) In what ways, if any, is internet usage changing men’s idea about women? 
Elaborate. 
12. To what extent do you believe that the Internet have helped men to raise their 
awareness about women’s rights? Elaborate. 
13. To what extent has the Internet usage changed your idea about women? 
 
 
 
